Special Orders
NO. 32

SIR: Last evening Lieutenant Ralph, Company M, First Missouri Cavalry, returned from a scout through Pemiscot County to the Arkansas line. He has with him 25 men of the same regiment. He <ar62_454> heard of a body of rebels, under Colonel Kitchen, who were reported to have been at Osceola on or about the 23d instant. Citizens report them to number from 200 to 300. I suppose from 100 to 150 would be about the number. It seems to have been a concentration of guerrilla bands for the purpose of conscripting.

They crossed New River at Hornersville, in the southern part of Dunklin County, and were last heard from at that point. Colonel Kitchen is reported to have relieved General McRae. The command of Lieutenant Ralph could not cross the swamp and New and Little Rivers without wading and swimming 12 miles, therefore he thought it unadvisable to attempt it. This band could be broken up by an expedition from Cape Girardeau or Bloomfield. From the fact that our cavalry force is now reduced to 53 men for duty, no successful move can be made from this point. This and Pemiscot Counties are not at present troubled with guerrillas.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIR: On my arrival here I found everything in very good condition. The country is clear of guerrillas, as far as I can hear, for near 40 miles. I can hear of the rebels on Crowley's Ridge, at a place called Scatterville. It is said Colonel Kitchen has returned from General Price and ordered all these scattered bands to report to him, and that they have gone. They may be getting together to go to Price. Freeman is there also. I will leave here on Monday with a small escort. I think I will be able to stop jayhawking by making their friends responsible for these acts. This I will do. Those who feed and conceal them are as mean as they are, and I will kill them if the thing does not stop. If Union men are robbed I will take their property to pay for it. If they kill a loyal man, I will kill 5 of them. I believe by this course it can be stopped. I would like to know the result of my visit to Saint Louis as soon as you know how it terminates. In the mean time, I will go on as usual and do all the good and as little harm as I can to the United States and as much harm and as little good as I can to the rebels.

Yours, respectfully,

Sol. Kitchen has returned from Price's army with 30 officers. He claims to be a brigadier-general, and in a speech at Jonesborough a few days since said he was in command of all rebel forces east of White River. The disposition of his brigade is as follows, as nearly as can be ascertained: Five hundred under Freeman on White River, near Augusta: 150 under Captain McKee, near Jonesborough; 150 (doubtful) under Reves, on Cherokee Bay. This embraces all the rebel force south of us on Crowley's Ridge, except about 40 men under Gibins, Bolin, Williams & Co., at Blue Land. McRae has gone west of White River from Augusta. Scouts, refugees, &c., all agree in this.

I wish to inform you of the following dispatch just received from Captain Leeper. He says Captain Johns has just returned from below; he met with the enemy in force, but says that Reyes, Kitchen, and Freeman have been camped on the [east]side of Black River 12 miles below Pocahontas, and that they crossed to the west side of the river on last Monday; they were said to be about 1,000 strong, and that it was the general talk in the country that they were going to attack Patterson. Also that Kitchen had men on Currant River last week to secure forage, preparatory to a move on this place. Captain Johns was some 10 miles above Pocahontas on Black River. I think, however, that this report is rather exaggerated and sensational, but will be on the alert.

On the 17th, I passed through Barnesville and encamped 6 miles from Current River, on Hen Peck Creek.

18th, took the main Alton road and encamped 3 miles north of Eleven Points River. After having encamped I sent a scout of 20 men, under the command of Lieutenant Blain, to look after some desperadoes on Spring Creek. About 4 miles from camp he discovered some 8 or 10 in an old house and charged upon them. The rebels fired a volley from the windows and door, killing 1 private (Thorpe), of Company D, and wounding Sergeant Burks, of the same company; then availing themselves of some rugged bluffs in the rear of the house, made their escape, abandoning their horses.

On the morning of the 19th, I scoured the hills of Eleven Points River, and then proceeded through Alton to Frederick's Fork, and encamped.

On the 20th, I took the Alton and Pocahontas road and moved forward in the direction of Pocahontas. About noon we came upon a rebel conscripting party. The advance charged upon them, killing 8, wounding 1 mortally, and capturing the remainder of the squad. On the afternoon of the same day a man was shot and killed by the advance guard in attempting to make his escape from a house. We encamped at McElroy's, 10 miles from Pocahontas.

On the morning of the 21st, I moved forward to Pocahontas. Finding nothing there I took the road to Warm Sulphur Springs, then a due west course to Eleven Points River, and encamped.

On the 22d, I marched toward the headwaters of the Fourche à Thomas. Moving up that creek, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon we encountered Captain Payton with his company of horse-thieves and murderers. He drew up in line and fired upon the advance without effect, when, bringing my men forward at the gallop, I ordered a charge. The men went into them with a yell, killed 11, and pursued the remainder for miles across the hills, dispersing them in every direction. I encamped at this place for the night.

On the 23d, took the Van Buren road, passed through that place and Patterson, arriving at this post on the evening of the 25th, having been absent nine and one-half days, traveled more than 300 miles, killed 21 guerrillas, captured 11 prisoners, some 12 horses, some arms, &c. The whole country through which I passed is infested with small bands of guerrillas, their principal headquarters being in Oregon County, and commanded by Captains Payton, Long, and Evans. Kitchen, Freeman, and Love have concentrated for some purpose a force of about 500 men east of Black River, near Jacksonport. Reyes has about 90 men 15 miles southeast of Pocahontas. No considerable force can exist for any length of time north of Pocahontas, there being no forage in the country. It was <ar61_643> with the utmost difficulty that I could obtain forage for 100 men by taking all I could find. There was about 15 feet of water in Black River at Pocahontas. I could not find any of Colonel Livingston's scouts; they never came up to the Missouri line.

Commanding Post of Pilot Knob.

DEAR GENERAL: I have 110 men in camp on Village Creek, and 200 more ready to go in camp as soon as I can procure supplies for them. Corn and wheat are very scarce in this country. Colonel Clark has come here with orders from the War Department which has caused a great deal of confusion; is telling all of my men that he has been confirmed as colonel of my regiment, and that he has orders to take command of them wherever he finds them. What shall I do with him? General McRae has an order signed by Gallagher revoking my orders and authorizing him to retain all the soldiers in his district. I wish you would inquire into this matter. It will be impossible to get men out of here under such conflict of orders; in fact, men are very loth to undertake to come out. Unless you wish me to remain here and so direct I shall come to you as soon as grass is sufficient to <ar62_1098> support horses, there being no chance to get forage north of Arkansas River. If Clark was out of here and no conflict with my orders I could very soon get up a good command, one strong enough to capture all the Yankees north of Arkansas River. I have been busily engaged in trying to suppress jayhawking.

I am, your obedient servant,

Refugees from Arkansas report that Kitchen has concentrated from 1,500 to 2,000 men at and near Jacksonport, for an attack on Batesville or a raid north.

But few guerrillas left on the border.

Your letter of the 28th is at hand.(*) Can you not move a portion of the forces at Yellville forward to Buffalo Creek, where there is forage, and where they can support the forces at and cover Yellville, thereby reducing the number of horses at Yellville so that they could be well fear? Or you can keep a portion of your command in the field on Buffalo, sending out detachments with six days' rations, <ar63_12> with instructions not to run down their horses while out, but feed and recuperate them. Do the best you can for the Government and people. If you are attacked by forces largely superior, fight and maneuver, keeping where you can get forage and supplies, attacking the enemy whenever you can. Send through your prisoners and wounded the first good opportunity. Kitchen, whom you spoke of as brigadier-general, is, I think, an old captain of bushwhackers, whose wife lives in Lebanon, on the Rolla road.

Cape Girardeau.

[ar61_644 con't]

On the 27th, Lieutenant Chitwood learned, by passing himself for a secessionist, that Captain Evans, a bushwhacker, had 5 or 6 men following him and watching his movements. He left a sergeant and 5 men on side of the road, and about 11 o'clock, 27th, 3 men passed along on his trail; they were fired upon, and I man killed, which proved to be Lieutenant Roberts, of Captain Evans' company; the other 2 made their escape. The lieutenant says that he learned, from what he considers reliable information, that Colonel Freeman's command, numbering 500 or 600 men, was near Pocahontas at the time; says that he could not obtain any forage of any consequence in Oregon County; that his horses were broken down, several of them having to be abandoned; that he believed that after the fight on the 26th that all gangs of rebels in Oregon County made for Freeman's command, and that they would not return without a sufficient force to overpower him, and that he therefore returned; his command reached Gasconade last night. The lieutenant reports that Captain Chambers and several of the men's horses were shot, so as to be worthless; that he captured 2 horses which were not injured, which were rode in by men of his command, whose horses were wounded and had to be abandoned.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

J. J. GRAVELY,

Springfield, Mo.

The force that was in front of Yellville was not so strong as reported. It was the old command of General McRae, and some portions of Freeman's command; no force can move into this State now without marching nearly 100 miles without forage, unless it is transported from the place of starting. Three prisoners captured at Batesville by Freeman's command have arrived here and say that the enemy were informed that our forces had left Yellville. The enemy might have anticipated occupying the place without a fight or capturing <ar63_52> train supplies, &c. Prisoners that we have taken say the enemy tried to cross the Arkansas and could not, and were compelled to come north of the mountains. General Ketchum is reported to be in command, but my belief is that this officer's name is Kitchen, a guerrilla captain who formerly resided in Lebanon, in this district. Official reports of officers in command of recruits are forwarded today by mail.

Shortly after it commenced raining and became very dark, the darkness and rain continuing without intermission all night. Having awakened about 3 o'clock in the morning, I held some conversation with Lieutenant Phillips, and then laid down again, with my head resting on the root of a tree. I had been in this position only about five minutes, when a man within a few feet of me demanded of me to surrender the entire command. I answered negatively, in rather rough language, upon which he immediately fired on me with a shotgun. I returned the fire with my revolver. At this the men sprang up with their arms, when the guerrillas, to the number of about 100, opened on us with shotguns and pistols, and as they were within 5 or 10 feet of us, we had no alternative but to right, notwithstanding the great disadvantages under which we labored. The fight lasted some five minutes, when the rebels commenced to retreat. I then ordered my men to fall back to the house, after which the rebels came up and carried off their dead and wounded. I also removed mine to the house. I felt that as it was impossible to see 5 feet it would be folly for me to pursue them in the woods, and also felt confident that they would renew the attack at daybreak, but in this I was disappointed. I then buried Lieutenant Phillips, who was killed after being shot down three times, and left Sergeant Handy, who was mortally wounded, in the hands of the women of the house, who promised to bury him. I then started to join Captain Montgomery, carrying my wounded on litters. The road lay through a very bad swamp for about 6 miles, yet the men cheerfully bore the fatigue of carrying their wounded comrades, and think that it was the most laborious march I ever made. After proceeding in this way some 6 miles, I found some teams and pressed them to convey the wounded. Inclosed I send a list(*) of the killed and wounded. Of the loss of the enemy I can form no correct estimate. The ground was covered with blood, and a large number of guns and pistols were picked up in the morning.

I was joined by Captain Montgomery, with his command, on the evening of the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th we marched to a point a few miles above Barfield's Point, where we embarked on the steamer Darling, arriving at this post about 11 p.m., on the 8th. The wounded have been well cared for, and will in all probability recover. Captain Montgomery's command while detached had no general engagement; he lost no men either killed or wounded, but killed some 6 or 7 guerrillas.

I cannot speak too highly of the energy and perseverance of the men of my command, displayed on this fatiguing march, nor of the desperate courage with which they met and repelled a fierce night attack made by overwhelming numbers of confident desperadoes. The question may occur as how they managed to elude the pickets. This can only be answered by the fact that they were thoroughly <ar61_874> acquainted with every part of the ground, and it was so dark, and the rain falling in such torrents, that they could neither be seen or heard. One of the sentinels near me did not hear them until I received the summons to surrender. I suppose the attacking party to have been under the command of Colonel Clark, of the Seventh Missouri (Confederate) Cavalry.

I send you copies of several papers(*) captured by Captain Preuitt, on the dead body of the guerrilla Captain Williams. By these you will see about how many different commands they have in this section of country. I suppose all the parts of regiments and the various guerrilla bands will foot up about 1,000 men. I have been warned by rebel sympathizers, citizens of influence, that it is the intention of Colonels McGee, Kitchen, Clark, and Freeman to make a combined attack on this post; but this I do not fear, as with the command here I think I can repel any force which they can bring to bear. They may attack the town for plunder, but I give them the credit for better judgment than to make an attack on the fort. I think that the only way that these bands can be successfully operated against is to send out a heavy cavalry force from Cape Girardeau and Bloomfield, going down between Little River and the Saint Francis, at the same time a co-operating force of cavalry from this post to move down on this side of Little River. You will notice that one of the inclosed orders is dated at the Blue Cane. This is a dense canebrake, in the center of which is one of the rebel camps. They here have a store supplied with stolen goods, a distillery, several houses, and a large amount of stock. I think the restrictions on shipping goods to this section should be more severe, as I am led to believe that the rebels receive half of their supplies from professed good and loyal merchants.

The three companies of the First Missouri Cavalry stationed here are very poorly mounted. To be effective, they should have at least 50 new horses. The proper requisition was made some two months ago, but the Cavalry Bureau has failed to furnish them. I will send to Saint Louis on the first boat all the guerrilla prisoners that can be convicted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I have information that I think reliable that Kitchen and Clark are now concentrating quite a force at Gainesville. All the citizens are ordered to remove at once. I am satisfied we may expect a raid soon on our outposts. I have scouts out and will endeavor to keep you advised. I-think they mean mischief either at Patterson or Bloomfield.

I beg your pardon for not having answered your telegram in regard to howitzers at Fort Curtis. I am not acquainted with the position of defense at Patterson, and therefore telegraphed on receipt of your first dispatch to Major Wilson, commanding at Patterson, for advice. Major Wilson sent written instructions which I somehow did not receive. Telegraphed to him again this morning on receipt of your second dispatch. Am awaiting an answer. Will inform you as soon as Major Wilson answers.

Advised all the outposts in regard to Kitchen and Clark's force gathering. Entertain no fear; they are on the lookout. Major Wilson has four good companies; will fight four times their number and whip them. Can re-enforce them in two hours from here. The company at Centreville should not be taken away from there; it is a most important point, an opening for the rebels to come in. Do not be alarmed; I think it is no more than a scare, to which we down here are used. Major Wilson thinks the howitzers could be used to advantage in case of an attack.

General Rice came to this creek just after I had received the above report, 7.30 o clock. We agree that we are between 5 and 6 miles from your headquarters; the junction is 4 miles still farther. We <ar61_763> propose to move at daylight. I send with this orders to Colonel Ritter to move at daylight. The road is good; there are two small creeks to cross; bottoms narrow (a few yards wide), but may (probably will) require some work. The crossing here is covered with water, and promises to last well. Lieutenant Porter places but little confidence in the prisoner's statement, but I feel satisfied that a considerable part of the enemy's force has got between us and Camden. The remainder may be camped to-night on the upper crossing of the White Oak, in which case we will be before them at the junction in the morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

There are some five or six fords between Van Buren and Doniphan, and many places that the river can be forded at low water. All roads crossing Currant River between Van Buren and Doniphan are very bad and scarcely ever traveled. I am not sufficiently well acquainted with the country to give you a satisfactory reply in regard to fortifications, but I would suppose that a location might be selected within 1 mile of Doniphan for fortifications. Captain Johns has just returned from Cherokee Bay. He reports guerrillas all gone below to join Kitchen. He did not find one on the trip. There was a mistake in regard to the howitzers. I understand Lieutenant Pope, in charge of them, that [he had] the boxes, or carriages, of guns and one caisson, but I found it not so. The boxes had been taken off some days ago, but the workmen not having the required lumber, a delay was occasioned. At the last issue of ordnance a new kind of cartridge was received not fitting the boxes, being 1 ½ inches longer than the old ones, projected that far out at the top of the box, making them unserviceable.

Relying on having enough artillery in Battery G, Second Missouri, since ordered to Cape Girardeau, I ordered an alteration in the boxes to suit the ammunition, which has not yet been accomplished; therefore it is impossible for those howitzers to move to-day as promised. In order to do the thing as quickly as possible, I shall, if not countermanded before mail time this noon, send Lieutenant Pope with the boxes to Saint Louis arsenal for exchange if possible; if not, then for the speediest repair. I would suggest to have those two companies, L and K, First Infantry, Missouri State Militia, at present at Benton Barracks, sent down here to re-enforce this post, so that Centreville and Patterson might be sufficiently re-enforced by cavalry from this post, besides some more infantry, there being only one company, one being exclusively used for artillery in Fort Davidson here, and would for garrison duty be far more advantageous, and secure this part of the country against any force that can be brought <ar63_166> from below. However, as it is, I entertain no fear. I wish guerrillas would show themselves in force so as to give us a chance to whip them to hell, from where they can rise no more.

Major H. Ewing
A A Genl. Marmaduke staff

Scouts returned from Poplar Bluff, Doniphan, and below, on the 15th instant; from direction of Bloomfield the 20th instant; scout also returned yesterday from Reeves' Station and below. Scout west from Patterson returned to day. All report that guerrilla bands have gone below to join Kitchen and Reves.

I learn to-night that Jeff. Thompson is at Harrisburg, but have not learned his force. Kitchen is near Gainesville with a scattered force of about 200. Bolin is between Clarkton and Kennett with about 100. It appears that they are plundering the citizens there in general. This information is not from any of my scouts. I expect some of them in to-night or in the morning. They are about Jonesborough and Chalk Bluff. Saint Francis 100 yards wide and swimming.

<ar63_283>

I have rebel information that their plan is to send two brigades of cavalry and two of mounted infantry to North Missouri, a column of guerrillas and Seventh Rebel Missouri on Rolla, to operate with the conspirators' organization here. Our troops are scattered over the State. Please let me have the Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry.

Some of my scouts are in and report Jeff. Thompson at Harrisburg with about 100 armed men and conscripting citizens; part of Bolin's men on West Prairie laying in supplies; Kitchen at home; Clark on Grand Prairie with about fifty men. Saint Francis River impossible to cross except in dug outs; overflows the banks for half a mile, but falling. It might be crossed in five or six days.

Yours, &c.,

Soon after these events the guard of the train was re-enforced by one regiment of cavalry, one regiment and one battalion of infantry, and two pieces of artillery, a detachment of which force (Sixth Kansas Cavalry) fell in with the head of my regiment while moving to the place ordered. Toward dark intelligence was received from my scouts that the enemy had encamped near the forks of the Prairie D'Ane and upper roads, and by your order Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell was withdrawn. On the morning of the 18th instant, leaving Kitchen's regiment and a detachment of the Third to cover our front and flank, I marched with Greene's regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell; Burbridge's regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Preston; a small detachment of Jeffers', under Captain Cobb, and Harris' battery, numbering in all 486 men. I came on the enemy in rear of Cabell's brigade at 9.30 o clock. Dismounted and placed Harris' battery in position on the extreme right of our line. At 10 o'clock this battery opened on the enemy. The remainder of my command was held in reserve. The enemy heavily engaged our left and center, and at 10.45 o'clock I was ordered to its support. Moving rapidly for a half mile through a thick forest, we tore down a rail fence, formed in an open field under a heavy fire of musketry, and advanced steadily across it, passing another fence. The left and center were hotly pressed, when I advanced at the double-quick with loud cheers, passed the line, delivered several well-directed volleys, and charged the enemy through burning woods and a dense smoke. He gave way, closely pressed, but reformed under cover of his train. Upon this position we advanced, firing; charged the train, with great slaughter to the enemy; who abandoned his artillery on the field and again formed behind the huts, fences, and timber of an adjoining plantation. With cries of "Here's your mule!" and cheers for Missouri, his line was again broken by our advancing force. Once more he rallied in the thick brush beyond this plantation, through the bare fields of which we charged and drove him in confusion. Again another stand was made on the crest of a steep hill, which was as quickly carried at the charge. No further resistance was now made to our victorious line, which scattered and drove the enemy in every direction, until by your order the pursuit was stopped. The command rallied and moved by the left flank across the road to cover the removal of the captured train, animals, artillery, and arms. Toward sunset we remounted, brought up the rear, and marching all night reached the position left in the morning at daylight. In this action three of my regiments were absent.

Where all behaved so gallantly it is difficult to determine upon whom to bestow praise. Every man did his duty. There was no straggling, no plundering. For eighteen days we marched and engaged the enemy, and notwithstanding the loss of sleep for three nights previous to this action, the men bore themselves with cheerfulness <ar61_829> and fortitude. To Capt. Benjamin Hooper, of my staff, I am under great obligations for valuable services on the field. His gallantry, as it has always been, was conspicuous. Privates Coleman, Company H, Fourth Regiment, and Kimbrough, Company F, Third Regiment, who acted as orderlies, executed my commands with intelligence and bravery. To the impetuosity of our advance is to be attributed my light loss in killed and wounded, a list(*) of which is herewith annexed.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

There is no present danger to Bloomfield; the water is too high. Colonel Tyler sent me the following telegram:

Colonel ROGERS:

Major Wilson reports that rumor places Kitchen and Reyes between Cherokee Bay and Gainesville trying to raise a force to attack Bloomfield and break up the court. I start an expedition in that direction to-morrow.

I do not believe it, but have scouts on the Saint Francis, and he cannot cross that stream until the water falls, and I should know it long before that. Last night the same rumor reached here, but I give no credence to it. I am watching and have no fears. I told you last night I thought the rumor wild. We cannot et to Bloomfield, nor neither can any enemy. We are all right at Bloomfield. Have no fears on our account.

I now deployed Burbridge's regiment as skirmishers, with intervals of one pace; brought up one gun of Lieutenant Zimmerman's section (the other piece was disabled); ordered Captain Cobb to press the enemy's right and heavily engage the enemy; he held.his position for half an hour and then gave way, fighting as he retired; drove him half a mile. At this time Brigadier-General Marmaduke appeared on the field with, a section of Hughey's battery and Monroe's regiment, of Cabell s brigade. The latter he moved to the right. The action was recommenced with greater vigor, when the enemy again gave ground. The whole line was advanced and the reserve brought up within 75 yards of the first line. The artillery did effective service--silenced the enemy's battery and broke its support. He retreated to the river, leaving his dead on the field. Our right was advanced to within 75 yards of his line, when it gave way. The field was ours. General Marmaduke then ordered the command to withdraw 2 miles to a point naturally inaccessible, and which was strengthened by hasty works of timber.

The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, his officers and men, was particularly distinguished in this action for coolness and gallantry. Lieut.' G. W. Scott and Lieut. Jesse McCaleb, Company I, deserve especial notice. Lieutenant Scott's charge with the reserve skirmishers was brilliantly and timely done. He cannot be too highly commended for bravery. Captain Cobb, of Jeffers' regiment, was also distinguished for gallant and useful conduct. He handled his squadron with skill and courage, and is a modest and meritorious officer. Greene's and Kitchen's regiments, though not actively engaged, were constantly under fire and behaved well. Lieutenant Zimmerman deserves to be mentioned for the manner in which he served his gun and for the gallant behavior of himself and men. Loss, 1 lieutenant, 1 non-commissioned officer, and 4 privates killed; 2 officers and 21 privates wounded. Retired in rear of Cabell's brigade at midnight; detached Greene's regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, to hold the position; marched until daylight to the southwestern edge of Prairie DAne, near Fulke's, 16 miles.

April 5, Campbell skirmishes with the enemy in front of our works; holds him in check all day; loss, none. April 6, brigade takes position on the edge of the prairie and assists in constructing Fort McKay; Campbell fights the enemy again and falls back 4 miles; no pursuit. April 7, Captain Porter, Fourth Regiment, with 150 men, relieves Campbell; engages the enemy, who retires; Lieut. G. W. Scott, Company I, Fourth Regiment, with 1 man charges 10 of the enemy; routed them, capturing arms and equipments. April 8, Porter still skirmishes with the enemy, who does not press him; is relieved by Brigadier-General Cabell. April 9, no fighting today. April 10, occupy our position at the works--the extreme left; enemy appears on the upper edge of the prairie; moves on my <ar61_833> left; skirmishers engage; sent a section of Harris' battery to support the left; enemy opened with artillery; an artillery fight takes place; enemy advances his line; drives in my skirmishers; is driven back in return; again takes the position, which he retires from at night; vedettes and skirmishers remain under arms all night; loss, 3 horses killed and 1 man wounded. April 11, enemy appears in force and offers battle; skirmish with him on the left; is engaged in the center by Brigadier-General Shelby; at 5 p.m. all the troops retire; brigade ordered to occupy the position and delay the enemy; relieved General Shelby's skirmishers at dark, 1½ miles in front of the works; covered the front with mounted and dismounted skirmishers; occasional shots during the night. April 12, sunrise, Steele's army appears on the prairie; skirmishing along the whole line; the enemy is held in check until 9.30 o'clock, when he advances on our left in large force and cannonades heavily; our forces are gradually withdrawn, and at 10.30 o clock the works are abandoned; Captain Roberts, Company I, Fourth Regiment, brings up the rear; enemy follows and attacks him, using artillery; rearguard fighting continues for several miles, when the enemy withdraw; encamped at sundown on Prairie De Rohan; detachment under Lieut. G. W. Scott attacks the enemy's rear; no loss; distance marched, 12 miles. April 13, marched at 10 a.m. 8 miles on the Munn's Mill road; ordered to the Anderson road, and halted two hours at Centreville; marched all night and reached Munn's Mill at 3 a.m.; distance, 30 miles. April 14, moved at daylight in the direction of Camden; got in front of the enemy, and bivouacked at Gulley's, 10 miles from Camden; flankers fell in with a small force which they attacked and dispersed; distance, 26 miles. April 15, ordered into position at 7 a.m. to cover the retreat of Shelby, who was falling back before the advancing column; remained until Shelby retired; moved off all the brigade, except Lawther's regiment and a section of Harris' battery; engaged the enemy at Gulley's, and kept up a retreating fight for 3 miles; turned to the right and moved over to the Camp Bragg road, 6 miles of Camden; Lawther's regiment remained in front of Steele's column, fighting until dark and passing through Camden; loss, 4 wounded; distance, 10 miles. April 16, drove in the enemy's pickets on Prairie D'Ane road; captured 3; Lieut. Ambrose W. Hulett charges a detachment 2 miles of Camden, capturing 2; several escapades to-day; ordered at 4 p.m. to move to the Prairie D'Ane road and attack Thayer's rear, who was moving into Camden; marched rapidly and found the enemy's rear guard 4 miles of town; pursues it in a trot, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, commanding Greene's regiment, in front; overtake the enemy at Mrs.------- and skirmish with them; Campbell moves on, driving in the rear guard; falls upon enemy's outpost; routs it; runs it into town; captures colors and camp equipments; column moved back to its first position on Camp Bragg road; loss, 1 captain (staff officer), captured; distance, 15 miles. April 17, several escapades in sight of the enemy's camp to-day; Lieutenant-Colonel Ellison on outpost captures 3 prisoners; Lieutenants Scott, Company I; Hulett, Company G, Fourth Regiment, and Lieutenant Smith, Company E, Jeffers' regiment, each commanding detachment, charged the enemy south and west of Camden, inflicting loss; loss, 1 man wounded; scouts report train and escort just passing the enemy's vedettes on the upper road; Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, Third Regiment, and Captain Jacobs, Fourth Regiment, «53 R R--VOL XXXIV, PT I» <ar61_834> ordered to pursue; escort is re-enforced, and consists of two regiments of cavalry, two regiments of negroes, regiment and battalion of white infantry, four pieces of artillery; Campbell ordered to lie in ambush; he falls in with Sixth Kansas Cavalry and drives it; train moves on and encamps on Prairie D'Ane road near Poison Spring; General Marmaduke reaches camp at 5 p.m. and orders command to :move; marched to Campbell's position and return by order, reaching camp after midnight; loss, 2 men wounded; distance traveled, 18 miles. April 18, marched at 7 a.m. and reached the enemy near Poison Spring; Lieutenant-Colonel Ellison and detachment of Greene's regiment are left to cover our old position; brigade dismounted and held in reserve; Harris' battery takes position on the extreme right; enemy presses our left; brigade ordered to its support; advanced at double-quick; charges and routs the enemy; enemy makes several stands, but is each time charged and routed with slaughter; whole train captured; brigade withdraws and reaches camp at sunrise the day following; loss, 1 officer and 1 private killed, 1 officer and 13 men wounded; distance traveled, 37 miles; Greene's and Burbridge's regiments and Cobb's detachment alone engaged. April 19, moved over to the Wire road and bivouacked at Mrs. Walker's, 12 miles of Camden, picketing the right and center; distance traveled, 15 miles. April 20, in statu quo. April 21, enemy attacks my picket on Wire road; is repulsed. April 22, all quiet. April 23, marched at 8 a.m. in advance to make a demonstration in force; deploy skirmishers this side of bridge on Two Bayous and advance main force in line; drive the enemy across the bridge; light skirmishing; shelled the enemy; withdraw and occupy former Position at 8 a.m.; distance, 20 miles. April 21, in statu quo. April 25, enemy's cavalry drives in my picket, which being re-enforced repulsed the enemy and pursue him to the bridge; loss, 1 man captured and 1 wounded; sent Kitchen's regiment to Champagnolle to guard pontoon bridge. April 26, advanced Greene's regiment 6 miles. April 27, marched at 10 a.m. to White Hall, on Ouachita River, where Wood's battalion reports. Sent Lawther's regiment to guard prisoners captured by Brigadier-General Fagan: crossed the river with Greene's and Burbridge's regiments, Wood's battalion, and Harris' battery; swam horses; up all night. April 28, marched all day and night; sent Wood's battalion to report to Major-General Price; halted one hour within 6 miles of Princeton. April 29, still marching; got on enemy's right flank; got on his rear between Tulip and Princeton; Jeffers' regiment and Wood's battalion in my front; attack enemy's rear on Jenkins' Ferry road; sent Harris' battery forward; again attacked the enemy, who halts on the Saline River; skirmish with him until dark; distance traveled from Wire road to Saline River, 90 miles, without feed for horses or rations and sleep for men; occasional skirmishing all night; no loss. April 30, ordered forward with Greene's and Burbridge's regiments to feel the enemy; begun skirmishing before sunrise; drove the enemy 500 yards; he halts and fights hard; is forced back half a mile; general engagement now begins; enemy in force; still drive the enemy slowly, fighting two hours without support; infantry comes up; for full account see report of May 5; loss, 6 privates killed, 1 major killed, 9 officers, 4 sergeants, and 30 privates wounded; bivouacked near the field. May 1, marched in direction of Arkadelphia, 25 miles. May 2, marched to within 12 miles of Arkadelphia; distance traveled, 13 miles; campaign ends. <ar61_835>

Recapitulation: Killed, 3 officers, 12 men; wounded, 13 officers, 84 men. Skirmishes, 16. Engagements, 3. Distance marched by main body, 435 miles.

Very respectfully., your obedient servant,

Maj. H. Ewing
A.A.Genl.

<ar61_915>

All quiet, as far as I could learn, west of Pocahontas and Doniphan.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

1. Gordon’s, Shank’s and Smith’s regiments, Elliot’s Hunter’s and Pickler’s battalions and Collin’s battery of four guns. Elloit’s battalion (150 men) absent on scout and not included.
2. Burbridge’s, Greene’s, Jeffer’s, Kitchen’s and Lawthers regiments, and Harris battery of four guns.
3. Six guns

Captured a rebel mail and the carrier ;nothing of importance in it. Destroyed a supply of medicines stored up by the rebels valued at about $10,000; captured and destroyed many shotguns, rifles, and a considerable amount of ammunition. Got into Gainesville just twenty-four hours after Kitchen, with several of his officers left there. Officers and men had a pretty severe time, but stood it well. Our only casualty was the wounding of Captain Johns by some guerrillas while he was in camp at Scatterville, Ark. I think the country has been more thoroughly scoured this time than ever before.

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

[ar61_938 con't]

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIR: I am just in possession of some information from Freeman's and McRae's rebel command, brought by Isaac Goacher, refugee, just come in from Lawrence County, Ark. He tells me Freeman himself is wounded, and is on Crowley's Ridge, but his and McRae's <ar64_165> command is on this side of Black River. He says he saw quite a lot of them as he came up all along the road in squads, from 20 to 60 in each squad. The last he saw was on Eleven Points River. They all were moving in this direction in different routes. He says he knows he must have seen some 500 or 600 men, all mounted: horses very poor, the men mostly bad clothes, and armed with all kinds of arms. He said Kitchen also had a squad separate, and that everybody is trying to get away. The rebels will escort their friends as far this way as they think they are safe. They also send their wives up here to live again. The widow Lennox has moved up in this country, or she started up here. He says she had some 5 or 6 negroes and some 5 mules and horses. Kitchen, with 25 men, escorted her as far as Jack's Fork. I don't know where she is. I have not heard from her yet in this county. Her farm is near Lake Spring. I sent Captain Benz yesterday morning down in that county to look around. This county seems full of bushwhackers, 3 and 4 together, but have done no mischief yet that I can learn. I have the boys out every day. I will try and do the best with them I can. I apprehend no danger of an attack here, but they will pester the county a great deal. People are all working finely and trying to make crops. I will protect them the best I can with my small force.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

Hiller, at Bloomfield, has information that the enemy are gathering quite a force at Cane Island, about 100 miles southeast of Bloomfield and across the Saint Francis. The river is not fordable, or we would cross and attack, but we think they will bridge it. We have scouts watching every move, and hope they will cross, when we will seize the bridge and debate with them. They are Kitchen's men and say [they] mean to join McRae. We shall know soon. Let me urge again that Hiller be relieved from court-martial, as he knows everybody there and can get information when a stranger could not.

We have been taking few prisoners. We have only taken 2, and the excuse of the men taking them was that they were unarmed. I have just examined them, and find them the worst of men. They say they were sent up here by Kitchen and told to bring back a horse when they returned from furlough; it was a great mistake to capture them. My men shall work.

On the 21st, we marched over the strip of land between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi rivers, where we met our boats, and on the 22d, were on our way to Vicksburg, where we arrived on the 24th - - the 13th and 19th corps in the meantime going to New Orleans—As we were too late to carry out the plans of Gen. Sherman, we remained at Vicksburg resting after our rough and arduous campaigning of ten weeks’ of incessant work until June 4th, when Gen. [John S.] Marmaduke, now the Governor of Missouri, having planted batteries at Columbia, 150 miles above Vicksburg, was interrupting the navigation of the Mississippi.  Gen. Smith was ordered by Gen. [Henry W.] Slocum (164) (who was in command at Vicksburg) and who is so well known in Bath, as a Trustee of the Soldiers’ Home), to dislodge him, on our way to Memphis, where we were now going.

We left Vicksburg on June 4th and arrived at, or near, Columbia, (165) in the South Eastern….[corner] of Arkansas, on the evening of the 5th, disembarked, and bivouacked for the night; Gen.  Marmaduke, in the meantime, withdrawing his batteries and troops from the bank of the Mississippi, and falling back into the interior. The battle we were now destined to fight, was so insignificant as compared with the many then being fought through-out our country, that I have scarcely seen a reference to it in print, and yet it was very important to those engaged in it.  On the morning of the 6th we started in pursuit of Marmaduke, It was then raining hard. We soon found our enemy in a good position for checking our advance, on the bank of a beautiful lake (“Lake Chicot”) along which the road wound. Our troops were at once spread out in line of battle, and artillery and musketry firing commenced, and for two hours the work of death went on. We could see the confederate ambulances passing to and fro over their field, carrying off the wounded. Some of their cannonballs striking the lake, performed a series of ricochets, bounding away over the surface until lost to view, throwing up a line of water spouts in their progress.
There was no particular maneuvering in this battle - - it was a fair stand up fight, opened by artillery on both sides, and so continuing with the musketry firing of our infantry, who gradually worked up to the enemy, and drove them from their position, when they fled, not again to stand. We had about thirty killed, and seventy wounded, and Marmaduke probably about the same number.(166)
Once during the progress of the fight. General Smith and staff got into an exceedingly dangerous position in the direct focus of a battery of three guns. Simultaneously their balls came; a 12-pound shot struck at our horses heels, another passed with a fearful ring under their necks, striking the ground at their feet, splashing both horses and riders with mud, and at the same second of time, a shell burst directly above our heads. When the next discharge from this battery came, we were about one hundred yards out of range, watching the contestants, and I doubt if one hundred yards were ever passed over in quicker time. As the ball splashed the mud under our horses, I heard a voice near by, say; “Whew! there goes a ball through Burns’ horse,” and I thought “it might have been.”
One of our men found upon the field, a silver spur with General Marmaduke’s name on it. As we were burying our dead, we found by the side of one of our dead soldiers, lying behind a stump, the remnants of forty cartridges, showing that before death overtook him he had fired that number of shots. After driving the enemy from our path, burying our dead, and gathering up our wounded, we marched to “Lake City,’ (167) quite a pretty little village on the bank of Lake Chicot, where we encamped for the night. Next day we marched to our boats again, and arrived at Memphis two days later, on the evening of the 9th.
164.  Henry Warner Slocum (1827-1894) came west with the Federal XI and XII Corps in the fall of 1863. He commanded the XX Corps in the Atlanta campaign and the march through Georgia. He later served three terms in the U.S. House of Representatives.

165.  Columbia does not appear on any modern Arkansas maps. On maps of the Civil War period, it is shown in extreme southeastern Arkansas near the Juncture of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

166.  The skirmish occurred near Lake Chicot (also known as Old River Lake) on June 6, 1864.

167.  Present day Lake Village.
 
 

I now marched with the full battery and Lawther's and Greene's regiments to Leland's, 1 ½ miles below. This position was an exposed one. We went into battery and awaited the enemy's approach. He came down in line of battle, crescent shaped, with two marine-boats, one gun-boat, and a transport. I engaged the fleet, which held its position, maneuvering for near two hours, when it passed on. The gun-boat was disabled, the marine-boat Diana roughly handled, with many killed and wounded, and the transport penetrated in many places.

Once more I limbered up and moved in a gallop back to Columbia; went into battery there, and at once engaged the gun-boat Romeo. She was quickly disposed of; struck seventeen times; greatly damaged; got out of the way, and has not since made its appearance before my batteries.

Before leaving camp on Bayou Mason I sent Captain Jacobs, Company F, Fourth Regiment, with a detachment of 40 men, down the river to make a reconnaissance, and with orders to board a transport if opportunity offered. On the morning of the day of the operations herein reported he seized a yawl near Ford's Landing and successfully boarded and captured the steamer Lebanon, upon which he found large quantities of goods, stores, &c. He burned the boat.

After the second engagement at Columbia I bivouacked at Sanders', on the river, and marched at 2 o'clock that night back to Gaines' Landing. There I found three gun-boats, which I avoided engaging for want of ammunition, but whose fire I drew by- sharpshooters while I moved my column by a circuitous road and struck the river 10 miles above. This occupied the day of the 25th, upon which no transports appeared.

On the 26th, I attacked a large transport in sight of a gun-boat. Struck her several times, but am not informed of the damage done her. On the same day I received an order from you to return to camp, which I reached at night. On the 27th, I marched with the brigade to Parker's, on Bayou Mason. On the 28th, encamped on Old River Lake, near Ditch Bayou. On the 29th, I moved with Burbridge's, Jeffers', and Kitchen's regiments to Smith's plantation, 4 miles above Sunnyside, on the Mississippi, and immediately attacked a passing transport, which was struck many times, but got safely off.

At daybreak on the 30th, I attacked the transport Clara Eames; cut her escape-pipe and penetrated her boiler. She made signs of distress; came ashore and surrendered. She was loaded with cotton. <ar61_952> I stripped her of everything valuable, and two marine-boats coming in sight burned her to the water's edge. I brought off 15 prisoners and? negroes.

I at once engaged the marine-boats, and after a short action drove them back to their station on the east bank of the river. An hour after I fired into a transport, doing her little damage for want of proper ammunition. An iron-clad now came up and shelled my position for some time. I did not reply with my guns, but forced her to long range with sharpshooters. On the same night I returned to camp.

On the 31st, a detachment of Cabell's brigade, with Hughey's four-gun battery, commanded by Colonel Monroe, was ordered by you to report to me. During the night of the 31st, I posted Lawther's regiment at Smith s plantation with instructions to fire into the enemy, while I moved with Monroe's command, Greene's regiment, and Pratt's battery to Columbia. Monroe supported the batteries. Greene's regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, covered the approach at Luna.

Early on the 1st instant I attacked the gun-boat Exchange. The action was short. She was badly disabled in her hull and boilers, and with difficulty got to the east bank above out of range, where she lay crippled until towed off. No other boats appeared in the river that day. Lawther successfully amused two gun-boats below, which anchored off and shelled him all day. At daylight June 2, I engaged the marine-boat Adams, one gun-boat, and a transport. They made no fight of consequence; were often struck, but passed on. Soon after the iron-clad Benton, or Louisville [the Monarch], a formidable-looking craft, hove in sight lashed broadside to a large transport. I posted sharpshooters on the bank and at once opened fire on the transport. The iron-clad fired but two shells when she was forced to close her ports by reason of the heavy fire of the sharpshooters. She cut loose from the transport, fell back a mile, and shelled us with 64-pounder rifles, doing no damage. The transport was badly hurt. Again the marine-boat Adams, two gun-boats, and one transport appeared.- They were engaged, but cautiously kept on the other bank, showing no inclination to fight. They were struck often. I now returned to camp. On the 3d and 4th no boats appeared. The river was blockaded:

In these actions I engaged 21 boats of all descriptions, of which 5 gun-boats and marine-boats were disabled, 5 transports badly damaged, 1 sunk, 2 burned, and 2 captured. My loss was I subaltern and 5privates slightly wounded. No guns or horses were hit. Captain Pratt, commanding battery, deserves especial mention for his uniform skill, coolness, and courage. Captain Hughey was particularly successful in the action with the gun-boat Exchange. The supports to the batteries behaved with their accustomed bravery. The gallantry and enterprise of Capt. John W. Jacobs, Company F, Fourth Regiment, cannot be too highly praised. This officer has on all occasions exhibited marked ability and distinguished courage.

These operations have demonstrated the practicability of blockading or seriously interrupting the navigation of the Mississippi River with field artillery. I venture the opinion that with 18 and 24 pounder rifles no boat could safely pass a battery, except an ironclad. In every instance except one my guns were without protection; were run right up to the edge of the bank. The effect of the <ar61_953> enemy's fire is shown in the damage done me. That serious injury has been inflicted upon him is evident from the fact that after the first day's fighting few or no boats passed without convoys--now none, except the fleet under Major-General Smith.

<ar61_984>

The enemy's infantry debouched from the timber at the foot of Old River Lake and at once deployed to my right. The skirmishing was general along the whole line. Burbridge and Ellison fell back slowly before the increasing force, halting often and checking the advance.

My main line, consisting of Greene's and Jeffers', reduced by heavy details, was formed in the grove which skirted my camp (Red Leaf), while Lawther's regiment supported the artillery sent 2 miles to the rear at Ditch Bayou. I determined to skirmish with the enemy to this bayou and there make a stand. The enemy was discovered to be in large force. Major-General Smith commanded, and parts of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps, numbering <ar61_985> some 8,000 infantry, with 700 cavalry and twelve cannon, were in my front. My force did not exceed 600 men and six cannon.

My skirmishers behaved with admirable coolness; made a stand at Red Leaf, where I used one gun. This brought the timid enemy to a halt, and taking advantage of it I retired my line and artillery a quarter of a mile. From this point I retired skirmishing and withdrew my force to the north side of Ditch Bayou--a deep cut 3 miles in length and running from Old River Lake to Bayou Mason. Here four guns of Pratt's battery were placed next to the lake and covering the bridge, supported by Greene's regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, and then Lawther's regiment, supporting Hughey's section, Lieutenant Cortright commanding. Jeffers' regiment formed the extreme right. Burbridge and Ellison were held in reserve.

The enemy advanced to within 700 yards, his line extending over a mile, supported by a column of infantry moving up the levee road on the lake, when we opened with artillery. The effect was visible. His line and column were thrown into confusion. The firing now became general along the line and continued for an hour, when the enemy massed and attempted to turn my right. Kitchen's regiment was sent to its support and the artillery ordered to fire by the right oblique with canister. The enemy gave way, but again renewed the fight with determination. Thus was the action continued until 2.30 o'clock, against odds of seven to one. My ammunition was exhausted, my rear not secure, and I determined to withdraw. Jeffers' and Kitchen's regiments and Pratt's battery were retired, then Lawther's, then Cortright's section. Burbridge's regiment was now advanced and covered the retiring troops. After engaging the enemy for half an hour Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell was likewise withdrawn. I now mounted Lawther's regiment, behind which Burbridge retired. Everything moved off slowly and in good order. Colonel Lawther brought up the rear, skirmishing. I moved to Parker's, on Bayou Mason, 3 miles west of Lake Village, at which place the enemy made his bivouac.

At 9 o'clock of the 7th, my scouts reported the enemy moving around the lake toward the river, and I at once sent Lawther in pursuit. He harassed him to his boats.

My loss was light considering the heavy force we engaged--1 officer and 3 men killed, 7 officers and 26 men wounded; total, 4 killed and 33 wounded. There were 11 horses killed and 21 wounded. From prisoners captured I learn that the enemy's loss exceeded 250 in killed and wounded. Eight of the enemy were captured by my scouts.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain Preuitt, commanding at New Madrid, telegraphed me late last night that he had information that Kitchen with 800 men was at Osceola, on the Mississippi River. He said he did not know that it was reliable, but would be prepared. I think Kitchen may be there, and that is the reason they have tried to keep the line down, but I think his object is to interrupt navigation and seize some steamers with supplies. Will keep you posted as far as I can.

I have taken the liberty to send the following to Preuitt, at New Madrid:

Captain PREUITT:

I am inclined to think Kitchen is below you, and that is the reason they try so hard to keep the line down. I would suggest that you send reliable scouts below. Also send a party up toward Charleston each day, to meet my men, so as to keep the line up. I have 200 men between you and Charleston. If you get any further news let me know at once, and I will assist you with every man I can spare. Show your teeth.

J. B. ROGERS,

You will report with your command as soon as possible to Col. T. H. McCray, at Jacksonport, Ark.

By command of Brig. Gen. Joseph O. Shelby:

<ar64_668>

<ar64_392>

The following from Charleston:

Colonel ROGERS:

Citizens of Arkansas report Kitchen at Scatterville with 300 men, and still recruiting. Says he thinks they intend to attack this place. I have commenced building a stockade. Lieutenant Calvert, from the swamps, says Edwards has killed 9 guerrillas since he got into the swamps. I heard of 80 guerrillas yesterday 12 miles from here, going toward Sikeston; think probably but 40 were there.

The following from Bloomfield just received:

Colonel ROGERS:

Captain Dawson just in from Poplar Bluff. Could hear nothing from Shelby west. Everything quiet in Butler County. I have spies in Greene, Randolph, and Lawrence Counties. Will keep you advised.

One of the spies just in from Greene County, Ark., says Shelby is at Jacksonport, and force variously estimated from 2,000 to 5,000. Says they are shoeing their horses fast, and that the general talk is that the biggest raid of the war is soon to be made into Missouri. He says that report in North Arkansas is that Steele had surrendered to Price with 9,000. The people are made to believe it is so. Kitchen has ordered every man that has ever been in rebel service into camp at once. Most all have deserted their arms, and have either gone into camp or are hiding in the brush.

COLONEL: General Shelby directs me to say to you that he wishes General Orders, No. 2(*) (which you will find inclosed), rigidly enforced. He further directs that you cause to report to you all companies, detachments, and squads that have been ordered to do so on or before the 1st day of July. You will call in all your recruiting officers by that time and proceed as rapidly as possible in the organization of your brigade. Those men who have been furloughed to cultivate their crops will have had ample time to finish their work, and they must be called into camp and kept there. You will consolidate detachments and squads into full companies and hold them in camp in readiness for any orders that may be sent you. You will order all the men belonging to Kitchen's regiment proper to report to him (Col. S. G. Kitchen), and will recognize him as the commander of that regiment until the matter is definitely settled by orders from district headquarters. Colonel Kitchen will report to you with his command at such time as you may order.

Very respectfully,

I have just received the following dispatch from Bloomfield:

Lieutenant Cell is just in from Chalk Bluff and Lieutenant Byrne from Butler County. They neither saw nor heard of any rebels. The latest and most reliable information Lieutenant Cell could get was that Shelby did not intend making a raid this way. If he made a raid at all it would be farther west.

By letter dated June 29, Lieutenant Steele, acting provost-marshal, New Madrid, says: Kitchen, with 400 men, infests that vicinity, stealing, murdering, cutting the wires, &c.; that the condition is horrible caused by the misrepresentations of interested traders. Investigate and report upon the condition of Pemiscot County.

I did not employ Carpenter until he said that you had sent him to me. The cavalry from Cape Girardeau arrived here to-day. I have a scout party from here to-day; shall have another to-morrow, and the next day will move with all the troops that can be spared into Pemiscot County, and perhaps into Arkansas. I think Kitchen is below here with considerable force.

I have the honor to be, general, yours to command,

Commanding Saint Louis District, Saint Louis, Mo.

I think you should get up a considerable expedition into Arkansas, going as far as Kitchen's command, and breaking it up. In this I can send you about 300 men and two howitzers also, if needed, from Pilot Knob and Patterson, to join you between Bloomfield and Chalk Bluff. Telegraph me whether you think that the best line to operate on, and whether you will want this additional force, and when you will be ready. The object of the expedition would be to break up and demoralize Kitchen's force, and also to give a chance to many Union families in that part of Arkansas to get out, and the men to enlist.

I left Rolling Prairie, Ark., on last Friday, July 22, 1864. Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols, of Colonel Jackman's regiment of Confederate troops, of Shelby's command, was at the Prairie when I left, with between 200 and 300 troops of his regiment. This force was conscripting the citizens of that section into the rebel service. They conscripted me and sent me to the vicinity of Forsyth, Mo., with a conscripting party, where I deserted them and came immediately to Springfield. Before I left Rolling Prairie I saw Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols in person and conversed with him. He says it is the intention of Shelby to move north soon. I think he intends to make a raid when corn begins to ripen. There was a dispatch received by Colonel Nichols on the 21st instant from Shelby's headquarters, which are between Batesville and Jacksonport, Ark. The dispatch-bearer told me that there was a move on foot, and that the troops had marching orders. I saw Daniel Fullbright, formerly of Springfield. Mo., in Nichols' command. He is an officer in the rebel army, though I do not know his rank. I am an old acquaintance of his. He told me that Shelby had re-enforced his command by about 3,000 men since he crossed the Arkansas River with his old command of 1,200 men. Besides these troops it is reported that Kitchen, McCray, Freeman, and Love have about 4,000 men on the rolls of their commands in Northern Arkansas. The troops I saw of Shelby's command are well armed; most of them have two navy revolvers and a cavalry gun. Shelby's old troops are well-mounted; but take the whole command, conscripts and all, they are poorly mounted. The men say that a large number of horses are dying for want of food. All of Shelby's command is cavalry. His old soldiers are very well clothed; some have rebel uniforms, some none but citizen's clothes, and some are dressed in Federal uniforms. His whole command are living on half rations of unbolted wheat flour and beef, sometimes with salt, sometimes without it. They do not get any subsistence from their main army. The rebel officers say they are bound to make a raid into Missouri once a year, or the Missouri rebel troops will <ar84_459> desert them. Crops are very poor in Northern Arkansas, on account of severe drought. The rebels will have to move soon to get subsistence and forage. I saw Major Weaver, of Price's army, near Rolling Prairie just before I left. He says he left Price's army about the 10th instant, and Price is at Camden, Ark., with 16,000 infantry. Does not think he will move soon, though there is some talk of invading Missouri in the fall; also that Marmaduke is at the mouth of Arkansas River, with 4,000 men, and that Kirby Smith and Taylor are at Shreveport, La., with 18,000 troops.

Statement made before me this 29th day of July, 1864, at these headquarters.

«41 R R--VOL XLI, PT I» <ar83_642>

There is quite a large force in rear Bayou Des Arc under command of McCray. Shelby was expected at Searcy last Saturday. The country north and south of here is full of rebels, so much so that I am obliged to keep my men along the railroad to prevent its being torn up, and cannot scout as much as I would like to. Colonel Geiger informed me that he had telegraphed you in reference to the force in Austin last Friday. I have since learned that they passed north on Saturday, and <ar84_522> consisted of McCray's, Jackman's, and Kitchen's commands, and estimated at 800 men. Colonel Geiger received his information from one Major Skelton, as notorious an old rebel as there is in Austin. My informant saw them and knew them well. Says that he overheard them say that it was their intention to attack this place and destroy the road, but learning that the cavalry was here at that time, they had returned northward. They are pressing teams in and about Hickory Plains, to haul forage to some point not known. I should have received information from Hickory Plains Sunday, but it has not arrived yet. There are citizens in from there usually every day. None have been in that I can place any confidence in since Saturday.

COLONEL: In compliance with circular order from headquarters Department of the Missouri, dated August 5, 1864, I have the honor to submit the following report for the month of August, 1864, for the information of the general commanding:

First, there are no organized forces of the enemy within the district. Second, that portion of Arkansas north of the Arkansas River is known as the District of Northern Arkansas, and is commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph Shelby, with headquarters in the field at and south of Batesville, Ark. From the best information I can obtain General Shelby bears upon his reports and claims to have an aggregate force of 10,000 men, including one battery of four guns. I am unable to ascertain the whereabouts of more than 7,000, taking their own statements as to numbers, and these are disposed as follows: At and south of Batesville, Brig. Gen. Joseph Shelby commanding--Adams, commanding post of Jacksonport, McCray and Jackman (recently promoted from colonel), and Colonels Nichols, Schnable, Greene, Dobbin, Vaughan, Bond, and <ar85_60> Kitchen (given names not known), 3,000 men, mounted. In Izard and and Lawrence Counties, Colonel Freeman's command, extending from Mount Olive along Strawberry Creek to Powhatan, 3,000, mostly mounted. In Fulton County, near Bennett's Bayou, Colonel Tracy, 200 mounted. In Marion County, at Wickersham's Mills, near Yellville, Ark., Lieutenant Thompson, 100, mounted. In Carroll County, about Rolling Prairie, Capt. Marion Fullbright, 100, mounted. In Benton County, command of Maj. B. Brown, 150, mounted; command of Major Pierson [Pickler], 200, mounted. Total, 6,750 mounted. In my opinion 4,500 men will prove a fair estimate for General Shelby's entire effective force, and include all that are mounted, armed, and fit for duty. In addition to these my information is that Captain [Colonel] Freeman has and bears upon his rolls 2,000 unarmed conscripts. My information of the force of the enemy north of the district is limited. My opinion, based upon the reports that I have received, is that the whole number of the enemy that has passed north through the district since last spring exceeds the number that has returned by about 1,000 men. This includes 250 men of Quantrill's command that went north about the middle of April, and have not returned to my knowledge. These men are said to be commanded by one Dodd [Todd], and Quantrill is said to be sick with consumption.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. SANBORN,

According to the latest information I have there is a force of some 250 rebels in Dunklin County, south of Kennett, under Major Parrott, of Colonel Kitchen's regiment. I am moving forces against them from this post, Bloomfield, Charleston, and New Madrid. I shall endeavor to make Dunklin County a hot place for them.

H. M. HILLER,

COLONEL: Your communication dated yesterday is just received. It is impossible from the scarcity of forage and subsistence to concentrate my command except when on the move, and I have therefore encamped the different brigades composing it as follows, viz: McCray's brigade, eight miles east of this place on the Gainesville road; Dobbin's brigade, fifteen miles south of this on the Jacksonport road; Colonels Jackman and Freeman with their brigades on Spring River, fifteen miles north, and Shelby's brigade, under Colonel Shanks, at Smith-ville, twelve miles west. Colonel Kitchen, with 600 or 700 men, is encamped at Gainesville, and Colonels Lyles and Rogan are on Crowley's Ridge. Orders have been sent Colonel Lyles, who is in command of those two regiments, which are as yet unorganized, to move without delay to Gainesville, Greene County. Division headquarters have been established at Powhatan, on Black River.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. Fagan's division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. F. Fagan, to consist of Brig. Gen. William L. Cabell's brigade, Colonel Slemons' brigade, Colonel McCray's brigade, Colonel Dobbin's brigade, and Colonels Lyles' and Rogan's commands, and Captain Anderson's battalion.

II. Marmaduke's division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. S. Marmaduke, to consist of Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, jr.'s, brigade, Colonel Freeman's brigade, Colonel Kitchen's regiment, and Lieut. Col. R. C. Wood's battalion.

III. Shelby's division, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. O. Shelby, to consist of Colonel Shanks' brigade, Colonel Jackman's brigade, and Colonel Coleman's command.

IV. Major-General Fagan, with his command, will march to Fredericktown by Martinsburg, Reeves' Station, and Greenville.

V. Major-General Marmaduke, with his command, will march to the vicinity of Fredericktown to the right of the route designated in paragraph IV, varying from it from ten to thirty miles, or as nearly within these limits as may be practicable on account of the roads and forage.

VI. Brig. Gen. Joseph O. Shelby, with his command, will march to the vicinity of Fredericktown to the left of the route designated in paragraph IV, varying from it from ten to twenty miles, or as nearly as may be practicable, on account of the roads and forage.

VII. The major-general commanding the army will march with the center column, and the division commanders will report to the army headquarters at least once a day, and oftener if necessary. The center column will march as nearly as practicable eighteen miles per day.

VIII. The major-general commanding trusts that the division commanders will carry out all orders against straggling and plundering.

IX. All property captured from the enemy to be issued under directions of the division commanders, full reports of the same to be made to army headquarters. Prisoners captured will be immediately reported and held subject to orders from these headquarters.

By command of Maj. Gen. Sterling Price:

Shelby came to Powhatan on the 12th of September with about 4,000 to 8,000 men, all conscripts, very badly armed and very poorly clad, and deserting him. McCray came to Powhatan on the 13th of September with about 2,000 men. Kitchen's regiment is scattered from Gainesville, on Crowley's Ridge, to Chalk Bluff, sending out scouts to Grand Prairie, Mo. Bowlin, with nineteen men, was seen Sunday last seventeen miles north of Bloomfield. I got this statement from a reliable source.

I have been waiting for some reliable news from Bloomfield. Captain Smith has just arrived there from toward the Arkansas line, between Black River and the Saint Francis, and reports that a picket force which he left at the shoals of the Saint Francis on his return were driven in. Captain Smith thinks that there is a force approaching Bloomfield under Kitchen and Clark. The force at Bloomfield are all in hand. They have horses for the howitzers. I have taken every precaution to prevent their being gobbled. Have scouts and mounted patrols out on all the roads. Have ordered Captain Sells to fall back here as soon as he is convinced that an overwhelming force is approaching.

COLONEL: I reached this point last night with my command. I will encamp to-night six miles north of Dallas, in the direction of Patton. Colonel Jeffers and Colonel Slayback joined me last night. Colonel Kitchen is behind five or six miles; will join me to-night. The <ar85_954> verbal instructions of the major-general commanding to me at Pocahontas were that I should keep Fredericktown fifteen or twenty miles to my left on my march. Shall I adhere to those instructions, or shall I march direct to Fredericktown? I have sent a heavy scout in direction of Cape Girardeau and Jackson. Will receive information of enemy's movements on that flank and will advise you. I have no news.

Very respectfully,

From the records of this office it appears that the following regiments raised in the States west of the Mississippi River are now serving in the region east of that river:

From Arkansas: Infantry, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth. Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, <ar84_1057> Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-eighth--twenty-three regiments infantry. Cavalry, the First, Second, and Third--three regiments cavalry.

From Texas: Infantry, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth--twelve regiments infantry and Waul's Legion. Cavalry, the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, Seventeenth (dismounted), Eighteenth (dismounted), Twentieth, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-seventh, Thirty-second--thirteen regiments cavalry.

From Missouri: Infantry; the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth--six regiments infantry. Cavalry, the First and Second--two regiments cavalry.

The following regiments raised west of the Mississippi River appear to be serving in that region:

From Arkansas: Infantry, the Twenty-second, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-seventh--nine regiments infantry.

From Texas: Infantry, the Second, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-second--seven regiments infantry. Cavalry, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-third, and Thirty-fourth--seventeen regiments cavalry.

From Missouri: Infantry, the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Sixteenth--six regiments infantry. Cavalry, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth--five regiments cavalry.

The numerical strength of these regiments can only be approximated, as the returns of division generals do not give the regimental strength, and no recent rolls or returns have been received from many of the above. An estimate founded on examination of the latest rolls and returns from forty-one of these regiments gives an aggregate of 17,020, or an average of 4.15 to each regiment. Taking 400 to be a fair average, the following would be a recapitulation:

From Arkansas: Regiments east of Mississippi River, 26, estimated strength, 10,400; west of Mississippi River, 9, estimated strength, 3,600.

From Texas: Regiments east of Mississippi River, 25 and 1 legion, estimated strength, 10,300; west of Mississippi River, 24, estimated strength, 9,600.

From Missouri: Regiments east of Mississippi River, 8, estimated strength, 3,200; west of Mississippi River, 11, estimated strength, 4,400.

In addition to the above it is proper to state that information has been received in this office of the raising of twenty-three regiments west of the Mississippi, and now serving in that region. They have not yet been organized in orders. Fourteen appear to be from Arkansas, six from Texas, and three from Missouri. As nearly as can be ascertained their average strength is 580 men rank and file, making an aggregate as follows:

From Arkansas, 14 regiments, 580 each, 8,120; from Texas, 6 regiments, 580 each, 3,480; from Missouri, 3 regiments, 580 each, 1,740--13,340.

No regiments raised east of the Mississippi appear to be serving west of that river. As to the Louisiana regiments the records do not make discrimination whether they be raised east or west of the river.

S. COOPER,

<ar86_79>

Fagan's division had four brigades, under Generals Cabell and McCray and Colonels Dobbin and Slemons. Cabell's brigade had the following regiments: Morgan's, 500; Monroe's, 500; Hill's, 500; Gordon's, 500; Gunter's battalion, 200; Harrell's battalion, 200; Witherspoon's battalion, 200; Hughey's battery, five 6-pounders and one 12-pounder howitzer. In McCray's brigade were the following regiments: Coleman's, Crandall's, Reves', Baber's, and Anderson's battalion; no battery. In Slemons' were the following regiments: Crawford's, Wright's, and Second Arkansas, and Gentry's battery, two guns. In Dobbin's brigade were McGhee's battalion and Zimmerman's battery, two guns, one 6 and one 12-pounder. Marmaduke's division had two brigades, under General J. B. Clark and Colonel Freeman. Clark's brigade had the following regiments: Kitchen's, Greene's, Burbridge's, Lawther's, Jeffers', Wood's, and Slayback's battalion and Pratt's and Harris' batteries. I cannot learn anything of Freeman's brigade or Shelby's or Cooper's divisions. Fagan's adjutant-general is here wounded, but will give no information. It was Cabell's brigade, Fagan's division, and Clark's brigade, of Marmaduke's division, with Hughey's and Pratt's batteries, that did most of the fighting here. I placed Major Montgomery in command of the post here when I started to Fredericktown. I don't see the necessity of my staying here. I have no baggage here and would like to go to Saint Louis for it, if I am to remain here. I want to go to Kansas City the 1st of November and sooner if Price should get in there. Telegraph posts are being set to Fredericktown to-day, and as soon as we get the wire and insulators on the way the line will be put up.

The force at Glasgow consisted of six companies of Forty-third Missouri Infantry, detachment of Companies B and M, Ninth Cavalry Missouri State Militia; detachment of Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry; detachment Fourth Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, and two companies of citizen militia, numbering in the aggregate about 550 men, indifferently armed, and under the command of Col. Chester Harding, jr., Forty-third Missouri Infantry. The attack was made from the south side of the river at about 5 a.m. with artillery, which firing continued until about 1 p.m. This battery of four pieces was supported by about 1,500 or 1,800 dismounted cavalry, using long-range guns and operating principally as sharpshooters. Their especial purpose appeared to be to prevent our forces from approaching the steamer West Wind, lying at the levee, and to render it impossible for us to cross and recross the streets running at right angles with the river. Their sharpshooters were successful in killing 2 or 3 men, wounding others, and shooting 1 or 2 officers' horses. Their shells destroyed or injured such buildings as were in range, especially those situated near a line of rifle-pits which had been hastily prepared by the militia the day previous, and in which the militia forces were posted. At about 7 a.m. Clark's division moved on us simultaneously from the north and on the Boonville, Fayette, and Keytesville roads, speedily dismounted and encircled the town, with their flanks resting on the river. Three pieces of cannon were interspersed along their line and in position to concentrate their fire upon the rifle-pit. Our forces were posted as follows: The detachment of Thirteenth Missouri Cavalry, commanded by Captain Mayo, on the extreme right; six companies of the Forty-third Missouri Infantry, Major Davis commanding, on the front and center, and detachment of Ninth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, under Captain Hunter, on the left, making an extended line about one mile in length, with natural formation of the surface in our favor. The enemy advanced, skirmishing along the entire line, and in one or two instances undertook an assault, but were driven back to the shelter of houses, fences, &c. The militia and citizens in the rifle-pit aided materially in repelling the assaults referred to. A detachment of eighty-five men of Ninth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, commanded by Capt. S. A. Hunter, checked the advance of Lawther's entire regiment, on the extreme left, and held them at bay until the engagement ended.

The line which was at first established had been forced back upon the right and center gradually, until at 1 o'clock the forces were separated by only the width of village lots, our boys sheltered by the front fences and the enemy firing from behind those in the rear. At this juncture the enemy was observed to be concentrating for an advance in force, which, had it been consummated, would have proved very disastrous to the tired and hungry men and a resistance avail little or nothing. Eight hours of constant and determined fighting had passed; <ar83_431> the buildings containing ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster stores had been fired; the steamer West Wind was disabled by shells; every line of retreat was cut off, and every road covered by their artillery fire. Further resistance seemed futile to the officer in command, who (after reviewing the condition and position of his command, and obtaining intimations from the rebel commander that he would offer honorable terms) consented to surrender the place upon the following conditions, viz: The Federal troops to form line and move to a street designated with arms and their colors flying; the private property of both officers and men to remain in their possession; officers to retain their side arms and citizens to be undisturbed either in person or property. Both officers and men had been under a constant fire for nearly eight hours, and their conduct apparently unexceptionable. Second Lieut. George F. Simmonds, Sixty-second U.S. Colored Infantry, was shot dead while leading a detachment of soldiers to a favorable position for sharpshooting. He was absent from his command (proper)upon sick leave, but volunteered to accompany Colonel Harding as his aide, and after tendering his services was ordered to report to Colonel Harding for orders and duty. Captain Steinmetz, commanding one of the militia companies, was also killed. Captain Dusold, Company A, Forty-third Missouri Infantry, was wounded in the head, but will doubtless recover. The surgeon's report shows 8 killed and 28 wounded. The enemy's loss was much larger, several officers having been killed and many officers and men wounded. The property lost consisted of arms taken from our men and about 1,000 suits of cavalry clothing, which had been temporarily left at the place by Major Curtis, aide-de-camp to Major-General Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas. It was impossible to get near this property, or it would have been burned with other public property. The enlisted men were paroled by calling their names from the company books and administering the ordinary parole oath. Officers were delivered a written parole signed by order of Brig. Gen. J. B. Clark, commanding Confederate forces. General Clark permitted us to proceed by any route we might select to the Federal forces, and accordingly crossed us over the Missouri River. We marched via Little Saline, Arrow Rock, and La Mine River to Boonville. Many citizens and non-combatants joined us in our march from rebel rule.

I must testify to the uniform, kind, and gentlemanly treatment we received at the hands of the Confederate officers, among whom were Brig. Gen. J. B. Clark, Brig. Gen. Joe Shelby, Colonels Greene, Quan-trill, Jackman, Kitchen, Jeffers, Burbridge, Coleman, and Nichols, all Missourians, and most of them subordinate to Major-General Marmaduke.

No attempts were made to abandon the place either before or after the attack, positive orders from General Rosecrans having been received directing the garrison to remain there as assistance would soon be given. Under the instructions received no alternative was left but to fight whatever force might attack us, and to do the best possible thing under the circumstances. Colonel Harding's report will doubtless furnish full and official particulars and information.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully,

G. A. HOLLOWAY,

Commanding District of North Missouri.

I get the following additional from Major Williams, at Pilot Knob: Fagan's division had four brigades, under Generals Cabell and McCray and Colonels Dobbin and Slemons. Cabell's brigade was composed of Morgan's, Monroe's, Hill's, and Gordon's regiments, each 500 men; Harrell's and Witherspoon's battalions, each 200 men, and Hughey's battery, five 6-pounders and one 12-pounder howitzer. McCray's brigade was composed of Coleman's, Crandall's, Reves', and Baber's regiments, and Anderson's battalion. Slemons' brigade was composed of Wright's, Crawford's, and two Arkansas regiments and Gentry's battery, two guns. Dobbin's brigade was composed of McGhee's battalion and Zimmerman's battery, two guns, a 6 and 12-pounder. Mar-maduke's division had two brigades, under General J. B. Clark and Colonel Freeman. Clark's brigade was composed of the following: Kitchen's, Greene's, Burbridge's, Lawther's, Jeffers', and Wood's regiments, and Slayback's battalion and Pratt's and Harris' batteries. I cannot learn anything of Freeman's brigade or Shelby's or Cooper's divisions. Fagan's adjutant-general is at Pilot Knob wounded; will give no information.

On the 27th of August the Seventh Regiment of Missouri Cavalry with the remainder of Clark's brigade left Mount Elba, on the Saline River, and marched twenty miles; camped at Hagen's Mills. 28th, marched twenty miles and camped at Stony Point. 29th, marched sixteen miles and camped two miles south of Princeton. Here we turned all our wagons over but two. 30th, left Camp Princeton; marched ten miles and camped near Tulip. 31st, marched twenty-five miles.

September 1, marched seventeen miles. 2d, sixteen miles. 3d, fifteen miles. 4th, crossed the Forest Mountain and marched eighteen miles. 5th, this day we were rear guard; our road was very bad; did not reach camp until 12 o'clock in the night, having marched twenty miles. 6th, left camp at daylight; this day we crossed Arkansas River at Dardanelle and encamped on the north side of the river, having marched fourteen miles. 7th, marched seven miles and encamped on Illinois Bayou. 8th, passed through Dover and encamped, having marched twenty-three miles. 9th, marched twenty miles. 10th, marched twenty-five miles. 11th, marched twelve miles. 12th, this day we crossed White River Mountain; no water; marched thirty-three miles. 13th, remained in camp. 14th, marched eighteen miles. 15th, marched to Strawberry River; twenty-one miles. 16th, remained in camp. 17th, marched twenty-two miles and camped at Spring River. 18th, left camp on Spring River and marched to Pocahontas, thirteen miles, and commenced crossing Black River at 10 o'clock at night. By daylight we had crossed everything and marched three miles and camped. 19th, marched fifteen miles. 20th, marched twenty-five miles and crossed the Missouri line. 21st, marched twenty-five miles and camped at Poplar Bluff. 22d, marched eighteen miles. 23d, marched twenty-two miles and camped at Bollinger's Mills, on Castor. 24th, started on a scout with Colonel Jeffers' regiment (Colonel Jeffers commanding), and marched to Old Jackson, where we took the enemy by surprise. We reached Old Jackson just before sundown, having marched forty miles. We killed 2 and captured 13 prisoners and 25 horses. 25th, marched twenty-five miles and encamped at Patton. 26th, marched thirty miles, passing through Fredericktown. 27th, marched twelve miles to Pilot Knob. Our regiment was guard for train while the fight was going on at that place. 27th [28th], Federals evacuated Pilot Knob at 4 a.m. 28th and 29th, in pursuit of the enemy; marched thirty miles. 30th, marched thirty miles and camped at Sullivan's Station, on the southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad. <ar83_696>

October 1, marched twenty-five miles to Union, where we had a skirmish with the enemy. 2d, marched twenty miles and camped at Washington. 3d, marched twenty-five miles and camped at Hermann. This town we captured after a short fight. 4th, marched twenty-five miles. 5th, marched twenty-five miles on a scout. 6th, marched twenty miles and camped near Linn. 7th, marched twenty miles and camped within sight of the enemy's camp-fires at Jefferson City. Considerable fighting going on during this day. 8th, marched fifteen miles and camped at Russellville. 9th, this day we had a fight at New California. Pratt's [Hynson's] battery and this regiment were all that were engaged. 10th, marched twenty miles and camped at Boonville. 11th, at 12 m. this day the enemy was reported near Boonville. We were ordered out; the enemy had gained the position we were to occupy. We were ordered to dismount. We did so, and soon drove the enemy, and lay in line of battle during the remainder of the evening. 12th, we lay in line of battle last night and all this day until 4 o'clock, when we were ordered back to camp, and at 8 o'clock we were again on the road. We marched all night and only traveled twelve miles; camped, fed, and cooked breakfast. 13th, were sent on picket; relieved in the evening. This day we marched sixteen miles. 14th, left camp at daylight and marched to Arrow Rock, sixteen miles. At this place we crossed the Missouri River (Clark's brigade and Jackman's only). It took us until midnight to cross. We then moved in direction of Glasgow, distant sixteen miles. At daylight we could hear heavy cannonading, which afterward proved to be General Shelby from the south side of the river. At sunrise we attacked the enemy at the suburbs of the town and soon drove them into their fortifications. Finding it impossible to escape us he surrendered at 1 p.m. Here we captured between 700 and 900 prisoners and about 2,000 stand of small-arms. 16th, recrossed the Missouri, which took us all night. 17th, left the river at 1 o'clock and marched twenty miles in direction of Waverly and camped at midnight. 18th, marched eighteen miles and camped at Waverly. 19th, passed through Dover and camped near Lexington, having marched twenty miles. This night we were ordered to the front and lay in line of battle until midnight. Marched in the direction of Independence fifteen miles on the 20th. 21st, marched to Little Blue, where the enemy tried to stay our progress, but after a very severe fight we drove the enemy and followed him to Independence, where we camped, having marched twenty-four miles; seven miles of this distance we marched on foot. In this fight Davies' battalion, attached to this regiment, behaved very gallantly; saved one piece of Pratt's [Hynson's] battery, and driving the enemy from his position. 22d, this day a force under General Rosecrans attacked us in our rear. Here we fought until 10 p.m., and held the enemy in check, then fell back about ten miles. 23d, at sunrise we were in line of battle, as the enemy was fighting our pickets. At this place (Big Blue) we had a short and bloody fight and were compelled to fall back. Here Colonel Kitchen was wounded. At 2 p.m. the enemy attempted to capture our train by a flank movement on our left, but were driven back after a short skirmish. We fell back twenty miles and camped. 24th, marched thirty-five miles. 25th, this day the enemy attacked us about 9 o'clock, but Pratt's [Hynson's] battery did such good execution that the enemy were compelled to fall back. About 10 a.m. he again attacked us in force. After a short engagement the command on our right, being flanked by the enemy, gave way; then the left gave way also, leaving the center to receive the enemy's charge, and being overpowered were compelled to seek safety <ar83_697> in flight. The scattered forces were shortly rallied, and at 4 p.m. we again met the enemy. This time we drove the enemy, and in turn were driven by him, but held our ground and fell back at sundown and marched until 1 a.m. Here we burned our trains, having marched thirty miles. We marched again at 2 a.m. 26th, this day we marched sixty-two miles and camped near Carthage. The enemy was in our rear all day. 27th, marched twenty miles. 28th, this day Shelby fought the enemy back. This day we marched twenty-seven miles. 29th, crossed the corner of Arkansas and camped in Cherokee Nation. Marched this day thirty miles. 30th, marched fifteen miles. 31st, sixteen miles.

November 1, marched nineteen miles and camped at Cane Hill; got forage for our horses--the first in five days. Here we remained until the 4th, when we marched twelve miles and camped in the nation. 5th, twenty miles. 6th, eighteen miles. 7th, crossed Arkansas River and camped two miles south, having marched six miles. 8th, marched twelve miles. 9th, fifteen miles. 10th, fifteen miles. 11th, seventeen miles. 12th, fifteen miles. 13th, eighteen miles and camped near Perryville. Here we received half a pound of flour to the man--the first that we received in twenty-two days. 14th, remained in camp. 15th, marched sixteen miles. 16th, eight miles. 17th, marched twenty-six miles and camped at Boggy Depot. 18th, remained in camp. 19th, marched fifteen miles. 20th, fourteen miles. 21st, twenty-three miles; crossed Red River and camped in Texas. Here we drew forage for our horses---the first we received since we left Cane Hill, being seventeen days. Here we drew full rations of flour. 22d, marched seventeen miles. 23d, remained in camp. 24th, marched twelve miles. 25th, twenty-one miles. 26th, seventeen miles. 27th, fifteen miles. 28th, camped at Clarksville, having marched twelve miles. 29th and 30th, remained in Clarksville.

December 1, marched sixteen miles in direction of Laynesport. 2d, marched fourteen miles and camped near mouth of Mill Creek. 3d, crossed Red River at Laynesport and camped on north side of Red River, having marched seventeen miles. 4th, marched down Red River ten miles and camped near Cressville, at which camp we have remained to the present time.

Respectfully submitted.

[ar83_687 con't]

In pursuance of orders received from Brigadier-General Clark, commanding Marmaduke's brigade, I turned over my train at Princeton, excepting one wagon, and took the field on the 31st of August, marching in a northwesterly direction through a broken, mountainous, and thinly populated country, and struck the Arkansas River at Dardanelle on the 6th of September. On the same day I crossed the river and moved north and northeast through a country equally barren and broken without interruption; crossed White River fifteen miles above Batesville, and arrived at Pocahontas, on Black River, at midnight of the 18th of September. We swam this stream during the night, proceeded up its left bank fifteen miles and recrossed it, making our bivouac in Ripley County, Mo., on the 20th, just two miles from the Arkansas line. On the same night I was ordered forward to Poplar Bluff, which town I occupied on the following morning, the enemy in small force evacuating the day before, and in pursuance of orders made a reconnaissance of the country and of the enemy's position at Bloomfield. From Poplar Bluff my march was northward to Patton, thence west to Fredericktown, during which my flankers dispersed several parties of militia, killing and wounding 4, capturing 11, and sustaining no loss. Here two companies of my regiment were detached on recruiting service.

The morning of the 27th of September found me in Ironton, where preparation was made to assault the enemy's position at Pilot Knob, contiguous to this village. His work, consisting of an octagonal bastion mounting four 32-pounder guns and two field batteries, lay in the cleared bed of a valley, around which Shepherd's Mountain and Pilot Knob rose up like a wall. I dismounted at the foot of Shepherd's Mountain, advanced to its crest with skirmishers deployed, and was by order of the brigadier-general put in line in reserve, ordered to preserve distance of seventy-five yards, and to support the first line at discretion.

Our artillery opening from both mountains, I moved at 1 p.m. down the northern slope of the mountain exposed to a heavy artillery fire. My regiment kept admirably aligned and preserved the prescribed interval; reached the plain, whereupon, observing confusion in the advance line, I charged past it, rallying it on my flank, and gained a short distance of the fort, only to find our whole force broken and retiring. I now took cover about seventy-five yards from the work and rallied <ar83_688> parts of several regiments, reformed the line, supported the troops on my left (which were hotly pressed), and held this position until ordered off at dark by Brigadier-General Clark. The steadiness of my regiment in this action was conspicuous. Four times it was halted and dressed on the colors, and sustained its whole loss without discharging a gun. Lieut. Archibald M. Jones and Private Shepherd, Company F, deserve especial mention for gallantry, bearing the wounded body of the brave Major Bennett, of the Tenth, from the field. About one-half of the effective total of my regiment was alone engaged in the assault--145 men. My loss was 3 officers and 26 men killed and wounded, among the latter class of which was that fine soldier and gallant officer, Maj. James Surridge, who was dangerously wounded in the leg, and whose horse was killed under him while leading the left wing of his regiment.

During the night the enemy evacuated his works and was pursued on the following day and overtaken on the 29th by the advance, to whose support I was ordered up, but after several slight skirmishes he made good his retreat to Leasburg, on the southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad, where he intrenched himself. On the morning of the 30th my regiment was moved forward to make a demonstration on the enemy's position to cover the withdrawal of the main column. At 10.30 a.m. I drove in his outposts, made feints on his right and left, attracted the fire of his artillery, engaged him for two hours, and retired with a loss of 4 wounded, and joined the column at Sullivan's Station at midnight.

From this point I marched with the division through Saint Clair to Union, the county seat of Franklin County, where the enemy made a feeble resistance and evacuated the place. Continuing the march we occupied Washington, on the Missouri River, and on the 3d of October appeared before Hermann. My regiment was in advance. Three miles north of town Lieutenant Graves, Company A, charged the enemy's outpost and pursued it to the suburbs, where I dismounted and took position on the extreme right of our line. At sunset I was ordered by General Marmaduke to advance, the enemy opening with artillery. I moved in line to the center of the town at a double-quick, where I formed in column, advancing on the battery, which I at once charged, the enemy--an insignificant force with one 6-pounder--fleeing and abandoning his gun.

From the 4th to the 9th instant I marched with the column. On the 9th the enemy was reported pursuing, and I was sent to the rear two miles north of Russellville, in Moniteau County, and went into position with eight companies dismounted, Company B mounted in reserve, and Company A mounted to protect my left, which was exposed. Here I engaged the enemy warmly for forty minutes, when he attempted to pass to my rear by my left, and was gallantly charged by Lieutenant Graves and repulsed. I now fell back under cover of Company B, which was very creditably handled by Lieutenant McGuire, and took position on the left of the brigade, formed at Russellville. The brigade retired. Soon after the enemy appeared and opened with artillery and again attempted to turn my left but was defeated with loss. Falling back slowly I went into position two miles farther on and awaited the cautious approach of the enemy, whom my skirmishers constantly engaged. We were shelled at long range without harm, when throwing my regiment into column of attack and making feint to charge, the enemy retired, and taking advantage of his retrograde I continued the retreat, thus forming and maneuvering for the double <ar83_689> purpose of delaying his march and avoiding a charge in an open country by his superior cavalry. Pending these skirmishes he moved another column on our left, which struck our right flank (Marmaduke's division) at California, through which town I passed under fire of his artillery and formed one mile beyond in support of Hynson's battery, and finally moved into camp on the Boonville road.

During this day I was assisted by Capt. George W. Kerr, of General Clark's staff, and it gives me pleasure to mention the fine conduct of this excellent officer.

On the 10th of October I made my bivouac with the main army at Boonville, and was the next day at 12 o'clock ordered out on the Tipton road to meet the enemy, then skirmishing near town. I was placed in command of Marmaduke's brigade on the field, and formed it dismounted with a strong line of skirmishers. The enemy in the meantime drove in our mounted skirmishers, whom I rallied on the right to cover that flank and advanced my dismounted skirmishers firing. I now ordered a general advance and drove the enemy a mile, who in his retreat left his dead and wounded in our hands, and I occupied the ground lately held by him. I lay in line during the night and the day following; returned to our bivouac at sunset; marched all night and the next day, and reached the vicinity of Arrow Rock on the evening of October 13.

On the morning of the 14th I was ordered by Brigadier-General Clark to march with his brigade to Arrow Rock and cross the Missouri River. The crossing was effected at midnight, and a short time after sunrise we were upon the important town of Glasgow, fortified and garrisoned by 1,000 men. The brigade I commanded was in advance, and by the general's orders I left the main road and moved to the right, facing the town, while he moved Jackman's brigade by the main road. The enemy was visible half a mile in front of his works. I moved at a trot; dismounted rapidly; ordered Lawther's regiment to the right, above the town, to engage the enemy's cavalry and cut off his escape and communications; put Harris' battery, commanded by Lieutenant Williams, in position and opened fire.

My line was formed, with Greene's regiment on the right, commanded by Captain Johnson; Jeffers' on the left; Burbridge's on the right of the center; Kitchen's on the left of the center; and Davies' battalion in the center. A heavy line of skirmishers was thrown out. I was now ordered forward. The enemy fought stubbornly and took advantage of houses, fences, and every obstacle until driven at the charge into his works. We had gained a position near his intrenchments which seemed inaccessible, and while restoring our line he got possession of a building from which our right was ranch annoyed until Captain Polk, Company B, Third Regiment, gallantly dislodged him, but with heavy loss. The fire now slackened, when the enemy to avert the final assault surrendered. Though the loss in this engagement was especially heavy on Greene's regiment, its gallant conduct was equaled by the action of the whole brigade. Captain Crabtree, Lieutenants Yandell, Jump, and Puryear, of the Third, were severely wounded; Lieuts. Arch. M. Jones and McGuire (both of the Third), and Lieutenant Scott, of the Fourth, fell bravely, as as they had so often fought before, and deserve to be remembered as models of every soldierly virtue.

To Major Waddell and Capt. George W. Kerr, of General Clark's staff, I was greatly indebted for valuable aid on the field, and I cannot commend too highly the splendid gallantry and usefulness of the latter. «44 R R--VOL XLI, PT I» <ar83_690> Nor should I forget to name the uniform good conduct and bravery of Privates Shepherd, Company F, Third Regiment, and Ellis, Company F, of the Fourth, who acted as couriers during the action.

On the 16th of October we recrossed the river and joined the main army on the 17th, when General Clark again took command of his brigade. On the 18th, 19th, and 20th, I marched at the head of my regiment with the main column, moving westward toward Independence. On the morning of the 21st, the brigade being in advance, cannonading announced that the enemy whom General Shelby had driven from Lexington had made a stand, and about midday my regiment was turned from the main road to the right for the purpose of crossing Little Blue River below the bridge which was destroyed. I moved rapidly across the river, and had marched a short distance when it was ascertained that Lawther's regiment was routed. I dismounted about 150 men, formed across the road, and immediately engaged the enemy, who was right upon us. Williams' three-gun battery was unlimbered fifty yards behind my regiment. The enemy, who was in greatly superior force, vigorously pressed his advantage. He was twice repulsed, when he began to flank me both on the right and left. The moment was critical; no supports arrived. Directing my wings to fire by the right and left oblique I took charge of the battery, firing Nos. 1 and 3 on my flanks, and then ordered rapid volleys of blank cartridges to be fired (the position of my men prevented the use of missiles). It produced the desired effect. The enemy fell back and was charged by us. He now rallied and opened with artillery; again advanced and was again repulsed. The fight was thus continued between unequal numbers, my ammunition was exhausted, the fortitude of my men severely tried, when Kitchen's regiment reached the field. I put it into line and directed it to fire by volley. The enemy fled to return no more.

Great credit is due to Capt. Charles K. Polk, of Company B, who held the enemy in check on my left. Sergeant Woolsey, Company G, was conspicuous for gallantry during the action, and Private Shepherd, Company F, deserves especial notice for rallying his company and leading a charge against the battery.

I now marched to Independence and was ordered to picket the approaches to that town from the south and west. On the morning of the 22d I was notified by General Marmaduke to hold my position until relieved. An hour or two after artillery and musketry firing indicated that the enemy was driving our forces and was near town, and I accordingly retired my outposts one mile, only in time to observe that the head of Rosecrans' army had penetrated the town and had driven our rear through it in confusion, and was pursuing on the Westport road. My position was extremely hazardous. I awaited orders until the enemy had almost surrounded me, when I moved on the Little Santa Fé road parallel to and within range of his column, who, deceived by our blue coats, held his fire. Three miles on that road I met Captain West, assistant quartermaster, who with an escort had been sent to relieve me, but was cut off. The enemy was still ahead of me on my right, which made it impracticable to join the main army, and hence I moved on for ten miles at a trot. Learning by the way that a body of Blunt's cavalry was then one hour in my front, turned across the country to the right and intercepted the train at Big Blue. Here the injuries and wound received at Blue Mills the day before became so painful that I was compelled to turn my regiment over to Capt. B. S. Johnson, whose report of an action of the 23d of October is herewith annexed, and to whom much commendation is due for uniform skill and courage while in command. <ar83_691>

On the night of the 24th I again assumed command, and before daylight of the 25th was moved out and took position. Our camp was on the Marais des Cygnes River, in Linn County, Kans. I was ordered to form two miles south of that stream with Burbridge's regiment. The remainder of Marmaduke's brigade was still in the rear, and engaged the enemy for a few minutes, retired beyond me, and reformed. I occupied my position about half an hour, when Burbridge's regiment, with the brigade, was withdrawn, and I was ordered by General Mar-maduke to move in rear. The country was a continuous prairie, and the enemy soon appeared in sight. After marching about a mile I was ordered to quicken my gait, then to trot, and finally to join the main body at a gallop. We had now marched some five or six miles, followed by the enemy, who seemed to take his gait from ours, but never came in gunshot range. On reaching the main body I found it formed some 300 yards north of Mine Creek--a deep, lightly wooded stream with abrupt caving banks--and was ordered into position in rear and to the right of Williams' battery. The main line was less than eighty yards from me, and another line covered half of my regiment, and was not exceeding twenty yards from it. I was notified that I was in reserve. We were mounted. I am thus explicit in describing the position of my regiment, in order to explain or extenuate the disaster which soon after overtook it, and which without explanation would leave a stigma upon its bright and dearly bought reputation. After a slight skirmish the enemy was seen to deploy from behind the left of his line in heavy column of attack, completely turning our right. Suddenly the first and second lines gave way, and rushing in great disorder ran over and broke the eight right companies of my regiment. The same wild panic seemed to seize everything. I wheeled my remaining company (B) to the right and opened on the flank of the enemy's column until two of Williams' guns were borne to the rear, when after every exertion, seeing the impossibility of staying this panic-stricken mob, I ordered Captain Polk (Company B) to withdraw as best he could.

Two hours later and near the Osage River I was placed in command of the brigade, and collected about 400 armed men, not including Wood's battalion, which did not report until the day following. Over two-thirds of the arms were lost in the rout. With this force, under General Clark's directions, I moved across the Osage and went into position five miles beyond on the Fort Scott road, the brigade composing a part of the right wing. The enemy had been in the meantime engaged by Shelby's division, which retired to the rear. We advanced upon the enemy as soon as he appeared in sight, and a sharp fusilade was kept up with slight loss to either side. The enemy seemed unwilling to press his advantage further, and after checking his pursuit we withdrew at dark.

Among the many officers who bore themselves with marked gallantry on this memorable and disastrous day I cannot forbear to record the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Ward and Captain Power, of the Eighth; Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, of the Fourth; Lieutenant Snapp, of the Third, and Captains Barry and Burr, of the Tenth, whose conduct came under my immediate notice.

I was again indebted to Capt. George W. Kerr for valuable assistance in times of danger, and in bearing tribute to his gallantry it reminds me to add the names of Privates Simpson and Adams, Company B, Third Regiment, who performed all the duties of staff officers with courage and skill. <ar83_692>

Continuing our march uninterruptedly the brigade crossed the Marmiton at 10 o'clock of the night of the 25th, where I halted one hour to burn the train as directed, and moved on in a southerly direction and encamped near Carthage, Mo., on the 26th. The distance traveled in this march was ninety-two miles. The brigade was not again engaged with the enemy, but endured the severest privations and sufferings during the march through Indian Territory to Boggy Depot, which place we reached on the 18th of November. For twenty-five days our animals were without forage. For twenty-three days we subsisted on beef without salt, frequently issued in insufficient quantities, and for three days were without food at all. The loss in animals was very heavy, and many wagons were abandoned in consequence.

For a report of the killed and wounded of the brigade in the actions in which I commanded it and of my own regiment during the expedition, I beg respectfully to refer you to the accompanying paper, marked A.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

My command, known as Marmaduke's cavalry brigade, consisting of Greene's, Burbridge's, Jeffers', Kitchen's, and Lawther's regiments, <ar83_679> Wood's battalion of cavalry, and Pratt's battalion of artillery, numbering in effective strength 1,200 men (equipments fair and horses in moderate condition), marched from Tulip, Ark., on the morning of the 31st of August at sunrise on the Benton road as the advance guard of the Army of Missouri. Arriving at the Arkansas River on the morning of the 6th of September, Lawther's regiment in advance, after a slight skirmish with a small detachment of the enemy's cavalry crossed the river, encamping on the opposite shore. On the morning of the 7th the line of march was resumed, the army moving in the direction of Southeast Missouri; crossed the Arkansas and Missouri line on the 20th; passed through Poplar Bluff, Mo., on the 21st; Saint Francisville on the 22d; Dallas County on the 24th; Fredericktown on the 26th, making a junction at this point with Generals Fagan's and Shelby's divisions, which had moved by routes to the west of my line of march. The entire army arrived at Ironton, Mo., on the 27th of September.

Before arriving st Pocahontas, Ark., Jeffers' regiment, of my brigade, under orders from the major-general commanding, proceeded to Southeast Missouri, arriving near Bloomfield on the 22d of September. The Federal garrison hastily evacuating that post, he attacked their rear with great vigor, killing a number, capturing 75 stand of small-arms and 6 wagons and teams loaded with army and sutler's stores, reporting to the brigade September 24, but detached again on the 25th. After a spirited charge he drove the enemy and captured the town of Old Jackson, Mo.; but the enemy having been apprised of his approach removed everything of value before his arrival. He rejoined the brigade September 26.

The army being in front of Ironton, Mo., on the 27th, Fagan's division drove the enemy from that town, forcing him to take refuge behind his fortifications at Pilot Knob. I received orders to occupy Shepherd's Mountain with my brigade, which was done without opposition. During all this time, however, volleys of musketry and the roar of artillery gave us notice that a spirited engagement was progressing on our right, the position occupied by Fagan's division. The enemy having taken refuge within a strong redoubt, and showing no disposition to skirmish with us beyond its protection, it was determined to bring the artillery to bear upon the enemy from Shepherd's Mountain and at the same time make an assault, my brigade on the left and Fagan's division on the right, Freeman's brigade, of Marmaduke's division, having been sent against the enemy in some other direction. The signal for the assault was the opening of artillery on Shepherd's Mountain. The fort lay directly in my front (as was supposed) one-half mile, but found the distance to be at least three-quarters of a mile upon examination afterward. The descent from the top of the mountain was as rugged as can be imagined, and it was impossible to move the troops down it in any order, huge bowlders, fallen timbers, deep and almost impassable ravines confronting the troops at every step, and the enemy's artillery opening with great accuracy at this moment upon our disordered ranks, I would not have been surprised to have seen all break in confusion; but with unfaltering courage they pressed forward, each one seeming eager to reach the enemy's intrenchments first. Owing to the irregular descent upon emerging into the open space around the fort the brigade was found divided, Burbridge and Jeffers on the left and Greene, Lawther, and Wood 150 yards to the right and connecting with Cabell's brigade. Thus disconnected (it being impossible to bring them together without great loss of time as well as life) the advance was continued. Greene's, Lawther's, and Wood's commands, with <ar83_680> Cabell's brigade, advancing to the very muzzle of the enemy's guns, found a deep ditch yawning before them impossible to cross. After some hesitation they recoiled before the terrible fire that was continually poured into their ranks, falling back from 75 to 100 yards from the fort under cover of a small natural embankment, and remained until after night-fall, when they were quietly withdrawn to an encampment one mile distant. Burbridge's and Jeffers' regiments being upon my left in the charge did not get nearer than seventy-five yards to the fort, and seeing the others repulsed took refuge in a ravine and remained until withdrawn after night. Thus ended one of the hardest fought small engagements of the war, as the list of killed and wounded will attest, the officers and men of my command behaving with a spirit that well became the reputation they had won upon many fields under the command of General Marmaduke and Colonel Greene as brigade commanders. I hope it will not be considered out of place for me to call attention to the dashing gallantry displayed by General Cabell in leading his troops to this terrible assault.

During the night the enemy blew up his fortifications and fled in the direction of the Southwest Branch Railroad. A rapid pursuit was commenced on the 28th, but we did not come upon his rear until the 29th, having continued the pursuit through the night preceding without halting. We pressed him hotly, but owing to the topography of the country it was impossible to deploy rapidly, and in consequence failed to bring him to a general engagement. Having already been in the saddle forty-eight hours, exclusive of the fatigues from the battle of Pilot Knob, my command was relieved from active pursuit in the advance by General Shelby's division, who pressed the enemy hotly until night-fall. Taking advantage of the darkness and the facilities afforded by the railroad at the station of Leasburg, the enemy protected himself behind formidable fortifications, and considering that it would occasion too great loss of life to make the assault, Generals Marmaduke and Shelby decided to withdraw on the 30th and move down the railroad some twelve miles, camping at Sullivan's Station. On the 29th Colonel Burbridge's regiment and Wood's battalion, of my brigade, under orders from General Marmaduke, were detached (Colonel Burbridge commanding) to destroy the railroad depots, &c., at Cuba, eleven miles from Leasburg in the direction of Rolla. The order being satisfactorily executed they rejoined the brigade on the 30th.

We arrived at Union, Franklin County, October 1; found a small body of the enemy, some 200 strong, posted in the town to dispute our entrance. Dismounting my command and opening my artillery I moved forward rapidly to the attack, routing the enemy, killing 32, and capturing 70 prisoners. At 12 o'clock that night Lawther's regiment, of my brigade, was sent forward in the direction of Washington as an advance. I was ordered to join him with the remainder of my command, and did so at 8 o'clock the next morning (October 2) one mile from Washington. The enemy having fled the night before, took possession of the town without opposition, destroying a bridge on the Pacific Railroad two miles below the town. On the 3d of October captured a train at Miller's Station, with a large amount of clothing and 400 Sharps rifles. Same evening captured Hermann after a slight engagement with the enemy, Greene's regiment in advance, which captured one 12-pounder iron gun. The train captured at Miller's Station was run up to Her mann, where stores, arms, &c., were distributed. On the 4th Wood's battalion, with four companies under Major Parrott, and one piece of artillery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, were sent <ar83_681> by order of Major-General Marmaduke with the train up the railroad to destroy the Gasconade bridge, which was accomplished without resistance, rejoining the brigade on the 5th, and on the 6th formed a junction with the main army at Linn.

From the time the pursuit commenced at Ironton to the arrival at Linn, Freeman's brigade, of Marmaduke's division, was detached as a guard to the general train, and marched under Major-General Price's orders with the main column. On the 7th of October Shelby's division (in advance) drove the enemy from the crossing of the Osage, and Fagan's division moving up to his assistance drove the enemy within the fortifications around Jefferson City. Marmaduke's division being in rear did not engage the enemy. Moved in direction of Russellville on the 8th, Fagan's division skirmishing with the enemy in rear. Moved to California on the 9th, Marmaduke's division in rear, my brigade in rear of the division, Greene's regiment skirmishing with the enemy. At California the enemy suddenly dashed in upon the flank, but opening upon him with Pratt's battalion of artillery checked his attack, and under its cover passed the brigade, leaving Lawther's regiment in rear skirmishing with the enemy. They followed, however, only a short distance from that point.

Arrived at Boonville on the 10th, that place having been captured the day before by General Shelby's command. On the 11th a picket of 100 men, commanded by Captain Hicks, of Burbridge's regiment, was attacked by a heavy force of the enemy and rapidly driven in. Marmaduke's and Fagan's divisions, moving rapidly to the front, offered battle, the enemy retiring after a slight skirmish, the principal loss being in Hicks' picket, that officer handling it with great judgment and gallantry. Left Boonville on the night of the 12th; arrived at Arrow Rock on the 14th. On the 14th received orders from the major-general commanding army to cross the Missouri River at Arrow Rock with my brigade and 500 men of Jackman's brigade, attack and capture the Federal post at Glasgow. I succeeded, after considerable difficulty, in crossing my command, but not as early as was expected. General Shelby, with two guns and one regiment, was ordered to assist in the capture from the south side of the river, the attack to begin at daylight, but owing to the delay in crossing the river I did not arrive at Glasgow at the appointed hour, Shelby's artillery opening at the appointed time, my command being some three miles distant. Pushing rapidly forward we soon came in sight of the town, finding the enemy in line of battle to receive us. Colonel Greene, commanding brigade, was ordered to make the attack on the enemy, who were directly in his front and in rear of the town; Jackman to attack the enemy on his right flank. After several shots from Pratt's artillery, which was posted on the heights south of Glasgow, the dispositions for the attack being made as indicated, both commands advanced to the attack in a spirited manner and soon drove the enemy within his works, which were constructed upon a commanding hill in the heart of the town, from which they poured a destructive fire of small-arms in our ranks; but nothing daunted, they advanced under cover of houses, fences, and other obstructions to within a short distance of his works, preferring to force his surrender by a continuous fire from sharpshooters rather than take him by assault. After a fire of small-arms and artillery for two hours Colonel Harding, commanding Federal forces, sent out a flag desiring to know what terms would be granted to him in case he surrendered. He was answered that they should be treated as prisoners of war, private property should be respected, and officers permitted to keep their <ar83_682> side-arms. Accepting the terms the entire Federal force was surrendered, consisting of Colonel Harding's regiment and four companies of militia, numbering between 800 and 900 men, 1,200 small-arms, about the same number of overcoats, 150 horses, 1 steam-boat, and large amounts of underclothing.

The capture was complete in every respect, and made with much less loss than could be expected when we take into consideration that the disproportion in force was not more than two to one, but the rapidity with which Colonels Greene and Jackman moved their troops to the attack, and following the enemy so closely in his retreat to his intrenchments that they had no opportunity to punish us severely. Notwithstanding, we sustained considerable loss in gallant officers and men in crossing the open fields and before we could get under cover of the houses around the fortifications, the loss in this action being -- killed and --wounded.

Colonel Harding, after consulting his officers and investigating the laws, orders, &c., of the United States in regard to paroling prisoners, determined to accept a parole for himself, officers, and men that I had offered him, having stated to me previous to this that he would not accept the parole unless he felt sure that it would be regarded by his Government. All were accordingly paroled and sent to Boonville under the escort of Lieutenant Graves with his company. He delivered them at Boonville. (See complimentary letter to Lieutenant Graves from General Fisk.)

I do not hesitate in complimenting the gallantry and good behavior of officers and soldiers in this action, but call your attention especially to Colonels Greene and Jackman, commanding brigades. General Shelby gave me material assistance in the reduction of the town by a judicious use of his artillery and sharpshooters from the opposite side of the river.

After a distribution of as much of the property, ordnance, &c., captured as the troops could conveniently carry, I had the steam-boat which was captured at the wharf burnt, evacuated the town, and recrossed the river on the 17th and rejoined the main army on the 18th, not coming in contact with the enemy again until the 21st at the crossing of Little Blue River, in Jackson County. My brigade being in advance, Captain Stallard's escort (Marmaduke's advance guard), came upon the enemy's pickets one mile from the bridge on Little Blue on the Lexington and Independence road. Stallard soon drove them across the bridge, which they burned to prevent a rapid pursuit. Under instructions from General Marmaduke I sent Burbridge's regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Preston in command) to secure the ford one mile above the bridge, and Colonel Lawther with his regiment to secure the ford one-half mile below, who soon reported the lower crossing clear, the enemy retiring toward Independence. I moved the brigade to the lower ford, but found the crossing very difficult and slow. Hearing quick firing to the front I hastened forward with Greene's regiment, leaving orders for the command to follow as rapidly as possible, and found that Colonel Lawther had indiscreetly attacked a very heavy force of the enemy posted behind some stone fencing which ran at right angles to the road and afforded complete protection against small-arms. He was driven back and in his turn assailed by the enemy, when I arrived with Greene's regiment. General Marmaduke having ordered Captain Stallard to support Lawther's regiment, Colonel Greene formed his regiment in line of battle, flanked by two pieces of artillery from Pratt's battalion, which was soon hotly engaging the enemy, Lawther having fallen to his rear <ar83_683> in confusion. Owing to the difficulties of crossing at the ford Greene's regiment fought at great odds unsupported, but they contested every inch of ground with stubbornness until the arrival of Wood's battalion, when the enemy gave way, but receiving re-enforcements drove us again to our original position. We were almost out of ammunition and the day seemed lost, but Kitchen's regiment, including Davies' battalion (Davies' absence from his regiment not accounted for), came up at this moment in as gallant style as veteran infantry and turned the tide of success, the enemy breaking and falling back toward his first position. A part of Shelby's division (Gordon's regiment, I believe) joined on the left of Kitchen and pushed hotly after the enemy, who, taking position behind the rock fencing spoken of, stubbornly contested the advance of Marmaduke's and Shelby's divisions for at least an hour, but finally gave way, Shelby in pursuit.

In this action Major Pratt, with one section of his artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Williams, did excellent service, and at a time of great emergency manned the guns themselves. Company B, Greene's regiment (Captain Polk), behaved with distinguished gallantry, resolutely supporting the artillery with only one round of ammunition for close quarters with the enemy. Colonel Greene distinguished himself above any other officer in the engagement. Loss in this action: killed, -- wounded.

On the same evening Independence was captured, my brigade encamping two miles beyond the town on the Westport road. On the morning of the 22d, Fagan's division being hotly pressed from the rear, General Marmaduke sent me an order to form line of battle at some suitable point near my encampment, some two miles from Independence, as a support to Freeman's brigade, which was formed in my front some half a mile, Fagan's division having been pressed back, then Freeman's brigade, the enemy came within range of my artillery (Pratt's) half an hour before sundown, which immediately opened and checked his advance. Then falling back probably a mile, under directions from Major-General Marmaduke I formed my brigade in order of battle by columns of regiments as follows, Wood's battalion, Bur-bridge's regiment, Lawther's regiment, Kitchen's regiment, and Jeffers' regiment, to await the advance of the enemy. I was advised that the resistance must be stubborn, as there was heavy fighting in front, and the rear of the train was only a short distance in advance. The enemy having now engaged the army both in front and rear, and possibly elated at having driven the rear of the column over twelve miles of hard-fought ground, and knowing from the report of their guns in the advance that the relative position of the contending forces had slightly changed, notwithstanding the almost impenetrable darkness of the night, they rushed upon us with a reckless fierceness that I have never seen equaled, giving us warning of confidence reposed in the efficiency and number of their troops in case we were pressed to a general engagement. First Wood's battalion was driven back, then Bur-bridge's regiment, then Kitchen's, then Lawther's, and last Jeffers', who contended longest and last with this fierce advance. Thus passed this long and never to be forgotten night of the 22d. The dark obscurity that enveloped friend and foe alike was only relieved by the bright flash of our guns, and the deathlike stillness that reigned in the forest around us was only broken as volley answered volley from the contending forces. Our loss was heavy, but especially in the regiment of the gallant Jeffers. <ar83_684>

The enemy being satisfied with the reception, or having spent his energies in.his furious onslaught, halted the pursuit at 2 in the morning.

On the 23d Marmaduke's division, again in rear, were attacked at an early hour by the same enemy and with the same spirit as before. Greene's regiment, commanded by Captain Johnson, and Burbridge's regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, with Freeman's brigade, met him first, my brigade being formed in his rear 500 yards. He contended manfully for the crossing of the Big Blue, but was forced back after having repulsed the enemy several times. Falling back through my brigade the enemy came upon me in the full enthusiasm of pursuit, and though my brigade contended nobly with the foe for two hours and strewed the open field in our front with his dead, our ammunition exhausted, we were forced to leave the field again to the enemy, our dead in his hands. The booming of Fagan's and Shelby's guns were heard all this time in the direction of Westport heavily engaging the enemy. At this time I was directed by General Marmaduke to pass the train and protect its left flank from a threatened attack from cavalry. I found them advancing upon the flank, but halted without coming to an engagement. Continued to retreat that night until 1 o'clock. Resumed the march southward on the 23d; crossed into Linn County, Kans., on the 24th. Resumed the march southward on the 25th, Mar-maduke's division being in the rear.

Before I had gone a mile from the encampment (on the Marais des Cygnes) of the night before, I received an order from General Marma-duke to form my brigade in line of battle, as the enemy had again appeared in our rear. I remained in that position until 10 o'clock; no engagement with small-arms; retiring from that position in line of battle. The enemy, 800 or 900 yards distant in line of battle, followed us. We were now well out on a prairie that seemed almost boundless. At the distance of a mile General Marmaduke directed me to halt, which we did. The enemy coming on with a steady advance approached very near in largely superior force. We retired at a trot, the enemy in close pursuit. We continued this way, each holding about the same position, across a flat prairie some four miles, when we came suddenly upon the trains halted, the delay occasioned by a deep ravine, the enemy not more than 500 yards in our rear. There was no time to make any but the most rapid dispositions for battle. To attempt to dismount and send the horses to the rear was inevitable destruction, as the enemy in the confusion would have been upon us. There was no alternative but to abandon the train or to fight on horseback. In the hurried consultation between Generals Fagan and Marmaduke I understood this to be the view taken of the emergency. It was determined not to dismount, which met with my approbation. Skirmishing had already begun, the artillery in action, when the Federal force (I should judge 6,000 or 7,000) made a furious charge on the right and left flank. Both gave way in hopeless confusion. Every effort was made by appeals and threats to retrieve the rout, but it swept in an irresistible mass ungovernable. The Federal force and that mingled together until you scarcely knew who was friend or foe. Gallant spirits, however, were seen here and there in hand-to-hand conflict with the foe, in sad contrast to those who had ignominiously thrown away their arms. General Marmaduke in the vain effort to rally his troops was captured by the enemy. Every gallant spirit in my brigade remembers with affection the gallant and prudent commander of an hundred battles, and mourn that his valuable services are lost to his country in the hour of her <ar83_685> emergency. The gallant Jeffers with Major Waddell, of my staff, and many other officers, were captured. I succeeded in forming I suppose 500 men on General Marmaduke's escort (which deserves great credit for being less demoralized than any troops I saw in the rout), all of which retired in some order to the main column. The retreat was continued with occasional skirmishing until we reached Newtonia, which was the last sight we had of the enemy. As I have heard that odium was cast upon the major-general commanding for adopting the line of retreat through the Indian Nation, I desire to say that that route was earnestly advocated by me in preference to any other.

Having assumed command of Marmaduke's division on the day and after the battle of Mine Creek, and Colonel Freeman, whose brigade composed a part of the division, never having made a report of the part taken by his command in the campaign, I am unable to call attention to it in a specific manner. It is in my knowledge, however, that he did good fighting at Independence and Big Blue. His brigade was detached from the division at Maysville, Ark., by orders from the major-general commanding, and sent to Northeast Arkansas. The retreat through the Indian Nation was attended with many hardships, particularly to the new recruits; but as the army was without meat rations only two days we encountered nothing like starvation.

My brigade staff were prompt and gallant in the execution of orders throughout the campaign, calling especial attention to Captain Kerr, ordnance officer of my brigade, who behaved with distinguished gallantry on many occasions.

The officers of my brigade with very few exceptions behaved well in every action and deserve high encomiums for gallantry, among whom Colonel Greene stands pre-eminent.

It is impossible to report the loss of the division on account of the absence of Colonel Freeman's report. The loss in my brigade can only be reported in the aggregate. Attention is called to list accompanying this and also Colonel Greene's report.

General Marmaduke's staff, who have been reporting to me since his capture, are surpassed by none in the army for activity, promptness, and gallantry. I regret especially my inability to do General Marmaduke justice in this report, as many things of moment were done by the division of which I was not cognizant. His command have the highest regard for him as a general and are anxious for his return, as only troops are who believe in their leader.

It gives me great pleasure to call attention to the gallant conduct of Private Adams, Company B, Third [Missouri] Regiment, of my brigade, during the battle of Mine Creek.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Price's Army.

SIR: This will introduce Capt. H. S. Glaze, of my staff, who will relieve your escort and provide the weary and sick with conveyance to <ar83_686> my camp. He is authorized to receipt for them should you so deem best. Highly grateful for your considerate and kindly treatment of my soldiers,

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

CLINTON B. FISK,

Very respectfully,

JNO. B. CLARK, JR.,

GENERAL: Herewith I send a plan of reorganization in accordance with my views, and several alternate plans. It will be perceived that I greatly reduce the cavalry by plan No. 1 without varying materially from General Smith's views. Besides, this plan will suit far better the geographical features of the country, with the defense of which I am intrusted. If I take action independently of General Smith's previous approval, and he directs changes after the reorganization is effected, either in part or altogether, the confusion which would result would be very disastrous to the pub? service. The whole country is flooded; creeks and rivers everywhere being almost impassable, some delay may take place on this account. I have been unable, notwithstanding every exertion on my part, to procure returns. I sent for them when General Price was at Perryville, and forwarded blanks when he was at Clarksville. The general commanding will not, I hope, find fault with a delay which is caused by events occurring before General Price reported to me. I beg that the answer of the general commanding may be addressed to me at Lewisville, and respectfully urge that this subject may be brought to his earliest attention. Tyler's brigade has been organized partly in Missouri and partly in Texas since its return. Is its organization legal? Whether so or not I recommend that it be preserved until it can be ascertained if there will be a sufficient number of men to fill up the old infantry organizations without it. If this should prove to be the case it is desirable it should be retained, as it is formed of a good class of men, and mostly neighbors, having been recruited from well-to-do farmers in Missouri, and that it should be attached, dismounted, to Price's division of infantry. If not so disposed of, I recommend that the men should be transferred to Price's infantry as recruits. <ar86_1118> Inclosed I send a form(*) of account to be used for the dismounted troops. The form of account explains itself. I propose dismounting the troops at Lewisville and transferring the dismounted men at once to the infantry.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

GENERAL: The following plans for the organization of the cavalry of this district are submitted for the approval of the general commanding department. The first is the one I most approve and recommend:

In his letter of the 9th instant he states that he desires that I shall form two brigades, one to be Shelby's and the other to be Marmaduke's or Cabell's, and one other small brigade. I have formed two small brigades and two medium sized, effecting a greater reduction of the cavalry than in any other way, and not dismounting either of the old cavalry brigades, which would create great dissatisfaction and would not seem to be right.

<ar86_1119>

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I regret to state that the report is meager and incomplete in many of its details, for the reason that Major-General Marmaduke and Briga-dier-General Cabell, who bore so honorable and conspicuous a part in the greater part of the expedition, were captured before its close and are now prisoners in the hands of the enemy, while Major General Fagan, who commanded the Arkansas troops who composed so large a portion of the forces engaged in it, has as yet been unable to make any report; neither have any been received from his subordinate commanders.

In conformity with the letter of instructions of General E. Kirby Smith of the 11th of August, 1864, I made immediate arrangements for a movement into Missouri, as concluded upon in my interview and conference with him upon that subject, with the cavalry forces in the District of Arkansas which was then under my command, being promised, in addition, the brigade of Louisiana cavalry commanded by Colonel Harrison, estimated at 1,500 strong. At the same time information in full detail of the proposed movement, of the routes intended to be pursued, and probable time when it would be made was without delay sent by me to Brigadier-General Shelby, who then commanded in Northeastern Arkansas, with instructions to make an attack, when in his judgment he should deem it advisable, upon Devall's Bluff and the railroad between Little Rock and the White River in possession of the enemy, and by diverting their attention from my own movements enable me to cross the Lower Arkansas--the route then proposed--and unite our forces without danger of failure. These instructions were carried out in full by General Shelby and resulted in his attack upon the railroad, terminating in the most complete success, over 400 Federals being captured, 300 killed and wounded, six forts taken and destroyed, ten miles of railroad destroyed, as well as vast quantities of forage, &c., full particulars of which are contained in the accompanying report of General Shelby. This exploit was one of the most brilliant of the war and cast additional luster upon the well earned fame of that gallant general and the men and officers under his command. «40 R R----VOL XLI, PT I» <ar83_626>

It was part of the plan concluded upon that I should cross the Arkansas River about the 20th of August with the troops under my immediate command, but from delay in receiving the necessary ordnance stores I was unable to do so. Finally the required complement was received on the 27th, and on the 28th of August I was relieved from the command of the District of Arkansas, crossed the Ouachita River, and on the 29th arrived at Princeton, where the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke were, and assumed command of all the cavalry in the District of Arkansas, according to the instructions of General E. Kirby Smith above referred to. In the meantime, owing to the delay in starting, I was of the opinion that the enemy had became informed of my intended line of march, and I concluded that I would cross the Arkansas River at the most feasible point north of Little Rock and south of Fort Smith, taking into consideration the probable means of obtaining forage and subsistence.

On the 30th I accordingly took up my line of march in the direction of Little Rock and arrived that afternoon at Tulip, a distance of nine miles. Colonel Harrison's brigade had not yet arrived, but as I could no longer delay I left instructions at Princeton directing him if he should arrive there within three days to follow on and form a junction with me, giving him information of the route I should travel; but in case he did not reach that place within that time that tie should then report to the commanding general of the District of Arkansas. Colonel Harrison did not take part in the expedition. On the morning at the 31st I resumed my line of march in the same direction as on the previous day, and continued on the same until I arrived within seven miles of Benton, when I diverged to the left, taking a northwest direction, sending Major-General Fagan across the Saline River to make a demonstration toward Little Rock and at the same time protect my right flank. On the 5th of September he rejoined me, bringing up the rear.

I reached Dardanelle on the 6th day of September. The country through which I had passed was hilly and in some parts mountainous, sparsely settled, but plenty of forage and subsistence had been obtained. The Arkansas River being fordable at this point, on the 7th I crossed it with the command and train and marched to Dover, a distance of fourteen miles. Major-General Marmaduke with his division and a portion of his train had already crossed it before my arrival, thus covering the crossing of the remaining portion of the army.

At Princeton verbal and written communications had been sent to Brigadier-General Shelby apprising him of the change of route and directing him to form a junction with me at Batesville, but up to this time had received no information from him of his movements or position. I resumed my line of march in the direction of the last-mentioned place, Major-General Fagan, with his command, marching along the Springfield road, and Major-General Marmaduke's headquarters and train on the Clinton road, marching by separate roads on account of the scarcity of forage and for the purpose of ridding that section of the country of deserters and Federal jayhawkers, as they are termed--i.e., robbers and murderers--with which that country is infested. These bands, however, dispersed and took refuge in the mountains at the approach of the army, although several of them were killed and a small number taken prisoners. On arriving at Little Red River on the 10th, still without information of the position or movements of General Shelby, I dispatched an officer of known skill and daring to communicate with him, directing that he should unite himself with the rest of the command at once. <ar83_627>

On the 12th I arrived at a point on White River eighteen miles above Batesville, and having received information that Brigadier-General Shelby, with his command, was at Powhatan, about sixty-four miles northeast of Batesville and on the selected route to Missouri, I adopted the town of Pocahontas as the point of rendezvous, and directed Major-General Marmaduke, with his own command, his train, and that of headquarters, to march to that point direct, while I proceeded with my staff to Batesville, and from thence to Powhatan, while Major-General Fagan, with his division, who had arrived at Batesville, marched to Powhatan on the left.

I arrived on the 13th of September and found Brigadier-General Shelby there with a portion of his command. The next day I reached Pocahontas, a distance of 356 miles from Camden, and there the remaining portion of Shelby's command reported, including the brigades of Jackman, McCray, and Dobbin. In fine, the whole army was concentrated. The country over which I had passed was rugged and mountainous in the extreme, and had damaged the transportation to some extent; but it had already been or was on the point of being repaired, and on the other hand, by adopting the routes marched over sufficient forage and subsistence had been obtained. The towns and villages through which I had passed had been robbed, pillaged, burned, or otherwise destroyed by the enemy, and were nearly deserted by the former inhabitants; in fact, the whole country presented but a scene of devastation.

Upon arriving at Pocahontas I immediately proceeded to organize the army, which was completed on the 18th, as follows: Fagan's division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. F. Fagan, was composed of Brig. Gen. W. L. Cabell's brigade, Colonel Slemons' brigade, Colonel McCray's brigade, Colonel Dobbin's brigade, Colonels Lyles' and Rogan's commands, and Captain Anderson's battalion. Marmaduke's division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. S. Marmaduke, was composed of Brig. Gen. John B. Clark, jr.'s, brigade, Colonel Freeman's brigade, Colonel Kitchen's regiment, and Lieut. Col. R. C. Wood's battalion. Shelby's division, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. O. Shelby, consisted of Colonel Shanks' brigade, Colonel Jackman's brigade, and Colonel Coleman's command.

Having determined to invade Missouri in three columns, Major-General Fagan, with his division, was ordered to march to Fredericktown, Mo., by the way of Martinsburg, Reeves' Station, and Greenville. Major-General Marmaduke, with his division, was ordered to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, to the right of the route to be followed by Fagan's division, as above designated, varying from it from ten to thirty miles, or as nearly within those limits as might be practicable on account of roads and forage. Brigadier-General Shelby, with his command, was to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown by a route to the left of General Fagan's, varying from it from ten to twenty miles as nearly as practicable on account of roads and forage. The headquarters to march with the center column. At Fredericktown the three divisions were ordered to form a junction. A map of the route to be followed was furnished each of the division commanders. The most stringent orders were issued against straggling and pillaging under the severest penalties, and the division commanders earnestly enjoined to use their utmost endeavors to have the order carried into effect in every particular and without delay.

On the 19th of September the army marched in the order above designated, and on that day I entered Missouri with nearly 12,000 men, of whom 8,000 were armed, and fourteen pieces of artillery, and on the 24th day of September reached Fredericktown, Mo., with the center column, <ar83_628> Brigadier-General Shelby, with his division, was in advance, passing in his route through Doniphan and Patterson, while Major General Marmaduke, whose route was by Poplar Bluff, Castorville, and Dallas, had not yet come up. On the 19th, before Brigadier-General Shelby reached Doniphan, news of the arrival of the army having been received, a force of the enemy composed of a portion of the Twelfth Missouri (Federal) Cavalry,(*) then occupying the place, withdrew and retreated to Ponder's Mill, burning the houses of citizens as they passed along, where they were overtaken the next day by scouting parties sent in pursuit and were routed with a loss of a lieutenant and 3 men killed, 4 wounded, and 6 prisoners, besides several horses and small-arms captured. Our loss, 2 killed and 5 wounded.

On the 22d Brigadier-General Shelby attacked the town of Patterson, but the garrison having received information of the approach hastily evacuated the place with a loss of 28 killed and several wounded; also telegraph battery and operator captured. No loss on our part. On the 25th I remained at Fredericktown awaiting the arrival of Marmaduke's division, which came up that evening within eight miles of the place. Major-General Marmaduke on his route had a few skirmishes with the Federal militia, killing and wounding 4 and capturing 11.

Colonel Jeffers, of Marmaduke's division, had, before the arrival of the army at Pocahontas, been sent with his regiment to Bloomfield, Mo., which the enemy evacuated at his approach, whereupon he attacked their rear, killing a number and capturing arms and six wagon loads of army stores, he rejoined his brigade (Clark's) on the 24th; detached again on the 25th, he attacked and by a gallant charge drove the enemy out of the town of old Jackson. (For particulars see Brigadier-General Clark's report.)

I received at Fredericktown satisfactory information that the strength of the enemy at Ironton was about 1,500 and that the Federal General A. J. Smith was encamped about ten miles from Saint Louis with his corps, composed of about 8,000 infantry, on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad. I immediately issued orders to Brigadier-General Shelby to proceed at once with his division by the way of Farmington to a point on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad, where there were three fine bridges in close proximity to each other, and to destroy the railroad there and the bridges; after effecting that object to fall back in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, which would effectually prevent General A. J. Smith from re-enforcing the garrison at those places, while I would attack and take them with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. General Shelby proceeded to the point indicated and performed the duty assigned him in the most complete and effective manner, destroying the splendid bridge at Irondale as well as the three bridges mentioned, tearing up miles upon miles of the track, burning the ties, rails, &c. (For full particulars reference is made to the accompanying report of Brigadier-General Shelby.)

On the morning of the 26th, being rejoined by Major-General Marmaduke's division, I proceeded at an early hour with Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, at the same time sending forward a portion of Fagan's division to take and hold a difficult pass in that direction between two mountains within three or four miles of Ironton. This was effected rapidly and with success. That evening I sent forward the remainder of his division, leaving his train at Saint Francis Creek, six miles from Ironton, where forage could <ar83_629> be obtained for the animals and where I encamped for the night with the rest of the command. That evening Major-General Fagan drove in the Federal pickets at Arcadia and took position before the town for the night. The next morning he drove the enemy from Arcadia, where they abandoned a very strong position, through Ironton, where he also took a strong fort in the most gallant and brilliant manner. The enemy took refuge behind their fortifications at Pilot Knob. Having received such information as appeared to be perfectly reliable concerning the character and strength of the fortifications as induced me to believe that the place could be taken without great loss, I accordingly directed Major-General Marmaduke to take possession of Shepherd's Mountain, which was west of the fortifications and completely commanded them. This was most satisfactorily accomplished and his artillery placed in position on the mountain. Major-General Fagan formed on the south and east. Skirmishing took place all the day and heavy firing of artillery from the enemy until about 2 p.m., when a charge was ordered and made in the most gallant manner, officers and men vying with each other in both divisions of unsurpassed bravery, charging up nearly to the muzzles of the enemy's cannon.

Where all acted as heroes it seems almost invidious to make any exception, but I must be allowed to call attention to the courage and gallantry of Brigadier-General Cabell in leading his men to the assault, having his horse killed under him within forty yards of the fort.

But the information I had received in regard to the strength of the fortifications proved totally incorrect. Our troops were repulsed, and it being too late to renew the assault they were withdrawn beyond the reach of the enemy's guns and preparations were made for a renewal of the assault on the next day. I had dispatched a courier on the morning of the 27th to Brigadier-General Shelby informing him of the proposed operations and directing him to rejoin the main army to assist in the attack, and on the evening of the 27th another courier was dispatched to him informing him of the capture of Arcadia and Ironton, and of the repulse at Pilot Knob, and of my design to renew the attack on the following morning; and hoping that the courier would meet him on the way, instructed him to join me, as also the route to pursue. Neither of these communications, as it appears, were received by Brigadier-General Shelby, who, having heard that there was a force of the enemy at Potosi, had left the railroad and marched to attack them at that place, which was captured by him with its garrison of 150 Federals, arms, ammunition, &c. The depot of the railroad at that place, with seven fine cars, was also destroyed. (For full particulars reference is made to the accompanying report of Brigadier-General Shelby.)

The enemy at Pilot Knob on the night following the first attack evacuated the fort, blowing up the magazine and leaving in my possession 16 pieces of artillery, a large number of small-arms, a large amount of army stores, consisting of bales of blankets, hundreds of barrels of flour, many tierces of bacon, a great quantity of coffee, &c. After destroying the artillery, which I could not take with me, and distributing such of the stores as were needed among the troops, I moved my command twelve miles on the road the retreating army had gone, sending Mar-maduke forward in pursuit in command of his own and Shelby's division, which had rejoined the command. Untiring pursuit was made night and day, but it was not until the evening of the following day (the 27th [29th]) that he was overtaken, owing to the natural difficulties presented by the country over which the enemy retreated. Major-General Marmaduke, who was in advance, fought him until an hour <ar83_630> before sunset, when Shelby was thrown in front, and the fight was continued until darkness put an end to the combat. The enemy having thrown up fortifications during the night, it was deemed advisable not to renew the attack and the forces were withdrawn. (The particulars in full of the pursuit are contained in the accompanying reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark.)

My loss in this report I cannot give, as I have no report from Fagan's division, but the loss in Marmaduke's division was 14 officers and 80 men killed and wounded, and the loss in Fagan's was doubtless greater.

While at Ironton, receiving information that the Federal force in Saint Louis far exceeded my own two to one, and knowing the city to be strongly fortified, I determined to move as fast as possible on Jefferson City, destroying the railroad as I went, with a hope to be able to capture that city with its troops and munitions of war. I arrived at Richwoods on the 30th, having passed through Potosi. Lieutenant Christian, whom I had previously sent to the Mississippi River before I left Camden for the purpose of obtaining gun caps, joined me at this place, bringing me 150,000. Lieutenant Christian is a most energetic and efficient officer and deserves especial notice.

Major-General Fagan sent 300 men to De Soto to destroy the depot at that place, which was effected, and the militia who had gathered there in some numbers at the same time scattered. At the same time General Cabell was sent with his brigade to cut the Pacific Railroad east of Franklin, which he did effectually, at the same time burning the depot in that town. On the 29th Colonel Burbridge and Lieutenant-Colonel Wood were detached from his command by Major-General Marmaduke and sent to Cuba to destroy the railroad depot at that place, which they succeeded in doing. The divisions of Marmaduke and Shelby tore up several miles of the southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad. (For full particulars see reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark.) Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, of Marmaduke's division, destroyed the important bridge over the Moselle. These two divisions were sent forward in the direction of Union, which was attacked and captured by Brigadier-General Clark, killing 32 and wounding 70 of the Federal garrison.

On the 2d of October Clark's brigade, of Marmaduke's division, took possession of the town of Washington without opposition, and destroyed the Pacific Railroad about two miles from that place. On the 3d a train was captured at Miller's Station with a large amount of clothing and 400 Sharps rifles, and on the same evening the town of Hermann was taken possession of after a slight opposition (the enemy abandoning a 6-pounder iron gun) by Clark's brigade. (For full particulars see report of Brigadier-General Clark with the accompanying report of Colonel Greene.) On the 4th of October Major-General Marmaduke sent a force of 400 men with one gun, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, for the purpose of destroying the Pacific Railroad bridge over the Gasconade River, which he effected. Linn was captured with about 100 prisoners and as many arms by a portion of Shelby's division.

On the 6th Brigadier-General Shelby sent a force under Colonel Shanks to destroy the bridge over the Osage on the Pacific Railroad, which was successfully accomplished. A passage was then forced by him across the Osage six miles below Castle Rock. The enemy disputed the passage warmly, but in vain. In this action the gallant Colonel Shanks received a severe, if not a mortal wound, and, left in the hands of friends to be cared for, he afterward fell into the possession of the enemy, and is reported to have since died, a loss to be greatly deplored. <ar83_631> Ever foremost in battle and last in the retreat, his death would be regretted by all who mourn the loss of the good and the brave. At the same time that Colonel Shanks forced the passage of the Osage as stated, Colonel Gordon, of the same division, forced its passage at Castle Rock, and the division bivouacked that night seven miles from Jefferson City.

On the next morning Major-General Fagan was thrown in advance with his division, and on the march came upon the enemy about five miles from Jefferson City in large force. A hotly-contested battle ensued, but the enemy were gradually driven back to the Moreau Creek, where, being re-enforced, they again made an obstinate resistance, but were finally routed and forced to seek shelter in their intrenchments, Fagan occupying the heights in full view of the city. On this occasion Major-General Fagan handled his troops with marked skill and ability under my own immediate observation. Night approaching I determined to move my forces two miles south of the city to a point where water and forage were abundant, and I accordingly did so and encamped for the night. I had received positive information that the enemy were 12,000 strong in the city, and that 3,000 more had arrived on the opposite bank of the river by the North Missouri Railroad before I withdrew my troops to the encampment selected, whereupon I gave immediate instructions to Brigadier-General Shelby to send a sufficient force to burn the bridges and destroy the railroad on the west of Jefferson City in the direction of California, the county seat of Moniteau County, and after consultation with my general officers I determined not to attack the enemy's intrenchments, as they outnumbered me nearly two to one and were strongly fortified, but to move my command in the direction of Kansas, as instructed in my original orders, hoping to be able to capture a sufficient number of arms to arm my unarmed men at Boonville, Sedalia, Lexington, and Independence, places which I intended to occupy with my troops en route.

The next day I accordingly took up my line of march in the direction of Kansas, and upon leaving Jefferson City was followed by General McNeil, who made an attack upon my rear guard (Fagan's division), but was easily repulsed. Brigadier-General Shelby, who with his division constituted my advance, reached California on the 8th, having sent a portion of his command on before him to destroy the Pacific Railroad at that place, which he did, destroying track and bridges, &c. Pushing rapidly on to Boonville, he by a rapid charge drove in their pickets, and the garrison taking refuge in their defenses, Brigadier-General Shelby, disposing such of his forces as he had with him in a manner to prevent the arrival of any re-enforcements, waited until his artillery could come up. In the meantime propositions for the surrender of the town were made to him, which were accepted, and accordingly the place with its garrison, stores, &c., were delivered into his hands. (For particulars reference is made to his accompanying report.)

I followed on with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke, and encamped on the night of the 8th fourteen miles from Jefferson City, and on the 9th marched through and beyond California, making twenty-six miles. On the 10th I arrived at Boonville with the rest of the command. My reception was enthusiastic in the extreme. Old and young, men, women, and children, vied in their salutations and in ministering to the wants and comforts of my wearied and war-worn soldiers. About 300 prisoners were captured at Boonville, with arms, ammunition, and many stores, which were distributed among the soldiers. On the 11th, hearing of the approach of the Federal General McNeil <ar83_632> with a cavalry force estimated at 2,500 men, for the purpose of attacking Boonville by the Tipton road, I selected my position about half a mile from the river and placed the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke in line of battle to receive him. The enemy attacked them, but was easily driven back with considerable loss, and was afterward pursued by a portion of Fagan's division and Jackman's brigade a distance of twenty-one miles from Boonville with heavy loss, in spite of obstinate resistance and the ruggedness of the country over which the pursuit was made. (For full particulars, so far as the action of his own troops were concerned, see the report of Colonel Jackman, accompanying.)

Captain Anderson, who reported to me that day with a company of about 100 men, was immediately sent to destroy the North Missouri Railroad. At the same time Quantrill was sent with the men under his command to destroy the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad, to prevent the enemy, if possible, from throwing their forces in my front from Saint Louis. These officers I was informed afterward did effect some damage to the roads, but none of any material advantage, and totally failed in the main object proposed, which was to destroy the large railroad bridge that was in the end of Saint Charles County.

I moved that evening from Boonville to Chouteau Springs on my proposed route, a distance of eleven miles, having recruited at Boonville between 1,200 and 1,500 men, mostly unarmed. That night receiving information that there was a large number of arms (amounting to 5,000) stored in the City Hall at Glasgow, I sent Brigadier-General Clark, of Marmaduke's division, with his own brigade and 500 of Jackman's brigade, with orders to cross the river at Arrow Rock and attack the place the next morning at daylight and capture it, at the same time sending Brigadier-General Shelby with a small portion of his division and a section of his artillery to attack the town from the west side of the river at the same hour, to divert the attention of the enemy and protect their advance under the cover of the fire of his artillery. Owing to unforeseen difficulties in crossing the river Brigadier-General Clark was unable to commence the attack for one hour after Brigadier-General Shelby had engaged them. The place was surrendered, but not until after the City Hall was destroyed and the arms consumed by fire. By the capture of this place, however, we obtained between 800 or 900 prisoners, about 1,200 small-arms, about the same number of overcoats, 150 horses, 1 steam-boat, and large amounts of underclothing. This enterprise was a great success, effected with but comparatively small loss on our side, and reflects great honor on all the parties concerned in it. The captured prisoners were paroled, such of the ordnance and other stores captured as could not be carried were distributed, and the remaining portion, together with the steam-boat, burned. (For full particulars reference is made to the accompanying reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark.) In the awards of praise contained in [them] the general commanding cordially concurs.

On the night of the 13th I encamped at Mr. Marshall's, marching fourteen miles, and on the next day marched to Jonesborough--a distance of eight miles--where I was joined by Major-General Fagan, who had been left behind at the La Mine. I there ordered Brig. Gen. M. Jeff. Thompson, then commanding Shelby's old brigade, to take with him a force of not less than 800 or 1,000 men and one section of artillery by Longwood, and from thence to Sedalia, to attack the Federal force at that place if he should deem it advisable and prudent. This order was promptly and completely carried out by Brigadier-General Thompson. <ar83_633> The place, though strongly fortified and well garrisoned, was carried by a bold and daring assault and fell into our hands with over 200 prisoners, who were paroled, several hundred stand of arms, many pistols, and several wagon loads of goods suitable to soldiers. (For particulars reference is made to the accompanying reports of Generals Shelby and Thompson.) The latter withdrew on the approach of the enemy.

On the 15th I reached Keiser's, having passed through Marshall, marching seventeen miles, where I remained two days awaiting the arrival of Brigadier-General Clark, for whose safety I began to entertain fears, inasmuch as information had been received that the enemy were on my left flank and in my rear in large force. Previous to the attack on Sedalia the large and magnificent bridge on the La Mine River on the Pacific Railroad had been destroyed by Lieut. James Wood, of Elliott's battalion, who had been sent there by Brigadier-General Shelby for that purpose. On the 17th I received information that the enemy (Kansas troops)had entered Lexington on the 16th. On the 17th I received news of the capture of Sedalia by Brigadier-General Thompson. On the 18th, having been joined by Brigadier-General Shelby's division and Clark's brigade, of Marmaduke's division, I marched to Waverly, a distance of twenty-two miles.

On leaving Pocahontas I had sent an agent into Saint Louis of great intelligence and tact to ascertain the strength of the enemy at that city, with directions to report to me if possible at Potosi. He was, however, so closely watched that he could not join me until after I had passed that city. Upon overtaking me he informed me that I would be pursued by 24,000 men from Saint Louis, 15,000 from Jefferson City, which, with the forces in my front from Kansas, he believed to be the entire force with which I would have to contend. I then abandoned my former determination to issue an address to the people calling upon them to rally to me, as they were already pouring in on me so rapidly that I knew I would not be able to protect and feed them, and as it would require that my army should be kept together to protect them on a rapid and dangerous retreat from the State.

At daybreak on the morning of the 19th I moved from Waverly in the direction of Lexington, Brigadier-General Shelby's division in the advance, and having received information that Generals Blunt, Lane, and Jennison, with between 3,000 and 4,000 Federals (Colorado, Kansas, and Missouri Federal troops), were at Lexington, and fearing that they might make a junction with McNeil and A. J. Smith, who were at Sedalia and Salt Fork, I made a flank movement to the left after crossing the Tabo, so as to intercept their line of march. The advance, under Shelby, met them about 2 p.m., and a battle immediately ensued. For a time the Federals fought well and resisted strenuously, but finally giving way, they were pressed by our troops, driven well past Lexington, and pursued on the road to Independence until night put an end to the combat. That night the enemy evacuated Lexington in great haste and confusion. Shelby's old brigade, under General M. Jeff. Thompson, bivouacked that night in the suburbs of the town. I encamped at General Shields' farm, three miles south of Lexington, marching that day twenty-six miles. On the morning of the 20th I moved west in the same direction as before to Fire Creek Prairie, a distance of twenty-two miles, where I encamped. Information reached me that the enemy had fallen back to the Little Blue. On the 21st I resumed my line of march to the Little Blue on the Independence road, Major-General Marmaduke's division in the front, whose advance <ar83_634> soon came upon the enemy's pickets, who, being driven across the Blue, destroyed the bridge as they crossed. A ford half mile below the bridge was seized by our troops and Marmaduke's division crossed it. His advance (Colonel Lawther's regiment) soon came upon the enemy, who were strongly posted behind a stone fence in superior numbers. Lawther's regiment was driven back and was hotly pursued by the foe, when they were re-enforced by Colonel Greene with about 150 men. A fierce engagement ensued with varying success, Colonel Greene stubbornly contesting every inch of ground, when Wood's battalion arrived, and the enemy gave way, but being re-enforced again renewed the attack, when, as the ammunition of our troops engaged (who still manfully resisted with success the far-superior numbers of the enemy) was about to become exhausted, Colonel Kitchen's regiment arrived to their relief. The enemy again fell back to their former strong position.

Hearing of the critical condition of Major-General Marmaduke's division, I had sent orders to Brigadier-General Shelby to march rapidly to his relief, who accordingly hastened to the scene of action with his division, and arrived there at the time when the enemy had taken refuge in their first position. An immediate attack was made upon them and a furious battle ensued, but the enemy were finally forced from their position and they retreated. Brigadier-General Shelby now taking the lead drove them in a stubborn running fight on foot (his men having been dismounted) for seven miles and beyond Independence. (For full particulars of this fight reference is made to the reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark, and to that of Colonel Greene, accompanying the latter.)

In this action Major-General Marmaduke acted with distinguished gallantry, having not less than two horses shot under him. Brigadier-General Clark, of his division, also exhibited great bravery and skill, while Colonel Greene, by the manner in which he handled his regiment against vastly superior forces flushed with previous success, beating them back with his handful of men and stubbornly contesting every inch of ground until assistance came to his relief, as well as the personal courage exhibited by him, justly excited the admiration of his superior officers. Fagan's division under my orders supported Shelby, but were not immediately engaged.

I encamped that night in Independence, having marched twenty.six miles, the troops being engaged with the enemy most of the time and driving them before them. On the evening of the 21st Captain Williams, of Brigadier-General Shelby's division, who had been sent on recruiting service by him, rejoined his command with about 600 men, capturing on his route the town of Carrollton with 300 prisoners, and armed his entire command. On the morning of the 22d I left Independence. The enemy had fallen back to Big Blue, on the Kansas City road, to a position strong by nature and strengthened by fortifications, upon which all their art had been exhausted, and where they had been joined by General Curtis and his forces, thus increasing Blunt's army to between 6,000 and 8,000 men. Receiving this information I determined to advance on the Santa Fé road, which had been obstructed by felling trees, and did so, Brigadier-General Shelby's division in front, who advanced, detaching Jackman and sending him on the Kansan City road to engage the enemy, then skirmishing with the pickets. Brigadier-General Shelby crossed the Big Blue with the remainder of his division, meeting some opposition from the enemy, which was soon overcome. After crossing the Big Blue he engaged the enemy to cover the crossing and the passage of the train. <ar83_635>

Brigadier-General Thompson with his brigade, except Gordon's regiment, pressed the enemy to near the town of Westport, where he was ordered to fall back to the Blue. Colonel Gordon, with his regiment, who had been retained to guard the left, soon became engaged and was sorely pressed by overpowering numbers, when he was rejoined by Jackman, and, gallantly charging, they repulsed the enemy, capturing a 24-pounder howitzer, and pursued them some distance, inflicting upon the enemy heavy loss. A large force of the enemy came out from Westport and a severe fight ensued, the enemy obstinately endeavoring to regain the gun which they had lost, but they were sternly resisted, and finally the arrival of Brigadier-General Thompson and night put an end to the conflict. (For full particulars reference is made to the accompanying report of Brigadier-General Shelby.)

Two flags were also captured, which were presented me on the battle-field by Captains McCoy and Wood, of Gordon's regiment, who had taken them from the enemy with their own hands.

In the meantime other forces had engaged me in the rear. Having received information that other bodies of the enemy were pursuing me, I had directed pickets to be placed at the Little Blue to give notice of their approach. This had been done by Major-General Fagan, and being advised on the morning of the 22d that the enemy had attacked and driven in his pickets, he dispatched Brigadier-General Cabell to drive back the enemy, which he succeeded in doing, but on his return on coming out of Independence the enemy struck Cabell a blow in the flank, cutting off 300 or 400 men and capturing 2 pieces of artillery. Major-General Marmaduke's division, which formed the rear of the army, became engaged with the same enemy about half an hour before sundown. The division was then about two miles from Independence. The advance of the enemy was checked by our troops, who then fell back about half a mile and took a new position, which the enemy attacked with increased fierceness, driving our troops steadily back until a late hour of the night and in almost impenetrable darkness. (For particulars reference is made to the accompanying report of Brigadier-General Clark.) I encamped that night on the battle-field near Westport in line of battle, having marched twelve miles, the troops almost constantly engaging the enemy the whole distance.

On the morning of the 23d I took up my line of march, and in a short time discovered the enemy in position on the prairie. The train had been sent forward on the Fort Scott road. I had instructed Major-General Marmaduke to resist the advance of the enemy, who was in his rear, if possible, as he was on the same road as the train. Brigadier-General Shelby immediately attacked the enemy, assisted by Major-General Fagan with two brigades of Arkansas troops, and though they resisted most stubbornly and contested every point of the approach, drove them six or seven miles into Westport. In the meantime Major-General Marmaduke, who was to my right and rear, being attacked with great fierceness by an overwhelming force of the enemy, after a most strenuous resistance, his ammunition being exhausted, had to fall back before the foe. (For full particulars reference is made to the accompanying report of Brigadier-General Clark.)

Being at that time near Westport, and in full view of Generals Fagan and Shelby and their commands, I received information that my train, which was in front and on the right of the Fort Scott road, was threatened by the enemy, some 2,000 or 2,500 strong, who were moving on a line parallel to the Fort Scott road. I immediately sent the information to Major-General Fagan and Brigadier-General Shelby, and directed them <ar83_636> to fall back to the train as soon as they could do so with safety, which I would attempt to defend until they arrived. I immediately pushed forward to the front of the train with my escort and there formed in line of battle the unarmed men, which were present to the number of several thousand, throwing my escort and the whole number of armed men of Tyler's brigade, formed as skirmishers (the whole not exceeding more than 200), to the front of the enemy, and directing Brigadier-General Cabell, who arrived soon after, to hold the crossing of the creek on my left, sending forward at the same time for a portion of Colonel McCray's brigade, which was in advance of the train, and on his approach forming him in line of battle on the left flank of the enemy, which caused the enemy to fall back a considerable distance on the prairie. In the meantime the rear and flank of the commands of Major-General Fagan and Brigadier-General Shelby by the falling back of Major-General Marmaduke were uncovered, and the former in attempting to rejoin me was attacked by a large force of the enemy, but with the aid of Colonel Jackman and his brigade, who came to his assistance, and who acted so heroically and skillfully as to receive the thanks of Major-General Fagan on the field, the enemy were repulsed, while Brigadier-General Shelby in attempting to obey my instructions was attacked in the flank and his command thrown into some confusion, but rallied, repulsed the enemy, and rejoined me that evening, as did also Major-General Fagan. (Full details of this are contained in the accompanying reports of Brigadier-General Shelby and Colonel Jackman.) I encamped that night on the Middle Fork of Grand River, having marched twenty-four miles and the troops having been engaged with the enemy nearly all day. The number of the enemy's troops engaged that day exceeded 20,000 well-armed men, while I did not have 8,000 armed men.

On the morning of the 24th I moved with the command on the Fort Scott road to the Marais des Cygnes, where I encamped, having marched thirty-three miles, no enemy appearing. During the night I received information from Major-General Marmaduke, who was placed in charge of the approaches in front, that the enemy were threatening his pickets, and upon consultation with Major-General Marmaduke we were both of opinion that the enemy were marching upon our right by Mound City on a road parallel to the one on which we were. We were strengthened in that belief by a dispatch which had been captured from the commanding Federal officer at that place to his scouts, stationed near our then encampment, stating that he would be largely re-enforced that night, and that he wanted a sharp lookout [kept] for my army, and to give him the earliest information of the route on which I would travel and the direction. I also received at a late hour at night information from some new recruits who joined me, and who had traveled fifteen miles on the route I had traveled, that there was no enemy in my rear. On the morning of the 25th I resumed my march in the same direction as before, and I considered from the information I had received the night before that if I should encounter the enemy it would be in my front or on my right flank. Brigadier-General Shelby's division composed the advance, Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke's divisions composed the rear guard, Colonel Tyler's brigade to the right of the center of the train 400 yards, Brigadier-General Shelby's old brigade to the right of the front 400 yards, and Colonel Jackman's brigade to the immediate front.

On reaching Little Osage River I sent forward a direction to Briga-dier-General Shelby to fall back to my position in rear of Jackman's <ar83_637> brigade for the purpose of attacking and capturing Fort Scott, where I learned there were 1,000 negroes under arms. At the moment of his reaching me I received a dispatch from Major-General Marmaduke, in the rear, informing me that the enemy, 3,000 strong, were in sight of his rear, with lines still extending, and on the note Major-General Fagan had indorsed that he would sustain Major-General Marmaduke. I immediately ordered Brigadier-General Shelby to take his old brigade, which was on my immediate right, and return to the rear as rapidly as possible to support Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. I immediately mounted my horse and rode back at a gallop, and after passing the rear of the train I met the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke retreating in utter and indescribable confusion, many of them having thrown away their arms. They were deaf to all entreaties or commands, and in vain were all efforts to rally them. From them I received the information that Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, and Colonel Slemons, commanding brigade, had been captured, with 300 or 400 of their men and all their artillery (5 pieces).

Major-General Fagan and several of his officers, who had there joined me, assisted me in trying to rally the armed men, without success. I then ordered Brigadier-General Shelby to hold the enemy, who were pressing their success hotly and fiercely, in check if possible at the crossing of the Osage until the train could be placed in safety, which he succeeded in doing for several hours. I again formed the unarmed men, numbering several thousand, in line of battle on the prairie beyond the river. Major-General Fagan in the meantime had succeeded in rallying a portion of his forces, and assisted Brigadier-General Shelby in again holding the enemy in check upon the prairie and in front of the immense lines of unarmed men until night-fall, when I withdrew. The train having reached the Marmiton, a distance of ten miles, I there overtook it, having marched a distance of twenty-eight miles.

On the next morning, after destroying many wagons with broken-down teams that could not be replaced, I took up my line of march at 2 o'clock, there being but little forage in the neighborhood of my encampment. We marched over beautiful prairie roads, a distance of fifty-six miles, and encamped at Carthage, on Spring River, the nearest point that forage could be procured, as I was informed by Major-General Fagan and Brigadier General Shelby, who earnestly desired me to reach Spring River, as no forage could be procured short of it. The Federal prisoners I had with me became so much exhausted by fatigue that out of humanity I paroled them. (For full particulars of this action seethe several reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark and other accompanying reports.) On the next morning at 9 o'clock, after giving the men and animals time to rest and feed, I resumed my line of march and encamped on Shoal Creek, a distance of twenty-two miles. During the march a number of desertions took place among the Arkansas troops and new recruits. No enemy having appeared the morale of the troops had considerably improved.

On the morning of the 28th I resumed my line of march in the direction of Newtonia, Brigadier-General Shelby in advance, Major-Generals Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions (the latter now commanded by Brigadier-General Clark) in the rear. On approaching Newtonia the advance of our forces was discovered by the Federal garrison, who commenced a retreat. On seeing this Shelby's advance endeavored to intercept them. The distance they had gained, however, was too great for this to be effected. They succeeded in killing the Federal Captain Christian, <ar83_638> a notorious bushwhacker, as it is termed--that is, robber and murderer--noted for his deeds of violence and blood. After pass-lug over the prairie about four tories beyond Newtonia, Brigadier-General Shelby halted his command at the edge of the prairie in a skirt of timber and there encamped for the night. The other divisions of the army passed on beyond him and encamped in the proper positions they were to assume in the line of march the following day. Ere long our scouts brought the information the enemy were crossing the prairie in pursuit of us. Preparations were immediately made to receive him, and about 3 o'clock General Blunt, with 3,000 Federal cavalry, moved rapidly across the prairie in pursuit of us and made a furious onslaught upon our lines. He was engaged by Shelby, supported by a portion of Fagan's command. A short but obstinate combat ensued, when Blunt was repulsed and driven across the prairie three miles with heavy loss. This was the last we saw of the enemy. The army marched that day twenty-six miles and encamped. (For full particulars see General Shelby's report.) On the 29th we marched twenty-six miles and encamped on Sugar Creek five miles south of Pineville, passing through the town. No information was received in regard to the enemy. On the 30th and 31st we reached Maysville, near the Arkansas line; marched forty-three miles, and on the 1st of November I reached Boonsborough, or Cane Hill, as it is called, marching seventeen miles. There information Was received by Major-General Fagan from Colonel Brooks that he had the town of Fayetteville, Ark., closely invested, and the Federal garrison forced to seek shelter within their inner fortifications, and asking for a sufficient number of men to enable him to capture the place and garrison. As this was a place of considerable importance to the Federals and its capture would be of great advantage to the cause, upon Major-General Fagan's earnest solicitation I ordered a detail of 500 men and two guns to be made for that purpose, which were furnished by General Shelby under Colonel Elliott, the two guns being furnished by Collins' battery. The expedition started to Fayetteville, formed a junction with Colonel Brooks, but before the place could be taken the approach of General Blunt with a large force of Federal cavalry caused the siege to be raised, and Colonel Elliott rejoined his command. Our march from Illinois River to Cane Hill was over a bad road, very rough and hilly, and rendered much worse than usual by the constant rains, consequently much of the stock became worn out and was abandoned on the route.

On the 3d I remained in camp. The weather was very bad, both snowing and raining during the day. I there received information that the Federal army at Little Rock had been greatly re-enforced by a portion of General Canby's command, and as it was necessary that I should here adopt the line of march I should pursue on my return to Arkansas, at district headquarters or elsewhere, as I should be directed, I determined not to risk the crossing of the Arkansas between Fort Smith and Little Rock, on which route I could not procure subsistence, forage, or grass in anything like sufficient quantity, but I decided to cross through the Indian country, where beef at least could be obtained, which would at least subsist my men for the few days it would require them to march until they would meet supplies, even if no salt or breadstuffs could be procured, while some grass could be obtained for the animals. In addition, the route across the Arkansas River below Fort Smith would be over a rough, hilly, and in many parts mountainous country that the stock in its then condition would be unable to travel over, while the route through the Indian country would be over a level and beautiful <ar83_639> prairie country traversed by good roads. Again, by the route below Fort Smith I would expose my whole army to be destroyed by a joint attack from Federal forces detached from the heavy garrison there and acting conjointly with large forces from Little Rock, which could easily be spared for the purpose, and which would in every probability take place, as information of my adopting that line of route would certainly reach them, and the slowness with which I would necessarily have to travel would give them ample time to make all necessary preparations. I was, furthermore, induced to come to this conclusion from the fact that it coincided with my instructions, in the propriety and reasonableness of which my own judgment fully concurred. Colonels Freeman, Dobbin, and McCray were ordered to return such of their men as still remained with their colors to the place where they had raised their commands in order to collect the absentees together and bring them within our lines during the month of December, if possible, and on the 4th day of November I took up my line of march with the balance of my command through the Indian Territory in the direction of Boggy Depot. On the 13th I arrived at Perryville, in the Indian Nation, a distance of 119 [miles], where I met with three wagons with supplies, and encamped, remaining over one day to rest and recruit my men. I had marched carefully and slowly, stopping to graze my stock whenever an opportunity offered. On the 14th General Shelby, at his own request, was left behind on the Canadian to recruit. On the 10th Cabell's brigade was furloughed, as also the brigade formerly commanded by Colonel Slemons, who was captured. On the 21st of November I arrived at Clarksville, where I received an order from Major-General Magruder to march to Laynesport and there establish my headquarters. I arrived there on the 2d of December, 1864, having marched 1,434 miles.

The march through the Indian country was necessarily a severe one, especially upon the stock, many of which died or became worn out and were consequently abandoned. The men in some instances hungered for food, but never approached starvation, nor did they suffer to anything like the extent that other of our soldiers have cheerfully endured without complaint for a much longer time during this war. At all events, I arrived in the country where forage and subsistence could be obtained in abundance, bringing with me in safety all the sick and wounded and all my command with which I entered the Indian country, without a single exception, except those who voluntarily straggled off and deserted their colors.

To enumerate specially the names of the officers who distinguished themselves for their skill and courage would swell this report beyond all reasonable limits; therefore, as to all but general officers and those who acted in that capacity, I would simply refer to the accompanying reports, heartily concurring in the meed of praise awarded to such officers as are therein enumerated by their immediate commanding officers. Maj. Gen. J. F. Fagan, commanding the division of Arkansas troops, bore himself throughout the whole expedition with unabated gallantry and ardor, and commanded his division with great ability. Maj. Gen. J. S. Marmaduke, commanding division, proved himself worthy of his past reputation as a valiant and skillful officer, and rendered with his division great service. His capture was a great loss to the army. Brig. Gen. J. O. Shelby, commanding division, added new luster to his past fame as a brilliant and heroic officer, and without disparagement to the officers I must be permitted to say that I consider him the best cavalry officer I ever saw. The services rendered by him and his division in this expedition are beyond all praise. Brigadier-General Cabell <ar83_640> bore himself as a bold, undaunted, skillful officer. Impetuous, yet wary, he commanded his brigade in such a manner as to win praise from all. I regret that for the want of reports from their several commanding officers I am not able to do justice to this as well as other brigades of Arkansas troops. Brigadier-General Cabell's capture was a great misfortune, and his place will be difficult to fill. Brigadier-General Clark, true to his past fame, bore himself with undaunted courage and bravery, as well as skill and prudence. His brigade was most skillfully handled. Colonels Slemons, Dobbin, and McCray (the former of whom was captured) acted throughout as brave, daring, yet prudent, officers, and are each entitled to great praise. Colonel Freeman proved himself to be a brave and energetic officer, but as his men were mostly unarmed they were not able to render the same brilliant services as other brigades that were armed. Colonel Tyler, who was placed in command of a brigade of new recruits, for the most part unarmed, deserves great praise for the success with which he kept them together and brought them within our lines, and deserves especial mention for the cool gallantry he displayed in charging the enemy with them at an important juncture, thereby greatly aiding in saving the train of the army from destruction.

My thanks are due to my staff officers for their untiring energy and unremitting attention to their duties during the entire campaign. Their zeal and devotion cannot be too highly commended by me.

In conclusion, permit me to add that in my opinion the results flowing from my operations in Missouri are of the most gratifying character. I marched 1,434 miles; fought forty three battles and skirmishes; captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers and men; captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of small-arms, 16 stand of colors that were brought out by me (besides many others that were captured and afterward destroyed by our troops who took them), at least 3,000 overcoats, large quantities of blankets, shoes, and ready-made clothing for soldiers, a great many wagons and teams, large numbers of horses, great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I destroyed miles upon miles of railroad, burning the depots and bridges; and taking this into calculation, I do not think I go beyond the truth when I state that I destroyed in the late expedition to Missouri property to the amount of $10,000,000 in value. On the other hand, I lost 10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,000 small-arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000 prisoners, including the wounded left in their hands and others than recruits on their way to join me, some of whom may have been captured by the enemy.

I brought with me at least 5,000 new recruits, and they are still arriving in large numbers daily within our lines, who bring the cheering intelligence that there are more on their way to the army. After I passed the German settlements in Missouri my march was an ovation. The people thronged around us and welcomed us with open hearts and hands. Recruits flocked to our flag in such numbers as to threaten to become a burden instead of a benefit, as they were mostly unarmed. In some counties the question was not who should go to the army, but who should stay at home. I am satisfied that could I have remained in Missouri this winter the army would have been increased 50,000 men.

My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, my provost-marshal, for the able, energetic, and efficient discharge of his duties.

Chief of Staff, Shreveport, La

SHREVEPORT, LA.
Brigadier-General W. R. BOGGS, Chief of Staff:
General--I have the honor to make the following report of my operations in the late expedition to Missouri. I regret to state that the report is meagre and incomplete, for the reason that Major-General Marmaduke and Brigadier-General Cabell, who bore so honorable and conspicuous a share in the greater part of the expedition, were captured before its close and are prisoners in the hands of the enemy; whilst Major-General Fagan, who commanded the Arkansas troops, composing a large part of the forces engaged, has as yet been unable to make any report, nor have any been received from the subordinate commanders.
In conformity with the letter <shv7_210>of instructions from General E. Kirby Smith, dated 11th August, 1864, I made immediate arrangements for a movement into Missouri, as concluded upon in my interview and conference with him upon that subject, with the cavalry force in the District of Arkansas, then under my command--being promised, in addition, the brigade of Louisiana cavalry, commanded by Colonel Harrison, estimated at 1,500 strong. At the same time information in full detail of the proposed movement, of the route to be pursued and of the probable time when it would be made, was, without delay, sent by me to Brigadier-General Shelby, who then commanded in Northeast Arkansas, with instructions to make an attack, when in his judgment he should deem advisable, upon Du Vall's bluff and the railroad between Little Rock and White river, in the possession of the enemy, and by diverting their attention, enable me to. cross the lower Arkansas and unite our forces without danger of failure. These instructions were carried out in full by General Shelby, and resulted in an attack upon the railroad, terminating in the most complete success--over four hundred Federals captured, three hundred killed and wounded, six forts taken and destroyed, ten miles of railroad destroyed, as well as vast quantities of forage, &c.; full particulars of which are contained in General Shelby's report accompanying. This exploit was one of the most brilliant of the war, and cast additional lustre upon the well earned fame of that gallant General and the officers and men under his command.
It was part of the plan concluded upon that I should cross the Arkansas river about the 20th of August, with the troops under my immediate command; but from delay in receiving the necessary ordnance stores I was unable to do so. Finally, the required complement was received on the 27th, and on the 28th of August I was relieved from the command of the District of Arkansas and crossed the Ouachita river. On the 29th arrived at Princeton, where the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke were, and assumed command of all the cavalry in the District of Arkansas, according to the instructions of General Smith above referred to. In the meantime, owing to the delay in starting, I was of the opinion that the enemy had become informed of my intended line of march, and concluded to cross the Arkansas river at the most feasible point north of Little Rock and south of Fort Smith, taking into consideration the probable means of obtaining forage and subsistence.
On the 30th I took up my line of march in the direction of Little Rock, <shv7_211>
and arrived that afternoon at Tulip, a distance of nine miles. Colonel Harrison's brigade had not yet arrived, but as I could wait no longer, I left instructions at Princeton, directing him, if he should arrive there within three days, to follow on and form a junction with me, giving him information of the route I should take; but in case he did not reach Princeton in that time, he should then report to the commanding officer of the District of Arkansas. Colonel Harrison did not take part in the expedition.
On the morning of the 31st I resumed my march in the same direction as on the previous day, and continued on the same until within seven miles of Benton, when I diverged to the left, taking a northwest direction, sending Major-General Fagan across the Saline river to make a demonstration towards Little Rock and to protect my right flank. On the 5th September he joined me, bringing up the rear.  I reached Dardanelle, on the Arkansas river, a distance of 167 miles from Camden, on 6th September. The country through which I had passed was hilly and in some parts mountainous, sparsely settled, but plenty of forage and subsistence was obtained. The Arkansas being fordable at this point, on the 7th I crossed and marched to Dover, a distance of fourteen miles. Major-General Marmaduke, with his division, and part of his train, had already crossed before my arrival, thus covering the crossing of the remainder of the army.
At Princeton verbal and written communications had been sent to Brigadier-General Shelby, apprising him of the changes of route, and directing him to join me at Batesville. But up to this time I had received no information from him of his movements or position. I resumed the march in the direction of the last mentioned point--Major-General Fagan, with his command, marching along the Springfield road, and Major-General Marmaduke and headquarters train the Clinton road; taking separate roads on account of the scarcity of forage, and to rid that section of country of deserters and Federal jayhawkers, as they are termed (i.e., robbers and murderers), with which that country is infested. These bands, however, dispersed and took refuge in the mountains at the approach of the army; several were killed and a few taken prisoners. Arriving at Little Red river on the 10th, and still without information of the position or movements of General Shelby, I dispatched an officer of known skill and daring to communicate with him, directing that he should unite himself with the rest of the command at once. On the 18th I arrived at a point on White river, <shv7_212>eighteen miles above Batesville, and received information that Brigadier-General Shelby was at Powhatan, about sixty-four miles northeast of Batesville, and on the selected route to Missouri. I adopted the town of Pocahontas as the point of rendezvous, and directed Major-General Marmaduke, with his own command and train and that of headquarters, to march to that point direct, while I proceeded to Batesville and thence to Powhatan. Major-General Fagan, with his division, who had arrived at Batesville, marched to Powhatan on the left. I arrived on the 13th September and found General Shelby with part of his command. Reached Pocahontas the next day, and then the remainder of Shelby's command reported, including the brigades of Jackman, McCroy and Dobbins. In fine, the whole army was concentrated. The country over which I had passed was rugged and mountainous in the extreme, and had damaged the transportation to some extent, but it had been or was on the point of being repaired; and on the other hand, by adopting the routes marched over, sufficient forage and subsistence had been obtained.
The towns and villages through which I had passed had been robbed, pillaged, burned and otherwise destroyed by the enemy, and were nearly deserted by the former inhabitants; in fact, the whole country presented but a scene of desolation.
Upon arriving at Pocahontas I proceeded to organize the army, which was completed on the 18th, as follows:
Fagan's division, commanded by Major-General J. F. Fagan, composed of Brigadier-General W. L. Cabell's brigade, Colonel Slemmons', Colonel McCroy's and Colonel Dobbins' brigades, Colonels Lyle's and Rogan's commands, and Captain Andrews' battalion.
Marmaduke's division, commanded by Major-General J. S. Marmaduke, composed of Brigadier-General John B. Clark's and Colonel Freeman's brigades, Colonel Kitchen's regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Wood's battalion. Shelby's division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. O. Shelby, consisted of Colonels Shanks' and Jackson's brigades, and Colonel Coleman's command.
Having determined to invade Missouri in three columns, General Fagan with his division was ordered to march to Fredericktown, Missouri, by the way of Martinsburg, Reeve's station and Greenville. Major-General Marmaduke with his division was ordered to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, Missouri, to the right of the route to be followed by Fagan's division, as above designated; <shv7_213>varying from it ten to thirty miles, or as near within those limits as might be practicable on account of the roads and forage. Shelby with his command was to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, by a route to the left of General Fagan's, varying from ten to twenty miles, as nearly as practicable, on account of roads and forage. Headquarters to march with the centre column. At Fredericktown the three divisions were ordered to form a junction. A map of the route to be followed was furnished each of the division commanders. The most stringent orders were issued against straggling and pillaging under the severest penalties, and the division commanders were earnestly enjoined to use their utmost endeavors to have the orders carried into effect in every particular and without delay.
On the 19th of September the army marched in the order above designated, and on that day I entered Missouri with 12,000 men--only 8,000, however, armed--and fourteen pieces of artillery, and on the 24th of September reached Fredericktown, Missouri, with the centre column. Brigadier-General Shelby was in the advance, passing, in his route, through Doniphan and Patterson; whilst Major-General Marmaduke, whose route was by Poplar bluff, Castorville and Dallas, had not yet come up. On the 19th, before Brigadier-General Shelby reached Doniphan, news of the arrival of the army having been received, a force of the enemy, composed of a part of the Federal Missouri Twelfth cavalry, then occupying the place, withdrew, first setting fire to the town, which was consumed, and retreated to Pender's mills (burning the houses of citizens as they passed), where they were overtaken the next day and routed, with a loss of a lieutenant and three men killed, four wounded and six prisoners, besides several horses and small arms; our loss two killed and five wounded.
On the 22d Brigadier-General Shelby attacked the town of Patterson, but the garrison having received information of his approach hastily evacuated the place, with a loss of twenty-eight killed and several wounded, also a telegraph battery and operator captured; no loss on our part.
On the 25th I remained at Fredericktown awaiting the arrival of Marmaduke's division, which came up that evening within eight miles of the place. General Marmaduke on his route had a few skirmishes with the Federal militia, killing and wounding four and capturing eleven. Colonel Jeffries, of Marmaduke's division, had, before the arrival of the army at Pocahontas, been sent with his regiment to Bloomfield, Missouri, which the enemy evacuated on <shv7_214>his approach, killing a number and capturing arms and six wagon loads of army stores. He rejoined his brigade (Clark's) on the 24th; detached again on the 25th, he attacked and, by a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of the town of old Jackson. For particulars see Brigadier-General Clark's report.. I received at Fredericktown satisfactory evidence that the strength of the enemy at Ironton was about 1,500, and that the Federal General A. J. Smith was camped about ten miles from Saint Louis with his corps, composed of about eight thousand infantry, on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain railroad. I immediately ordered Brigadier-General Shelby to proceed at once with his division, by way of Farmington, to a point on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain railroad, where there were then five bridges in close proximity to each other, to destroy the railroad there and the bridges, and after effecting that object to fall back in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, which would effectually prevent General A. J. Smith from reinforcing the garrison at those places, which I would attack and take with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. General Shelby proceeded to the point indicated and performed the duty assigned him in the most complete and effectual manner, destroying the splendid bridge at Irondale as well as the three mentioned, tearing up miles and miles of the track, burning the ties, rails, &c. For full particulars, reference is made to his report accompanying. On the morning of the 26th, being rejoined by Major-General Marmaduko with his division, I proceeded at an early hour, with his and Fagan's divisions, in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, at, the same time sending forward a portion of Fagan's division to take and hold a difficult pass in that direction, between two mountains, within three and four miles of Ironton. This was effected rapidly and with success. That evening I sent forward the remainder of his division, leaving his train at Saint Francois creek, where forage could be obtained for the animals, and where I encamped for the night with the rest of the command. That evening General Fagan drove in the Federal pickets at Arcadia and, took position before the town for the night. Next morning he drove the enemy from Arcadia, where they abandoned a very strong position, through Ironton, where he also took a strong fort, in a most gallant and brilliant manner. The enemy took refuge behind their fortifications at Pilot Knob. Having received such information as appeared to be perfectly reliable concerning the character and strength of the fortifications as induced me to believe that the <shv7_215>place could be taken without great loss, I accordingly directed Major-General Marmaduke to take possession of Shepherd's mountain, which was west of the fortifications and completely commanded them. This was most satisfactorily accomplished, and his artillery placed in position on the mountain. Major-General Fagan formed on the south and east. Skirmishing took place all the day, and firing of artillery from the enemy until 2 P.M., when a charge was ordered and made in the most gallant and determined manner, officers and men vieing with each other, in both divisions, in deeds of unsurpassed bravery, charging up to the muzzles of the enemy's cannon. Where all acted, as heroes, it would seem almost invidious to make any exception; but I must be allowed to call attention to the courage and gallantry of General Cabell in leading his men to the assault, having his horse killed under him within forty yards of the fort. But the information I had received in regard to the strength of the fortifications, proved totally incorrect. Our troops were repulsed; and it being too late to renew the assault, they were withdrawn beyond reach of the enemy's guns, and preparations were made for a renewal of the assault on next day. I had dispatched a courier, on the morning of the 27th, to Brigadier-General Shelby, informing him of the proposed operations, and directing him to rejoin the main army to assist in the attack, and on the evening of the 27th another courier was dispatched, informing him of the capture of Arcadia and Ironton, and of the repulse at Pilot Knob, and of my design to renew there the attack on the following morning, and hoping that the courier would meet him on the way, instructed him to join me, as also the route to pursue. Neither of these communications, as it appears, was received by Brigadier-General Shelby, who, having heard that there was a force of the enemy at Potosi, had left the railroad and marched to attack them at that place, which was captured by him, with its garrison of one hundred and fifty Federals, arms, &c. The depot, of the railroad at that place, with seven fine cars, were also destroyed. For full particulars, reference is made to the accompany report of Brigadier-General Shelby.
The enemy at Pilot Knob, on the night following the first attack, evacuated the fort, blowing up the magazine, leaving in my possession sixteen pieces of artillery, a large number of small arms, a large amount of army stores, consisting of bales of blankets, hundreds of barrels of flour and bacon, quantities of coffee, &c. After destroying the artillery, which I could not take with me, and distributing <shv7_216>among the troops such of the stores as were needed, I moved my command twelve miles on the road the enemy had retreated, sending Marmaduke forward in pursuit, in command of his own and Shelby's divisions, which had rejoined the command. Untiring pursuit was made night and day, but it was not until the evening of the following day that he was overtaken, owing to the natural difficulties presented by the country over which the enemy retreated. Major-General Marmaduke, who was in advance, fought him until an hour before sunset, when Shelby was thrown in front and the fight continued until dark. The enemy having thrown up fortifications during the night, it was deemed not advisable to renew the attack, and the forces were withdrawn. The particulars in full are contained in accompanying reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark.
My loss in this effort I cannot give, as I have no report from Fagan's division, but the loss in Marmaduke's division was fourteen officers and eighty men killed and wounded. The loss in Fagan's division was doubtless greater. Whilst at Ironton, receiving information that the Federal forces exceeded my own two to one, and knowing the city to be strongly fortified, I determined to move as fast as possible on Jefferson City, destroying, the railroad as I went, with a hope to capture that city with its troops and munitions of war. I arrived at Richwoods on the 30th, having passed through Potosi. Lieutenant Christian, whom I had sent to the Mississippi river before I left Camden for the purpose of obtaining gun-caps, joined me at this place, bringing 150,000. Lieutenant Christian is a most energetic and efficient officer, and deserves especial notice. Major-General Fagan sent 300 men to De Soto to destroy the depot, which was effected, and the militia, who had gathered there in some numbers, at the same time was scattered. At the same time, General Cabell was sent with his brigade to cut the Pacific railroad, east of Franklin, which he did effectually, also burning the depot in that town. On the 29th, Colonel Burbridge and Lieutenant-Colonel Wood were detached by Major-General Marmaduke and sent to Cuba to destroy the depots on the Southwest branch of the Pacific railroad at that place, which they succeeded in doing. The divisions of Marmaduke and Shelby tore up several miles of the Southwest branch of the Pacific railroad. For full details, see reports of Brigadier-Generals Clark and Shelby. Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, of Marmaduke's division, destroyed the important bridge over the Moselle. These two divisions were sent <shv7_217>forward in the direction of Union, which was captured by Brigadier-General Clark, killing thirty-two and wounding seventy of the Federal garrison. On the 2d of October Clark's brigade took possession of Washington without opposition and destroyed the Pacific railroad bridge about two miles from that place. On the 3d a train was captured at Miller's station, with a large amount of clothing and four hundred Sharp's rifles. On the same evening %he town of Hermann was taken possession of, after a slight opposition (the enemy abandoning a six-pound iron gun), by Clark's brigade; for particulars, see report of Brigadier-General Clark, with the accompanying report of Colonel Green. On the 4th of October Major-General Marmaduke sent four hundred men with one gun, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, to destroy the Pacific railroad bridge over the Gasconade river, which he effected. Linn was captured with one hundred prisoners and as many arms by a portion of Shelby's division. On the 6th Brigadier-General Shelby sent a force under Colonel Shanks to destroy the bridge over the Osage, on the Pacific railroad, which was successfully accomplished. A passage was there forced by him across the Osage, six miles below Castle Rock. The enemy disputed the passage warmly, but in vain. In this action the gallant Colonel Shanks received a severe if not mortal wound, and was left in the hands of friends to be cared for; he afterwards fell into the possession of the enemy, and is reported to have since died--a loss greatly to be deplored. He was ever foremost in battle and last in retreat; his death would be regretted by all who mourn the loss of the good and the brave. At the same time Colonel Shanks forced the passage of the Osage as stated, Colonel Gordon, of the same division, forced its passage at Castle Rock, and the division bivouacked that night seven miles from Jefferson City. On the next morning Major-General Fagan was thrown in front with his division, and on the march came upon the enemy five miles from Jefferson City, in large force. A hotly contested battle immediately ensued, but the enemy was gradually driven back to Moscow creek, when being reinforced they again made an obstinate resistance, but were finally routed and forced to seek shelter in their entrenchments--Fagan occupying the heights in full view of the city. On this occasion Major-General Fagan handled his troops with marked skill and ability, under my own immediate observation. Night approaching, I determined to move my forces two miles south of the city, where water and forage were abundant. Did so, and encamped for the night. I had received <shv7_218>positive information that the enemy were 12,000 strong in the city, and that 3,000 more had arrived on the opposite bank of the river, by the North Missouri railroad, before I withdrew to the encampment selected; whereupon I gave immediate instructions to Brigadier-General Shelby to send a sufficient force to burn the bridges. and destroy the railroad west of Jefferson City, in the direction of California, the county seat of Moniteau County; and after a consultation with my general officers, I determined not to attack the enemy in his entrenchments, as they outnumbered me two to one and were strongly fortified, but to move my command in the direction of Kansas, as instructed in my original orders, hoping to be able to capture a sufficient number of arms to arm my unarmed men at Booneville, Sedalia, Lexington and Independence--places which I intended to occupy en route. The next day I accordingly marched towards Kansas and was followed by General McNeill, who made an attack on my rear guard, Fagan's division, but was easily repulsed. General Shelby's division, constituting my advance, reached California on the 7th, having sent a portion of his command to destroy the Pacific railroad, which it did, track, bridges, &c.; passing rapidly on to Booneville he, by a rapid charge, drove in their pickets and the garrison took refuge in their entrenchments. Brigadier-General Shelby, disposing his forces in such a manner as to prevent the arrival of reinforcements, awaited until his artillery could come up. In the meantime propositions for the surrender of the town were made to him and accepted. Accordingly, the place, its garrison, stores, &c., were delivered into his hands. For particulars, reference is made to his accompanying report.
I followed on with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke, and camped on the night of the 8th fourteen miles from Jefferson City. On the 9th marched through and beyond California, making twenty-six miles. On the 10th arrived at Booneville with the rest of the command. My reception was enthusiastic in the extreme--old and young, men, women and children vied. in their salutations and in ministering to the wants and comforts of my wearied and war-worn soldiers. About 300 prisoners were captured at Booneville, with arms, ammunition and many stores, which were distributed among the soldiers. On the 11th, hearing of the approach of General McNeill, with a cavalry force estimated at 2,500 men, for the purpose of attacking Booneville by the Tipton road, I selected my position about half a mile from the river, and placed the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke in <shv7_219>line of battle to receive him. The enemy attacked them, but was easily driven back with loss, and was pursued by a portion of Fagan's division and Jackman's brigade a distance of twenty-one miles from Booneville, with heavy loss, in spite of an obstinate resistance and the ruggedness of the country over which the pursuit was made.
For full particulars of the action, so far as his own troops were concerned, see report of Colonel Jackman accompanying.
Captain Anderson, who that day reported to me with about 100 men, was sent to destroy the North Missouri railroad; at the same time Quantrell, with the men under his command, was sent to destroy the Hannibal and Saint Joseph railroad, to prevent, if possible, the enemy from throwing their forces from Saint Louis in my front. These officers, I was afterwards informed, did some damage to the roads, but none of advantage, and totally failed in the main object proposed, which was to destroy the large railroad bridge in the edge of Saint Charles county. I moved that evening from Booneville to Charteau Springs, on my proposed route, a distance of eleven miles, having recruited at Booneville 1,200 or 1,500 men, mostly unarmed. That night, receiving information that there was 5,000 stand of arms stored in the city hall at Glasgow, I sent Brigadier-General Clark, of Marmaduke's division, with his own brigade and 500 of Jackman's, with orders to cross the river at Arrow Rock and attack the place the next morning at daybreak and. capture it; at the same time sending Brigadier-General Shelby, with a small portion of his division and a section of artillery, to attack the town at the same hour from the west site of the river, to divert the attention of the enemy and protect their advance under cover of the fire from his artillery. Owing to unforeseen difficulties in crossing the river, Brigadier-General Clark was unable to commence the attack for an hour after Brigadier-General Shelby had engaged them. The place was surrendered, but not until the City Hall was destroyed and the arms consumed by fire. However, we obtained eight hundred or nine hundred prisoners, 1,200 small arms, about the same number of overcoats, one hundred and fifty horses, one steamboat, and a large amount of under-clothing. This enterprise was a great success, effected with but small loss on our side and reflects great honor on all parties concerned. The prisoners were paroled, such of the ordnance and other stores as could be carried were distributed and the remainder with the steamboat burned. For particulars, reference is made to the accompanying reports of <shv7_220>Generals Clark and Shelby. In the awards of praise contained, the Commanding General cordially concurs.
On the night of the 13th encamped at Mr. Marshall's, marching fourteen miles, and on the next day to Jonesboro', eight miles, where I was joined by General Fagan, who had been left behind at the Lamine. I then ordered Brigadier General M. Jeff. Thompson, then commanding Shelby's old brigade, to take with him a force of not less than eight hundred or one thousand men and one section of artillery by Longwood and thence to Sedalia and to attack the Federals at that place, if he should deem it prudent and advisable. This order was promptly and completely carried out by General Thompson; the place, though strongly fortified and well garrisoned, was carried by a bold and daring assault, and fell into our hands with over two hundred prisoners, who were paroled, several hundred stand of arms, many pistols and wagon loads of goods suitable to soldiers. Reference is made to the accompanying reports of Generals Shelby and Thompson. The latter withdrew on the approach of a large force of the enemy.
On the 15th I reached Kansas, having passed through Marshall, marching seventeen miles, where I remained two days awaiting General Clark, for whose safety I began to entertain fears, inasmuch as information had been received that the enemy were on my left flank and in my rear in large force. Previous to the attack on Sedalia, the large and magnificent bridge over the Lamine, on the Pacific railroad, had been destroyed by Lieutenant James Wood, of Elliott's battalion, who had been sent there for that purpose by General Shelby. On the 17th I received information that the enemy (Kansas troops) had entered Lexington on the 16th. On the 17th I also received news of the capture of Sedalia by General Thompson. On the 18th, having been joined by Shelby's division and Clark's brigade of Marmaduke's division, I marched to Waverly, twenty two miles.
On leaving Pocahontas I had sent an agent of great intelligence and tact into Saint Louis to ascertain the strength of the enemy at that city, with instructions to report to me if possible at Potosi. He was, however, so closely watched that he could not join me until I had passed that city. Upon overtaking me he informed me that I would be pursued by 24,000 men from Saint Louis and 15,000 from Jefferson City, which, with the force in my front from Kansas, he believed to be the entire force with which I would have to contend. <shv7_221>I then abandoned my former determination to issue an address to the people, calling upon them to rally to me, as they were already pouring in so rapidly that I knew I would not be able to protect and feed them, and as it would require that my army should be kept together to protect them on a rapid and dangerous retreat from the State. At daybreak on the morning of the 19th I moved from Waverly towards Lexington -- General Shelby's division in the advance. Having received information that Generals Blunt, Lane and Semmison, with between 3,000 and 4,000 Federals (Colorado, Kansas and Missouri Federal troops) were at Lexington, and fearing they might make a junction with McNeill and A.J. Smith, who were at Sedalia and Salt Fork, I made a flank movement to the left, after crossing Tabo, so as to intercept their line of march. The advance under Shelby met them at 2 P.M., and a battle immediately ensued. For a time the Federals fought well and resisted strenuously, but finally giving way, they were pressed by our troops, driven well past Lexington, and pursued on the road to Independence until night. That night the enemy evacuated Lexington in great haste and confusion. Shelby's old brigade, under Brigadier General M. Jeff. Thompson, bivouacked that night in the suburbs of town. I encamped at General Shield's, three miles south of Lexington, marching that day twenty six miles. On the morning of the 20th I moved west, in the same direction as before, to Five Creek prairie, twenty two miles, where I encamped. Information was received that the enemy had fallen back to the Little Blue. On the 21st I resumed my line of march to the Little Blue on the Independence road -- Marmaduke's division in the front, whose advance soon came upon the enemy's pickets, who, being driven across the Blue, burned the bridge as they crossed. A ford half a mile below the bridge was seized by our troops, and Marmaduke's division crossed it. His advance, Colonel Lawther's regiment, soon came upon the enemy, who were strongly posted behind a stone fence, in superior numbers. Lawther's regiment was driven back and hotly pursued by the foe, when they were reinforced by Colonel Green with one hundred and fifty men. A fierce engagement ensued, with varying success -- Colonel Green contesting every inch of ground, when Wood's battery arrived and the enemy gave way; but being reinforced, again renewed the attack. Just as the ammunition of our troops engaged -- who still manfully resisted with success the far superior numbers of the enemy -- was about to become exhausted, Colonel Kitchen's regiment <shv7_222>arrived. Again the enemy was repulsed, and fell back to their former strong position. Hearing of the critical condition of General Marmaduke's division, I had sent orders for Shelby to move rapidly to his relief. He accordingly hastened with his division to the scene of action, and arrived there at the time the enemy had taken refuge in their first position; an attack was made upon them; a furious battle followed; the enemy was forced from his position and retreated. General Shelby now, taking the lead; drove them in a stubborn running fight on foot (his men having been dismounted) for two miles, and beyond Independence. Far full particulars of this fight, reference is made to the reports of Generals Shelby and Clark, and to that of Colonel Green, accompanying the latter. In this action, General Marmaduke acted with distinguished gallantry, having not less than two horses shot under him. General Clark, of his division, also exhibited great skill and bravery, whilst Colonel Green, by the manner in which he handled his regiment against vastly superior forces, flushed with success, beating them back with his handful of men, contesting every inch of ground until assistance came, as well as by the personal courage exhibited by him, justly excited the admiration of his superior officers. Fagan's division, under my orders, supported General Shelby, but was not immediately engaged. Encamped that night in Independence -- marching twenty six miles, the troops being engaged most of the time.
On the evening of the 21st, Captain Williams, of Shelby's division, who had been sent on recruiting service, rejoined his command with six hundred men, capturing on his route the town of Carrollton with three hundred prisoners, and arming his entire command. On the morning of the 22d I left Independence. The enemy had fallen back to Big Blue on the Kansas City road, to a position strong by nature and strengthened by fortifications, upon which all their art had been expended; where they had been joined by General Curtis and his forces, thus increasing Blunt's army to between 6,000 and  8,000 men. Receiving this information, I determined to advance on the Santa Fe road, with Shelby's division in front, detaching Sackman and sending him on the Kansas City road to engage the enemy, then skirmishing with the pickets. General Shelby crossed the Big Blue with the remainder of his division, meeting some opposition from the enemy, which was soon overcome. After crossing, he engaged the enemy to cover the crossing and passage of the train. General Thompson with his brigade, <shv7_223>except Gordon's regiment, pressed the enemy to near the town of Westport, when he was ordered to fall back to the Blue. Colonel Gordon, with his regiment, who had been detained to guard the left, soon became engaged and was sorely pressed by overpowering numbers, when he was rejoined by Jackman, and gallantly charging they repulsed the enemy, pursued them some distance and inflicted heavy loss upon them; also captured a twenty four pound howitzer. A large force of the enemy came out from Westport and a fight ensued, the enemy endeavoring to regain the lost gun. They were sternly resisted, and finally the arrival of General Thompson and night stopped the combat. Reference is made to the report of General Shelby for particulars. Two flags were also captured and presented to me on the battlefield by Captains McCoy and Wood, of Gordon's regiment, who had taken them with their own hands from the enemy. In the meantime other forces had engaged me in the rear. Having received information that other bodies of the enemy were pursuing me, I had directed pickets to be placed at the Little Blue to give notice of their approach. This had been done by General Fagan, and being advised on the morning of the 22d that the enemy had attacked and driven in his pickets, he dispatched General Cabell to drive back the enemy, which he did; but on his return, coming through Independence, the enemy struck Cabell in flank, cutting off three hundred or four hundred men and capturing two pieces of artillery. General Marmaduke's division, which formed the rear, became engaged with the same enemy half an hour before sundown. The division was then about two miles from Independence; the advance of the enemy was checked by our troops, who then fell back one half mile to a new position, which the enemy attacked with increasing fierceness, driving our troops steadily back until a late hour at night, and in almost impenetrable darkness.
For particulars, reference is made to the accompanying report of General Clark. I encamped that night on the battlefield near Westport, in line of battle, having marched twelve miles, the troops constantly engaging the enemy the whole distance. On the morning of the 23d I took up my line of march and soon discovered the enemy in position on the prairie. The train had been sent forward on the Fort Scott road. I had instructed General Marmaduke to resist the advance of the enemy, who was in his rear, if possible, as he was on the same road as the train. General Shelby immediately attacked the enemy, assisted by General Fagan, with two <shv7_224>brigades of Arkansas troops, and though they stubbornly resisted and contested every point of approach, drove them six or seven miles into Westport. In the meantime, General Marmaduke, who was to my right and rear, being attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy, had to fall back, after a most strenuous resistance -- his ammunition being exhausted.
For full particulars, reference is made to the report of General Clark.
Being at that time near Westport, and in full view of Generals Fagan's and Shelby's commands, I received information that my train, which was in front and on the right of the Fort Scott road, was threatened by some two thousand or two thousand five hundred of the enemy, moving in a line parallel with the Fort Scott road. I immediately directed General Fagan and General Shelby to fall back to the train as soon as they could do so with safety, which I would attempt to defend until they arrived. I immediately pushed forward to the front of the train with my escort, and there formed in line of battle the unarmed men who were present to the number of several thousand throwing my escort and all the armed men of Tyler's brigade forward as skirmishers -- the whole not amounting to more than two hundred -- to the front of the enemy, and directing General Cabell, who arrived soon after to hold the crossing of the creek on my left, sending forward at the same time for a portion of Colonel McCroy's brigade, which was in advance of the train, and on his arrival found him in line of battle on the left flank of the enemy, which caused the enemy to fall back a considerable distance on the prairie. In the meantime, the rear and flank of the commands of Generals Fagan and Shelby, by the falling back of General Marmaduke, were uncovered, and the former, in attempting to rejoin me, was attacked by a large force of the enemy, but with the aid of Colonel Jackman and his brigade, who acted so heroically and skillfully as to receive the thanks of General Fagan on the field, the enemy was repulsed. General Shelby, in attempting to obey my instructions, was attacked in the flank, and his command thrown into some confusion, but he rallied, repulsed the enemy and joined me that evening, as did also General Fagan. Full details of this are contained in the accompanying reports of General Shelby and Colonel Jackman.
I encamped that night on the middle fork of Grand river, marching twenty four miles -- the troops having been engaged with the enemy nearly all day. The number of the enemy's troops engaged <shv7_225>that day exceeded 20,000 well armed men, whilst I did not have 8,000 armed men.
On the evening of the 24th I moved with the command on the Fort Scott road to the Marais du Cygnus, where I encamped, having marched thirty three miles -- no enemy appearing. During the night I received information from General Marmaduke, who was placed in charge of the approaches in front, that the enemy was threatening his pickets; and upon consultation with General Marmaduke, we were both of the opinion that the enemy was marching upon our right by Mound City, on a road parallel to the one on which we were. We were strengthened in that belief by a dispatch which had been captured from the commanding officer (Federal) at that place to his scouts stationed near our then encampments, stating "that he would be largely reinforced that night, and he wanted a sharp lookout for my army, and he wanted the earliest information of the route on which I traveled and the direction." I also learned at a late hour that night, from some recruits who joined me and had traveled fifteen miles on the route I had come, that no enemy was in my rear.
On the morning of the 25th I resumed my march in the same direction as before, and thinking from the information received the night before that if I should encounter the enemy, it would be in my front or on my right flank.
General Shelby's division composed the advance; Generals Fagan and Marmaduke brought up the rear; Colonel Tyler's brigade to the right of the centre of the train, four hundred yards; Shelby's old brigade to the right of the front of the train, four hundred yards; and Colonel Jackman's brigade to the immediate front. On reaching Little Osage river I sent forward a direction to General Shelby to fall back to my position in rear of Jackman's brigade, for the purpose of attacking Fort Scott, where I learned there were one thousand negroes under arms. At the moment of his reaching me, I received a dispatch from General Marmaduke in the rear, informing me that the enemy, 3,000 strong, were in sight with lines extending, and on the note General Fagan had endorsed he would sustain General Marmaduke. I immediately ordered General Shelby to take his old brigade, then on my immediate right, and return to the rear as rapidly as possible to support Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. I mounted my horse and rode back at a gallop, and after passing the rear of the train I met the divisions of Generals Fagan and Marmaduke retreating in utter and indescribable <shv7_226>confusion, many of them having thrown away their arms. They were deaf to all entreaties or commands, and in vain were all efforts to rally them. From them I learned that Major General Marmaduke, General Cabell and Colonel Slemmons, commanding brigade, had been captured, with three hundred or four hundred men, and all their artillery -- five pieces. General Fagan and several of his officers, who then joined me, assisted me in trying to rally the armed men, without success. I then ordered General Shelby to hold the enemy (who were pressing their success hotly and fiercely) in check, if possible, at the crossing of the Osage until the train could be placed in safety -- which he succeeded in doing for several hours. I again formed the unarmed men, numbering several thousand, in lines of battle on the prairie beyond the river. General Fagan in the meantime had succeeded in rallying a portion of his forces and assisted General Shelby in again holding the enemy in check upon the prairie and in front of the immense lines of unarmed men until night, when I withdrew. The train having reached the Marmiton, ten miles, I then overtook it, having marched twenty eight miles. On the next morning, after destroying many wagons, with broken down teams that could not be replaced, I moved at two o'clock, there being but little forage in the neighborhood of my camp. We marched over beautiful prairie roads fifty six miles and encamped at Carthage, on Spring river, the nearest point where forage could be procured, as I was informed by Generals Fagan and Shelby, who earnestly desired me to reach Spring river, as no forage could be obtained short of it. The Federal prisoners I had with me became so much exhausted by fatigue that, out of humanity, I paroled them. For full report of this action, see the several reports of Generals Shelby and Clark, and other accompanying reports.
On the next morning at 9 o'clock, after giving the men and animals time to rest and feed, I resumed the march and camped on Shoal creek, twenty two miles. During the march a number of desertions took place among the Arkansas troops and recruits. No enemy having appeared, the morale of the troops had much improved.
On the 28th I marched towards Newtonia -- Generals Fagan and Marmaduke's divisions, the latter now commanded by General Clark, in the rear, and General Shelby's in the advance. On approaching Newtonia our advance was discovered by the Federal garrison, who commenced to retreat. On seeing this Shelby's advance <shv7_227>attempted to intercept them -- the distance they had gained was too great for this to be effected. They succeeded, however, in killing the Federal Captain Christian, a notorious "bushwhacker," noted for his deeds of violence and blood.
After passing over the prairie four miles beyond Newtonia, General Shelby encamped in a skirt of timber; the other divisions passed beyond and encamped in the positions they were to take in the march of the following day. Ere long our scouts brought information that the enemy was crossing the prairie in pursuit of us. Preparations were at once made to receive him, and at 3 P.M., General Blunt, with 3,000 cavalry, made a furious onslaught on our lines. He was met by Shelby, supported by a portion of Fagan's command. A short but obstinate fight ensued, when General Blunt was repulsed and driven three miles, with heavy loss. This was the last we saw of the enemy. For full particulars, see General Shelby's report.
The army marched that day twenty six miles. On the 29th we marched twenty six miles and encamped on Sugar creek, five miles south of Pineville, passing through that town. On the 30th and 31st we reached Maysville, near the Arkansas line, marching forty three miles. November 1st we reached Boonsboro', or Cane Hill, as it is commonly termed, marching seventeen miles. Then information was received by General Fagan from Colonel Brooks that he had the town of Fayetteville, Arkansas, closely invested, having forced the garrison within their inner fortifications, and asking for men to enable him to take it. As this was a place of importance to the Federals, and its capture would be of great advantage to the cause, upon General Fagan's earnest solicitation, I ordered a detail of five hundred men and two guns to be made to him for that purpose, which was furnished by General Shelby, under command of Colonel Elliott -- the guns from Collins' battery. The expedition started to Fayetteville, formed a junction with Colonel Brooks, but before the place could be taken, the approach of General Blunt, with a large cavalry force, caused the siege to be raised, and Colonel Elliott rejoined his command. Our march from Illinois river to Cane Hill was over a bad road, rough and hilly, rendered worse than usual by constant rain; in consequence, much of the stock became worn out and was abandoned on the route. On the 3d I remained in camp; the weather very bad, both snowing and raining during the day. I there received information that the Federals at Little Rock had been greatly reinforced by a portion of <shv7_228>General Canby's command; and as it was necessary that I should here adopt the line of march I should pursue on my return to Arkansas, to district headquarters, or elsewhere, as I should be directed, I determined not to risk the crossing of the Arkansas river between Fort Smith and Little Rock, on which route I could not procure subsistence, forage or grass in anything like sufficient quantity; but decided to cross through the Indian country, where beef at least could be obtained, which would subsist my men for the few days it would require them to march until they would meet supplies, even if no salt or breadstuffs could be procured, whilst some grass could be obtained for the animals. In addition, the route across the Arkansas river below Fort Smith would be over a hilly and mountainous country -- that the stock, in its present condition, would be unable to travel over -- whilst through the Indian country it would be over level plains, traversed by good roads. Again, by taking the route below Fort Smith I would expose my army to be destroyed by a joint attack from forces detached from the heavy garrison there, acting with large forces from Little Rock, which could be easily spared, and which would, in all probability, take place, as information of my adopting that route would certainly reach them, and the slowness with which I was compelled to move would give them ample time to make all preparations. I furthermore came to this conclusion from the fact that it coincided with my instructions -- in the propriety of which my own judgment fully concurred. Colonels Freeman, Dobbins and McCroy were ordered to return, with such of their men as still remained with their colors, to the places where they had raised their commands, to collect the absentees, and bring them within our lines during December, if possible; and on the 4th of November I marched with the balance of my command through the Indian territory in the direction of Boggy depot. On the 13th I reached Perryville -- a distance of one hundred and nineteen miles -- when I met three wagons with supplies and encamped, remaining one day to rest and recruit my men. I had marched carefully and slowly, stopping to graze my stock whenever an opportunity offered. On the 14th, General Shelby, at his request, was left behind on the Canadian to recruit. On the 20th, Cabell's and Slemmons' brigades were furloughed. On the 21st of November I arrived at Clarksville, where I received an order from General Magruder to march to Lanesport and there establish my headquarters. I arrived there on the 2d of December, having marched 1,434 miles. The march <shv7_229>through the Indian country was necessarily a severe one, especially upon the stock, many of which died or became worn out and were left. The men, in some instances, hungered for food, but never approached starvation, nor did they suffer to the extent that other of our soldiers have cheerfully endured without complaint for a much longer time during the war. At all events, I arrived in the country where food and forage could be obtained in abundance, bringing with me all the sick and wounded and all my command with which I entered the Indian country, except those who voluntarily straggled and deserted their colors. To enumerate specially the names of the officers who distinguished themselves for skill and courage would swell this report beyond all reasonable limits. Therefore, as to all but general officers and those who acted in that capacity, I must simply refer to the accompanying reports, heartily concurring in the meed of praise awarded to such officers as are thus enumerated by their immediate commanding officers.
General Fagan, commanding the division of Arkansas troops, bore himself throughout the whole expedition with unabated gallantry and ardor, and commanded his division with great ability.
General J.S. Marmaduke, commanding the division of Mississippi troops, proved himself worthy of his past reputation as a valiant and skillful officer, and rendered with his division great service. His capture was a great loss to the service.
General J.O. Shelby, commanding the division of Missouri troops, added new lustre to his past fame as a brilliant and heroic soldier, and, without disparagement to the other officers, I must be permitted to say that I consider him the best cavalry officer I ever saw. The services rendered by him and his division in this expedition are beyond all praise.
General Cabell bore himself as a bold, undaunted, skillful officer. Impetuous, yet wary, he commanded his brigade in such a manner as to win praise from all. I regret that from want of reports from their several commanding officers, I cannot do justice to this as well as the other brigades of Arkansas troops. General Cabell's capture was a great misfortune, and his place will be difficult to fill.
General Clark, true to his past fame, bore himself with undaunted courage and bravery, as well as skill and prudence. His brigade was most skillfully handled.
Colonels Slemmons, Dobbins and McCroy (the first of whom was <shv7_230>captured) acted throughout as brave, daring, yet prudent commanders and are each entitled to great praise.
Colonel Jackman, through the whole expedition, won for himself great honor for the services he rendered, as have been herein enumerated, and for which the whole army awarded him the highest praise.
Colonel Freeman proved himself to be a brave and energetic officer, but as his men were mostly unarmed they were unable to render the same brilliant services as other brigades that were armed.
Colonel Tyler, who was placed in command of a brigade of new recruits, for the most part unarmed, deserves great praise for the success with which he kept them together and brought them within our lines. He deserves especial mention for the cool gallantry he displayed in charging the enemy with them at an important juncture, thereby greatly aiding in saving the train from destruction.
My thanks are due to my staff officers for their untiring energy and unremitting attention to their duties during the entire campaign; their zeal and devotion cannot be too highly commended by me.
In conclusion, permit me to say that in my opinion the results flowing from my operations in Missouri are of the most gratifying character. I marched 1,434 miles, fought forty three battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over three thousand officers and men, captured eighteen pieces of artillery, three thousand stand of small arms, sixteen stand of colors (brought out by me, besides others destroyed by our troops who took them), at least three thousand overcoats, large quantities of blankets, shoes and clothing, many wagons and teams, numbers of horses and great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I destroyed miles upon miles of railroad, burning depots and bridges. Taking this into the calculation I do not think I go beyond the truth in saying that I destroyed in the late expedition to Missouri $10,000,000 worth of property. On the other hand, I lost ten pieces of artillery, two stand of colors, one thousand stand of small arms, whilst I don't think I lost over one thousand prisoners, including the wounded left in their hands, other than recruits on their way to join men some of whom may have been captured. I brought out with me over five thousand recruits, and they are still arriving daily. After I passed the German settlements in Missouri, my march was an ovation; the people thronged around and welcomed us with open hearts and hands. Recruits flocked to our flag in such numbers as to <shv7_231>threaten to become a burden instead of a benefit, being mostly unarmed. In some counties the question was not who should go to the army, but who should stay at home. I am satisfied that could I have remained in Missouri this winter the army would have increased fifty thousand men.
My thanks are due Lieutenant Colonel Bull, my Provost Marshal General, for the able, energetic and efficient discharge of his duties.
I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,