I Solomon G. Kitchen, aged 45 years born on the State of Tennessee appointed from the State of Missouri do solemnly swear, that while I continue in the service I will bear ??? faith and yield obedience to the Confederate States of America and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against their enemies and that I will observe and obey the orders of the President of the Confederate States and the orders of the officers appointed over me according to the rules and articles of War.

Sworn to and Subscribed                 S. G. Kitchen
before me this 21st
day of Jany, 1863
at Washington Ark
Jno. J. Clendenin
???? of the 5th Cav of Arks 

I am directed by Lieut. Col. Solomon G. Kitchen, commanding battalion C. S. Army, to inform you of a raid now being made by the Federal troops into this portion of Arkansas. The Federals are now encamped, to the number of 260, '2 miles south of Oak Bluff (or Scatterville), Greene County, Arkansas. We have not information sufficient to tell whether there is a force supporting them farther up the ridge. We have only eighty-six guns in camp, but will remain here unless driven by the enemy, or ordered by you. Colonel Kitchen begs leave to report to you for duty, and holds himself and command subject to your orders.

-----skirmish at, Apr. 1 [21], 1863, 32:Ev3. See also 32:299. Union troops engaged per battle lists (b) 2d Mo. S. M. Cav., Co. H (1 officer and 24 men missing) (a) same regt. NOTE:This misdated entry was based on the correspondingly misdated entry in battle list (a). The mis-dating by the battle list compilers evidently resulted from a misreading of a record of events on the Co. H muster roll. The record of events indicates that the co. left Bloomfield, Mo., on Apr. 1 and marched to Chalk Bluff. On the morning of Apr. 21, Co. H was attacked by a party of some 300 Confederates led by "Col. Ketcher" [Lt. Col. S. G. Kitchen]. The Union force was driven from the field losing "Capt. [Richard M.] Hulse, 3 sergts., 2 corpis., & 19 men with all company property, arms & c." Evidently the compilers of battle list (a) made the simple mistake of taking the date the expedition commenced for the date of the skirmish, and their determination was uncritically accepted by the editors of the army-records compilation.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose you report of Major [Hiram M.] Hiller of his expedition into Arkansas.(*)

All probably was accomplished by that expedition that could have been done, but it is easy to see the depressing effect that the mutinous spirit displayed at Chalk Bluff must have had on the command. I have 42 mutineers in arrest, working them on the defenses of this place, and it is not supposable that the arrests indicate the full proportion of this mutinous spirit. I have every reason to believe that this objection to moving out of the State originated amongst commissioned officers. I have directed inquiries, but may not be able to report evidence sufficient for conviction before a court, although abundant for our moral conviction of their guilt. Examination as to military capability before a proper board would rid the service of these self-emasculated gentry, who desire to circumscribe their service of their country by State lines.

I shall move a reconnaissance in force toward Doniphan to-night, under command of Colonel La Grange, who, with a truly honorable spirit of enterprise, desires the assignment to that duty. Due care has been had to keep us advised of what is doing within the enemy's lines.

The First Wisconsin are encamped 4 miles on the other side of the Castor, where I can hold them for any move. I have commenced works of defense, plans of which I will forward as soon as I can get copies, and have been felling timber and making abatis.

I shall keep fully in view, in every move I make, the importance of covering and protecting Ironton, by falling back on Patterson, if necessary. In doing this, I will afford what protection I can to Cape Girardeau, and at the same time seek to harass and cut off the communications of the enemy. I pray you not to be apprehensive about my keeping my little force compact and in hand. If you hear of my allowing enterprising moves by detachment, be sure I am proceeding on well-founded information of the enemy's weakness in that quarter, and I shall endeavor not to sacrifice the chance of a victory over an army by minor enterprises, however tempting the opportunity.

I am still keeping 40 wagons here loaded with commissary supplies. I left Major Crane at the Cape, and expected him here yesterday. I regret this delay, as we might have been paid while waiting, and no time lost. <ar33_227>

We succeeded in capturing the quartermaster of Colonel Kitchen yesterday, and also received a prisoner from Captain Hulse, at Chalk Bluff, whom papers, captured with him, denote to be a lieutenant in the rebel army.

We have captured 2 men who were engaged in taking our couriers on the Ironton route. One of them, in attempting to escape, was shot dead.

All communication by telegraph has been cut off for three days. I hope to have it right soon.

Page 104
The Federal division left Bloomfield soon after the Confederates moved south. According to Lieutenant Colonel William Baumer, 1st Nebraska Infantry Regiment, US, the march started at 7:00 p.m., marched until 3:00 a.m., rested one hour, then resumed the march, arriving near Four Mile about daylight.
As the Union division moved south, they suffered severe losses from Confederate Colonel Thompson’s rear guard detachment. Taking up actions, which were to elevate Colonel Jo Shelby into a place as one of the South’s best cavalry officers, famous for his ability to carry out rear guard actions to permit commanders to escape from precarious positions, Colonel Thompson was a constant threat and danger to the Federals. Assisted by the dark and by guides who knew practically every inch of the terrain, Thompson’s men popped up almost at will, to the direct front, left or right front, flanks, even, at one time, near the rear, hitting a light, fast assault, then fading away. Such actions kept the Federals constantly tense and alert, causing confusion and delays. Each time the Confederates made an assault, the Union would have to move troops to repel the action, but, by the time any troops could be in position, Thompson’s men would be gone, falling back to the sides of the ridge and rushing to hit at another location. Thanks to Thompson’s detachment and Shelby’s tactics. General Marmaduke moved his division slowly along, unmolested. It must be taken into consideration that the superior sized Union division had every opportunity to take forward action against General Marmaduke, but made no move to attempt flanking actions or other means to impede the Southerner’s movement.
Lieutenant Colonel Solomon Kitchen, learning of the movement of General Asboth’s troops of the 4th Missouri Cavalry Regiment, US, almost as soon as they left New Madrid, sent troops to hold them back. The Union troops, demoralized by trying to traverse the unfamiliar swamps during a time of very high water, were easily denied a crossing of Little River by Kitchen’s men who were residents of the swamps and were at home fighting in the mud and water. The Columbus troops made it no further than the east bank of Little River.”
May 1,1863
On May 1, 1863, General Marmaduke’s carefully measured withdrawal reached the small, but prosperous village of Four Mile in Dunklin County, near the present day town of Campbell.  Although the exact time was not recorded, and, no doubt, with so many men it required some time for all to pass, the division was at Four Mile in the early, still dark, morning hours. Four Mile was, appropriately, four miles from the Chalk Bluff crossing. At the village was a road junction of the Crowley’ s Ridge Military Road and a crude swamp road with led to Gillis Bluff, Ash Hills and Poplar Bluff. The remainder of the 15th Missouri Cavalry Regiment, the part that did not leave at Bloomfield, was sent up the Poplar Bluff Road to act as pickets on that route, but met no resistance there, so, eventually, after General Marmaduke had crossed the Ste. Francois River, moved further along and back into their normal area of operations, taking along orders to attach and report to Colonel Burbridge’s command.”
Upon arriving at Four Mile, General Marmaduke assigned Shelby’s Column, two brigades, Thompson’s and Burbridge’s, with artillery support, as a force to hold back back the Union advance and had local partisan fighters on Crowley’s Ridge to roam the area and guard against flanking movements. All of the battle line was dismounted. The second brigade, then commanded by General Marmaduke, moved forward to the river and began to move their horses across, with part of Carter’s Brigade returning to Four Mile to assist with the defense against the Federals.
As Marmaduke’s Division began to cross the river, a mistake was made with General Thompson’s bridge. Fairly strong to start, it was overloaded with too many wagons crossing at one time, causing some of the supports to break, leaving the bridge to float, shake and quiver when used. But, it held up until all were crossed.
The bridge, as stated earlier, was of logs and vines. A log pontoon was built for the center with spans in two directions to reach the banks. According to General Thompson, the bridge was built along the bank of the river, up and down stream, and at a length much longer than the width of the river. When completed, the downstream end of the bridge was attached to the bank, the upstream end floated out into the current to float across to the other bank, stopped there by the length of the bridge, and tied to the other bank for stability. The raft, also of log and vine and about twelve feet by eight feet, was operated by ropes, pulled across by a person walking across the bridge.”
From Four Mile, The Crowley’s Ridge Military Road, or known locally as the Gainesville Road, continued southwest along Crowley’s Ridge, climbing a slight elevation. Gravel Hill, then gradually headed down the side of the ridge to the riverbank, following the bank for a short distance as a “plank” or “corduroy” road, then turning sharply to the ferry ramp. Across the river on the Arkansas side, the road went due west on a plank road for a short distance, then climbed, curving up the ridge side to the top.
Plank roads were common in the swampy areas. Early types were logs placed across the road, logs touching, with either mud used to fill the spaces between the logs or the top of the logs hewn off level so that the ride was not too rough for wagon travel. Some of the plank roads were several miles long, about the only means to cross some of the swampy land. If the ground was extremely unstable, some logs would sink and others were placed on top until a firm base was found. After experience building such roads, later types had larger logs used as a bottom base with plant placed perpendicular to the route of the road, pegged or nailed into the logs, with two strings of the planks used, a distance of the width of wagon wheels so that wagons could place the wheels of the wagon on each of the strings of planks, giving a fairly smooth ride. Attaching the planks also gave stability to the logs beneath.
Chalk Bluff, the village on the Arkansas side of the river, was only about 20 years old when burned and destroyed by General McNeil in 1863. A family named Seitz moved to the location in 1840 with Abraham Seitz building a house on the bluff and starting a ferry service across the Ste. Francois River. That would indicate that there was enough traffic using the road as early as the 1840s that a ferry was profitable. A small village grew around Seitz home and a post office opened in 1850. Abraham Seitz died in 1858 and his holdings passed to a relative. Dr. Timothy Dalton, who operated the ferry and a store. Growth became much faster and, by the start of the Civil War, Chalk Bluff, as the village was named, had three small stores, a blacksmith, gunsmith, brick mason, cabinet maker and two doctors, including Dr. Dalton.
Four Mile, the town four miles to the east of Chalk Bluff on the Missouri side, was settled earlier, but grew slower. In 1860, there were two stores, a post office, blacksmith, the Taylor Hotel, an inn and stagecoach stop, cooper and a doctor. It was a short distance from the present town of Campbell near what is now Missouri Highway 53. The soil near the top of Crowley’s Ridge was clay, fair for farming, great for pasture once the growth of virgin timber was removed. However, lower on the bluff, on low spots above the water level of the surrounding swamps, the soil was black gumbo, rich, some of the finest farmland in the world.  Crowley’s Ridge residents were, for the most part, farmers, con-tent to fight the swamp for the unbelievable harvests possible on the rich soil.
Early morning of May I saw the Union forces of Generals Vandever and McNeil approaching Four Mile, with the 6th Missouri Cavalry Regiment, CSA., opening fire upon the Federal advance, the 1st Iowa Cavalry Regiment, US, before 4:00 a.m. It is not known how far in advance of the main column the Union advance was moving. Major Joseph W. Caldwell, US, commanding the Union advance, stated that a halt was called until daylight, then the advance proceeded, stopped at Four Mile by Confederate small arms and cannon fire (elements of Carter’s Brigade and Pratt’s Battery, using two 6-pound cannons and two 3-inch rifled Parrot guns). The 3rd Missouri Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, US, was brought up to assist the 1st Iowa Cavalry, then an artillery battery under Lieutenant Lawrence Jacoby, US, was moved up and the standoff became an artillery duel.
Thompson’s Brigade, CSA, was moved forward, the horses taken across the Ste. Francois River to a safe location on the Arkansas side, then the regiments returned to a pro-determined location on Gravel Hill, forming a battle line. Colonel Colton Greene’s Brigade, CSA, was then ordered to swim horses across the river and return to Gravel Hill to complete the defensive line there.
Colonel John Q. Burbridge’s Brigade, CSA, was ordered to swim horses across the river and take up position at a third line of defense much nearer the river, a pro-determined final line to retard Federal movement to the river. Hamilton’s Artillery, CSA, was directly moved across the river and placed on defensive line south of the river, placed far up the bluff with firing opportunity open on any Federal troops that might proceed along the road or by the ridge towards the river.
A serious problem soon became apparent as the horses were moved across the river. The horses were pushed into the water to swim, saddles and other gear still attached. The swift current of the flooded river slipped the girths causing saddles to move underneath the horses, restricting movement and resulting in many drowned horses. Around 40 valuable mounts were lost before different procedures were initiated.
While there were a few flaws in the plans, such as the drowning horses, without a doubt General Marmaduke and his staff had good defensive planning. Federal reinforcement from the east was blocked by Kitchen’s troops and to the west by the 15th Missouri Cavalry Regiment, CSA, and four defensive lines were selected along the Crowley’s Ridge Military Road. The first was at Four Mile, just to the west end of the village, the next line was at Gravel Hill, a mile from Four Mile, then a last line on the Missouri side, just a mile from the river, was at the point the ridge broke to drop to the river. A final line was on the Arkansas side and was with protective revetments, elevated to overlook the Missouri bluffs, the road approach to the river and the river crossing, the line heavily enhanced with artillery. Considering terrain, manpower, resources and position. General Marmaduke proved himself a wise tactician, no doubt acquired from his West Point studies and wide military experiences before and during the war.
Soon after the initial start of the artillery firing at Four Mile, the morning position of units was Carter’s Brigade, CSA, forward at Four Mile supported by Pratt’s Battery, CSA, with four guns  opposite was two Federal regiments, the 1st Iowa Cavalry, US, and the 3rd Missouri Volunteer Cavalry, US, supported by Jacoby’s Artillery, US. To the rear of the Federal offensive line was the remainder of the Union division. About one mile west of the first line, or approximately three miles from the river crossing, at Gravel Hill, Thompson’s and Greene’s Brigades, CSA, with Collins’ Battery, CSA, were waiting in a secondary defensive line.  Two miles further towards the river from Gravel Hill, or, about I mile from the river, Burbridge’s Brigade, CSA, without artillery support, was digging protective trenches. To the flanks of the entire tier of defensive positions, moving as desired, were members of Thompson’s Command, CSA, and partisans or guerrillas from Major Hilderbrand’s or Captain Bolin’s groups, civilians, and men from Kitchen’s Battalion. Across the Ste. Francois on the south or Arkansas side, was Hamilton’s Battery, CSA, part of Kitchen’s Battalion, CSA, and civilians from the surrounding countryside.
P 126
Lieutenant Colonel Kitchen: “After the fiercely contested battle on the ridge, the enemy abruptly withdrew to revel the night away. Cannon by cannon was moved to the river bank and across, teams swam to the south bank and moved into place to repel the enemy, all having been successfully crossed without loss by midnight. Regiment by regiment the men moved south and across the bridge, going into line on the far bluff, crossing in utmost silence.”
(Ponder, 1994)

I immediately assumed command, and on the 10th marched northward toward Chalk Bluff, with the intention of co-operating with Lieut. Col. W.J. Preston, who was on duty with several hundred men from your command at that time in this portion of the State. Having formed a junction with Colonel Preston, to resist a force of the enemy which was reported crossing the Saint Francis River for the purpose of making a raid into Arkansas, and Colonel Preston suddenly and unexpectedly retreating, I was compelled to retire with the force then at my disposal (about 100 men) before a superior force of the enemy, consisting of some 400 cavalry and two piece's of artillery.

My battalion then encamped 7 miles from Gainesville, where it remained until the morning of the 20th, when it marched to Chalk Bluff. I had learned, from my scouts, of an encampment of about 60 Federals at or near the Bluff, and determined to surprise and capture it, if possible. Arriving at the Bluff after dark, I left my horses on the south bank of the river, and, crossing my men over in a canoe, attacked the enemy at daylight with 100 men, and succeeded in completely surprising and routing the camp, a majority of the enemy escaping so rapidly and hurriedly they stampeded from their tents. The fruits of our victory consisted of 18 tents, 60 horses, 10 mules, 2 wagons, blankets, clothing, cooking utensils, &c., and 23 prisoners, including in the number Capt. Richard M. Hulse, of McNeil's regiment, Gamble militia. The enemy lost 3 or 4 killed and about the same number wounded. Our loss was 2 killed and 2 wounded.

On the same day (21st) I recrossed the Saint Francis and marched to my old camp near Gainesville, and from which place I sent the prisoners to Little Rock under a guard of 20 men.

Having learned of your movements in a letter to Brig. Gen. M. Jeff. Thompson, I marched my command to Chalk Bluff and reported for duty. A portion of my force was detailed to assist in building the bridge, another in scouting and picketing on each side of the Saint Francis, and the remainder of my available troops were' ordered to blockade Taylor's Slough, which they accomplished on 'the morning of May 2. The battalion moved I'm Chalk Bluff with your column, and is now on duty guarding the northern frontier and performing other duties under your late orders.

<ar32_296>

I have sent Captain Reyes' company west of Black River, with instructions to camp in the vicinity of Powhatan. He will scout in the direction of Pitman's Ferry and Thomasville, Mo. He is also instructed to thoroughly picket the country, to guard against any surprise of the enemy. My pickets are placed between Black River and Cache Swamp. I will send scouts east of the river. As yet I have received no information from Colonel [S. G.] Kitchen concerning the movements of the enemy in that direction. I will write him, in accordance with your instructions, and get all the information he possesses. But Colonel Kitchen informed me that he was ordered to report directly to Brigadier-General Marmaduke, and, of course, any information he will give me will be voluntarily given.

If Colonel Kitchen was ordered to report to me, I could then keep Colonel Shelby perfectly advised of the movements of the enemy. 1 have established my headquarters at Burden's Mill, 16 miles from Jacksonport. I suppose I can get forage to keep us between two and three weeks, by hauling 6 or 7 miles.

I have no paroled prisoners; all the prisoners captured by my command were turned over to Colonel Shelby's brigade.

On April 14, orders were received to immediately prepare my command for active service. I obeyed this order by sending train, baggage, &c., to the rear, and providing each of my companies, in addition to the regimental train allowed, with one pack mule, for the purpose of conveying such cooking utensils as could be conveniently transported.

On Friday morning, the 17th, I moved, marching 25 miles in a northerly direction, and camping on a small creek in Oregon County, Missouri.

The next morning I resumed the march, expecting to form a junction with Colonel [Joseph O.] Shelby, to whom I had been ordered to report, at Williams' Creek. Owing, however, to the scarcity of forage, Colonel Shelby had already started, leaving me to march in his rear through a country known as the Wilderness. After marching 28 miles, I was compelled to halt and encamp without obtaining a particle of forage for my horses. <ar32_297>

The next day I crossed Current River at Van Buren, camping 22 miles south of Patterson, which place I reached the next evening, learning, however, that the garrison occupying the place had retreated, burning their quartermaster's and commissary stores. Lieutenant-Colonel [William J.] Preston, with three companies of my regiment, was here ordered to report to Colonel [George W.] Carter, commanding Texas brigade of cavalry, he having been sent to attack Brigadier-General [John] McNeil's threes at Bloomfield, Mo. This part of my command did not report to me again until our forces fell back from Cape Girardeau.

I again resumed the march from Patterson, moving in the direction of Fredericktown, and encamped within 12 miles of that place, and entered the town next day at 12 o'clock, but found no enemy.

On the evening of the 25th, I received orders to move on the Cape Girardeau road, which I obeyed, passing through Jackson about daylight. At 10 o'clock we reached the city and made preparations to attack it. By Colonel Shelby's order I formed my brigade in line of battle upon his right, occupying a position that completely protected my men from the artillery of the enemy, and at the same time placing me in supporting distance from his battery. An artillery duel of an hour and a half duration was here kept up on either side, the enemy showering their shot and shell upon us, but doing little execution on account of our protected position. My loss here was only 7 wounded, 2 dangerously. Lieut. G. R. Gilmore, of Company D, and acting adjutant of Lieutenant-Colonel Preston's regiment, was slightly wounded in the ankle.

About 12 o'clock I received an order from Colonel Shelby to withdraw my force, it being Brigadier-General Marmaduke's intention to make only a demonstration, and not to assault the place. I then moved my command upon the Jackson road, and encamped about dark 4 miles beyond that place, upon the road leading to Dallas. Before I could post my pickets, and, in fact, before I had fairly encamped, a company belonging to Colonel [R. C.] Newton's regiment, which had unaccountably encamped some 300 yards from the regiment, was attacked by the enemy and scattered. This company lost 6 men killed, wounded, and missing: and almost the whole of their horses. I immediately formed the brigade on foot, and awaited the approach of the enemy, whom I rightly conjectured to be in force, sending the train to Jackson. Colonel Preston was here ordered to dislodge a small force of the enemy posted on the road between my camp and Jackson, which was done without loss. Not being sufficiently acquainted with the country to attempt an advance upon the enemy, whose strength and locality I was totally ignorant of, I ordered Colonel Newton to retire with his regiment toward Jackson, and form his line I mile west of town, and Colonel Preston was ordered to form his line of battle near the junction of the Dallas and Fredericktown roads, and to resist any movement of the enemy from that quarter.

At 3 o'clock the next morning an order was received from Brigadier-General Marmaduke to withdraw my command to Jackson. I immediately did so, leaving, however, a picket force to cover my rear, which an hour after I had left was attacked and driven into town.

The march southward from Jackson for several days, as far as my command is concerned, presents nothing worthy of consideration. The enemy, however, were pressing our rear, and frequent skirmishes were engaged in, which, owing to the position the brigade occupied, were more frequently heard than engaged in. Once, however, the rear guard gave way and was forced back upon the command without giving sufficient warning of the approach of the enemy. This for a time <ar32_298> threw my brigade into disorder, but the men were promptly rallied by their officers, and formed in line ready to resist the approach of the enemy. The enemy was, however, gallantly repulsed by the Texans, under command of Colonel Carter.

After my brigade had passed Bloomfield, I received orders to march back to the town and form upon the right of Colonel Shelby, and to resist the farther advance of the enemy. A heavy skirmishing was soon begun in front, and kept up till dark. No firing was heard during the night, though my scouts reported to me continually that the enemy was making a flank movement upon my right, which would have given him possession of a hill that commanded our whole position.

I was ordered next morning to move in the direction of Chalk Bluff. When within 2 miles of that point, I received orders to dismount my men, and to send horses and train across the river, and to march the infantry thus dismounted back a short distance to a position that had been selected for fighting. The position assigned me was on the left of Colonel Shelby's brigade, my left resting on an open field. Not willing to expose the men any more than necessary, I ordered temporary breastworks to be made, which would have effectually protected them from the musketry of the enemy. The enemy soon commenced a vigorous shelling, remarkable for its accuracy, the shells passing directly over my lines,, within 2 feet of the ground.

At 2 o clock at night I received orders to withdraw my forces with the Utmost secrecy and dispatch, and to leave my skirmishers in front to resist any night advance of the enemy. The brigade was safely crossed to the south side of the Saint Francis River, and occupied a position above the bluff on the bank of the river, which completely commanded the road leading to the bridge. I here received orders to march the brigade upon the Gainesville road and encamp until further orders, leaving, however, my sharpshooters upon the river, subject to Brigadier-General Marmaduke's order.

Subsequent events would be but a detailed list of short rations, hard marches through swamps, &c, in no way worthy of mention save for the cheerfulness with which the men under me endured those hardships.

In conclusion, major, I would return my sincere thanks to both officers and men of this command for the bravery which, with but few exceptions, they have displayed upon the battle-field, and for the unflinching fortitude with which they endured every hardship.

I would take this occasion to acknowledge my obligations to Colonels Newton and Preston for the co-operation and assistance they gave me in carrying out all orders received.

In compliance with your orders, I marched from Jackson, Ark., on April 17; crossed Eleven Points [River] on the same day; crossed Current River on the 19th instant [ultimo], and reported to Colonel [George W.] Carter, commanding Texas brigade.

I resumed the march, after a halt of two hours, in rear of Carter's brigade, which position in column I occupied on the 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d instant [ultimo], arriving at Patterson some hours after its capture on the 21st, moving on toward Greenville, crossing Saint Francis River at that place, crossing Mingo Swamp and River near its mouth, and reaching Bloomfield at midnight on the 22d instant [ultimo], to learn that the enemy had retreated northward two days before.

After a halt of two hours, I again took up the line of march, reaching the main bridge on White Water River on the 23d, which was picketed by the enemy and captured by Colonel Carter's advance.

On the 24th instant [ultimo], I was informed that we were in presence of the enemy in force, commanded by Brigadier-General [John] McNeil, and was ordered to the front, taking a circuitous route until I struck the main road 4 miles from Cape Girardeau. Here I was ordered to halt and went into position, remaining in line during the night.

On the morning of the 25th, heavy firing being heard OH the left, I was ordered by Brigadier-General Marmaduke to throw forward Colonel [M. L.] Young's battalion, and follow with the command to the support of the left. Colonel Young formed twenty minutes before my arrival, and had 1 man wounded while in long range of the enemy. Arriving on the Jackson road, 2 or 3 miles from Cape Girardeau, I was ordered into line, and covered Colonel [Joseph O.] Shelby's retiring column. After changing position several times, I was ordered into position 2 miles to the rear, which I left half an hour afterward to take up the line of march to Jackson.

About 4 o'clock of the following morning I was ordered to mount and proceed back to the bridge on White Water, and hold it. This was effected by 11 o'clock, and I occupied the position until the rear guard came up, when I resumed the march, reaching Bloomfield in the evening of the 27th instant [ultimo]. <ar32_304>

On the 28th instant [ultimo], I took position across the Cape Girardeau and Kitchen's Mill road; lay on my arms all night, and was ordered to fall back early next morning 20 miles. Arriving to the rear of Four Mile, I was ordered to dismount my men, to swim the horses across the Saint Francis River, and to go into line. At 2 o'clock at night I was ordered to cross the Saint Francis in rear of the whole column, which was accomplished without loss. Arriving on the south side of the river, the campaign may be said to have ended.

It is impossible to state at this time the exact number of my men who fell into the enemy's hands. Some were cut off, but are daily reporting. Not exceeding 5 have been reported captured.

I cannot avoid mentioning the good order and endurance of my command during these arduous marches. No case of cowardly straggling came under my observation, and the rigor of discipline and hardships of the field were alike borne with uncomplaining fortitude.

<ar32_327>

Lee's report or dispatch to President Davis of the battle of Fredericksburg has been received. He reports a glorious victory, stating that our loss was comparatively small, and the enemy's was 30,000 or 35,000 killed and wounded. This does not embrace Stoneman's command, which is believed to have been captured. The Memphis papers also state that on the 9th and 10th Johnston had attacked Rosecrans' re-enforcements from Kentucky, near Shelbyville, and had destroyed them, and then attacked and routed Rosecrans, who retreated in great confusion to Nashville. This item comes by way of both Helena and Memphis and is brought by Mr. Harris, of Louisiana, a friend of mine, who took the paper to Little Rock yesterday. A fight also at Vicksburg. There are two versions of the Vicksburg fight--one from Memphis and the other from Helena. The first states that the enemy had gotten in the rear of Vicksburg, and that we had been largely re-enforced from Mobile and Port Gibson, and were confident of whipping him, and that he was then striving to get back to the river. The second report is that three or four of our batteries were taken, and 700 men captured, but when the boats and transports moved upon the others we received <ar32_328> them, killing and wounding 14,000, and taking a great many prisoners. The reports of Fredericksburg and Murfreesborough are true, I believe, but I don't know about the last. I will send you papers as soon as they come.

The number of my sick is on the increase, they are greatly damaged by our late expedition, but, I hope, will be rested and well again.

1st Lieut. R. J. Stewart Co B Burbridge Rgt was granted leave of absense 18th of last Jany for 20 days since that time I have received reliable information that Lieut Stewart has voluntarily delivered himself up to the enemy at Bloomfield, Mo.  I think his name should be striken from the role of officers by general order.
Jno. Q. B.

 <ar33_845>

MAJOR: Indorsed herewith is a communication from Colonel Dobbin.(*) I ordered him to report, in person, to-day, and, if I can get him under my authority, will have him encamped in this neighborhood, and his small pox cases placed in a pest-house. I believe that the account of small-pox in his regiment has been exaggerated; it is certainly of a very mild type.

Colonel Chrisman, contrary to my orders, escorted a Federal flag of truce 14 miles through our lines, in defiance of my pickets, and intended to bring it here, but was prevented by Lieutenant Killingsworth, commander of pickets. Major Scudder, of the Fifth Kansas, bearing the flag, has a communication to General Marmaduke. As soon as it reaches my headquarters, it will be forwarded.

A good deal of dissatisfaction, verging on mutiny, has manifested itself in the brigade, which I will investigate at once, and report fully after so doing. From what I can learn, it is avowedly caused by my personal interferences with the men and companies, a written statement to that effect having been handed to Major Hill, inspector-general. I believe other causes are operating, but will not state them till better informed.

The pickets and scouts report no movement of the enemy from Memphis or Helena.

<ar33_846>

[ar32_285 con't]

My command consisted of the following brigades: Shelby's Missouri cavalry brigade, Greene's Missouri cavalry brigade, Carter's Texas cavalry brigade, and Burbridge's brigade, composed of Burbridge's Missouri cavalry regiment and Newton's Arkansas cavalry regiment. My whole strength was about 5,000 men, eight pieces of field artillery, and two light mountain pieces. Of this force about 1,200 were unarmed and 900 dismounted. Of those armed, the greater part had shot-guns; some were armed with Enfield rifles and Mississippi rifles, and some with common squirrel rifles. I carried with me the unarmed and dismounted men for two reasons: First, with the hope of arming and mounting them, and, second, knowing, from the great anxiety of all to go into Missouri, that, if left behind, many would probably desert, I therefore deemed it most advisable to take them with me, hoping to be able to arm and mount them. I concentrated my division on Eleven Points River, and intended marching in the direction of Rolla, but found it impossible to do so. The country for at least 100 miles was without forage or subsistence, it having been destroyed to prevent raids or army movements. I then determined to march to the east of Ironton, capture the outpost (a regiment) at Patterson, and strike [John] McNeil, who was at Bloomfield, with a force I estimated to be about 2,000, cavalry, infantry, and artillery. I anticipated that McNeil, on hearing of my move, would make forced marches to reach Ironton before I could <ar32_286> cut him off. If successful in capturing McNeil's forces, I anticipated that my whole command could be well armed and finely mounted for vigorous action. It was impossible, on account of forage and subsistence, to march the whole division by one route on Patterson. And I furthermore desired to make demonstrations, as if a large force of infantry and cavalry were invading the State via Thomasville, Houston, and to the west of Rolla, expecting by this means to withdraw all their forces from Northern Arkansas and extreme Southwest Missouri, and at the same time throw the threes about Ironton, Patterson, and Bloomfield off their guard until I had gained a position to surprise or cut off the forces at Patterson and Bloomfield, and thence move northward between Saint Louis and Ironton, if I deemed it advisable. I divided the command into two columns: One under Shelby, composed of Shelby's and Burbridge's brigades, to march via Van Buren, Mo., and reach Patterson on the evening of April 20; the other, under Carter, composed of Carter's and Greene's brigades, to march via Doniphan and reach Patterson the same evening. Shelby had instructions to throw out scouts well to his left, to create the impression of a force moving northwesterly. I marched with Carter's column. His route was the shortest and most secret. With a part of his column I intended to surprise and capture Patterson, and from thence to strike McNeil. About midnight April 19, when 30 miles distant from patterson, Carter detached Lieutenant-Colonel [D.C.] Giddings---in command of his regiment (about 450 men), Reyes' independent company of spies and guides, and two pieces of [J. H.] Pratt's battery--to move rapidly, cautiously, and secretly by a more direct and unfrequented route to surprise Patterson. When 12 miles from Patterson, about daylight, Colonel Giddings surprised and handsomely captured the whole Federal picket from Patterson--1 lieutenant and 24 men. He marched on and could have successfully surprised the whole garrison, but that he moved too slowly; did not take sufficient risk for the nature of his expedition, and allowed his artillery to open when within 2 miles of the fort. The troops there (about 600 cavalry, under Colonel Smart) took the alarm, and precipitately fled to Pilot Knob, burning everything--they could, but leaving behind a large supply of subsistence and some quartermaster's stores. Colonel Giddings pursued them vigorously for 7 miles, killing, wounding, and capturing a number. All the prisoners taken except those in hospital I paroled.

On the evening of the 20th, as ordered, the two columns entered Patterson. Colonel Shelby's column encountered a Federal, picket from Patterson, and killed or captured 8 or 10 of them.

On the 21st, I ordered Carter's column to march against McNeil in the direction of Bloomfield, and Shelby's column to march on Fredericktown, supposing that McNeil would attempt to make his escape to Iron-ton. If he remained in Bloomfield, Carter would whip him, and if he attempted to get to Ironton, Shelby would capture him.

Shelby's column surprised Fredericktown on the morning of April 22, capturing dispatches ordering McNeil to Ironton. He was expected at Fredericktown on the 22d.

McNeil left Bloomfield on the 21st, abandoning and burning a large amount of quartermaster's and commissary stores en route for Pilot Knob via Dallas.

On the 22d, he learned of Shelby's column, and retreated hastily toward Cape Girardeau. Carter pursued him, hoping to prevent his reaching there, but was too late, owing to high water, marshes, and bad roads, besides having a longer route to march, with horses very much worn <ar32_287> down by forced marches and want of forage. En route to Cape Girardeau, Carter with a small detachment of men charged and captured Captain [Stephen V.] Shipman and 40 men out of a guard of 60 men. I kept Shelby's column near Fredericktown, marching daily a few miles toward Cape Girardeau to catch McNeil if he marched toward lronton, and to await information from Carter (whose dispatch bearers were captured by the enemy) and the junction of his column, and also to watch and learn of this movements of the Federals in the direction of Ironton. From Fredericktown I sent out a detachment of 90 men, under command of Captains[William T.] Lineback and [J. M.] Muse and Lieutenant [Josiah L.] Bledsoe, with instructions to burn and destroy the bridges over Big Creek, on the Iron Mountain and Saint Louis Railroad. They found a guard stationed at the point indicated of 250 or 300 men, whom they at once vigorously attacked, killing, wounding, and capturing several, and succeeded in leaving one of the three bridges in flames. This detachment afterward rejoined their command at Bloomfield, having accomplished their work in a dashing manner.

On the 25th, I received dispatches from Carter that he had pursued McNeil to within 4 miles of Cape Girardeau. I immediately ordered Shelby to make a night march (some 30 miles)to Cape Girardeau, in order to form a junction with Carter. On learning the Federal forces were in the fortifications, I deemed it unwise to attack and storm the place. I so informed Colonel Shelby, and ordered him on the Jackson and Cape Girardeau road, to make a demonstration against the enemy, while I withdrew Carter by the Bloomfield road, intending to unite the columns at Jackson. Shelby's demonstration amounted almost to an attack. I deemed it necessary to bring Carter's column up to his support. I moved rapidly toward Shelby's column, and on arriving found that Shelby had driven the enemy's pickets and advanced forces into their works; that the enemy were admirably posted, possessing great natural advantages in position, supported by four large forts mounted with heavy guns, field artillery, and about 3,000 infantry and cavalry. As soon as the two columns had united, I withdrew toward and encamped them around Jackson.

On the night of the 26th, a force of about 3,500 cavalry and artillery, under General Vandever, attacked Newton's regiment, who were encamped on the Jackson and Fredericktown road. Newton's loss was 2 killed and 6 or 8 wounded or captured.

In the mean time McNeil had been heavily re-enforced by water.

On the morning of the 27th, I found myself between two forces--McNeil on the east and Vandever on the west--either outnumbering my force, and both prepared to attack me simultaneously. At daylight I ordered my forces in retreat southward via bridge over White Water, Bloomfield, and crossing of Saint Francis at Chalk Bluff. Vandever and McNeil, with their combined force, pursued me. My effective fighting force did not exceed 3,500. The enemy had about 8,000--4,500 cavalry, 3,500 infantry, and fifteen pieces of artillery. I anticipated no damage or trouble except in crossing Saint Francis River, which was much swollen, rapid, unbridged, and no ferry-boats on it. When I commenced my retreat, I ordered details of the unarmed and non-effective to proceed rapidly to Chalk Bluff, under charge of my division quartermaster, to construct rafts for crossing. My retreat was orderly and slow. Vandever and McNeil did not seem anxious for a fight. Light rearguard fighting was of daily occurrence. Shelby's or Carter's brigades were habitually in the rear and always did their duty. On several occasions I offered battle when the advantages in position were greatly in my favor. My object was to give ample time to the bridge party. <ar32_288>

My division reached Chalk Bluff the evening of May 1. I dismounted the greater part of my command, selected a strong position about 4 miles from the crossing, where I formed line of battle to resist the advance of the enemy till my wagons, horses, and artillery had crossed. A little before day I quietly withdrew the men, and by sun-up my whole command was safely across. The pursuit here ceased.

My loss in the expedition is some 30 killed, 60 wounded, and 120 missing (stragglers), perhaps captured. I gained on the raid about 150 recruits and a great improvement in the number and quality of horses. The Federal loss must have been at least five times as great as mine in killed and wounded. In every instance when he made the attack he was repulsed.

The officers and men deserve special mention for their bravery, steadiness, and endurance. At no time were they in the least demoralized, but were always willing, even anxious, to fight.

I submit herewith a report of the brigade commanders. I will forward as soon as prepared the names of the killed, wounded, and missing of my command; also a list of Federal prisoners paroled.

MAJOR: Inclosed find letter from Colonel Kitchen,(*) reporting the movements of the enemy above. I have written to him, directing him to picket Chalk Bluff, placing his command at an intermediate point, accessible to forage and water, between Chalk Bluff and Brown's Ferry; then to picket Brown's Ferry. Have informed him that I should report to division headquarters for instructions relative to re-enforcements, &c. If Kitchen's statement is reliable in every particular, relative to the force of the enemy and forage, and if the enemy should move to Brown's Ferry, there is but one of two courses to pursue, to wit, re-enforce him, so as to enable him to keep his forage and subsistence, or else remove the major portion of the command to this point, leaving for picket duty on Upper Saint Francis only such number as may be able to find forage and subsistence. With my present light, the latter course seems to me to be most judicious. Before doing either, however, I recommend that more certain and later news of the enemy's force and movements be obtained.

I respectfully ask for instructions in the premises. It is about 110 miles from this point to Chalk Bluff. You will find in an open envelope a communication addressed to Major [W. B.] Blair.(*) Please submit the papers to General Marmaduke, and request him to give them such indorsement as he may deem proper, before forwarding them to Little Rock. No news additional of the enemy's movements, either from Memphis or Helena. Men and horses recuperating. No news from Vicksburg in addition to that already given. Greene's men and horses also rapidly improving.

Greene's, Burbridge's, and Jeffers' regiments and Kitchen's battalion Missouri troops will form a brigade, to be commanded by Brig. Gen. J. S. Marmaduke. This brigade and Shelby's brigade Missouri troops will form a division, to be commanded by Brigadier-General Marmaduke.

The brigadier generals in command of divisions will also exercise immediate command over their respective brigades.

MAJOR: It has just been reported by one of Dobbin's men that Bragg, with five days' start, has been re-enforcing Johnston, and Rosecrans re-enforcing Grant; also that Johnston has driven Grant, with great slaughter, before him, refusing him permission to bury his dead, lest he should take advantage of it to retreat. It is very certain that the enemy <ar33_858> is sending down re-enforcements from above Memphis, but don't know where they come from.

If General Holmes had allowed me to take my guns over there, I could have operated them without any danger of losing them, and destroyed more Yankees than I will at the present rate in a year.

I have kept this letter open, hoping to receive dispatches direct from Memphis, but the courier has not arrived. The rain of yesterday and to-day has made the roads muddy and delayed the courier.

A large amount of commissary and quartermaster's stores are reported to be on the opposite side of Saint Francis River, in Crittenden and Mississippi Counties. They are not needed by the people there, nor is there a market offered them by the Yankees; but, in view of the trade being with Memphis, the people demand the pay in greenbacks, and, if I secure the supplies, I will have to impress them.

I have sent over two judicious men for the quartermaster's department and two for the commissary department, to inspect the character, amount, and location of the supplies, and to report the same to me. I have also sent over a select scout to examine all the roads between this point and Memphis, and 25 miles above, toward Osceola. That scout will return and report to-morrow.

These observations have been made a preliminary to any future military operations in that direction, and as precautionary against any operations of the enemy. I have scouts within a few miles of Helena, on all the roads leading from it in this direction. Besides, as a precaution, my pickets are thrown 10 miles beyond the L'Anguille, on the roads coming from Helena. I start a scout of 100 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Giddings to-morrow toward Helena. The object of this scout is to watch the enemy, and, if possible, to ambush the Fifth Kansas. Five feet of water in the Saint Francis up to Wittsburg. I do not fear that gunboats or transports will come up, nor do I apprehend any attack from Helena. All the information contained in Lieutenant Walton's report relative to affairs in Helena, sent forward yesterday, has been confirmed by an intelligent lady, who resides in Helena and reached my headquarters to-day. She says that they are exceedingly alarmed, and apprehensive that you and Price will attack them daily. Whether Vicksburg falls or stands, whether we whip or are whipped, we will never have as good an opportunity to operate against Helena and Memphis as now. If we had been operating on the river above Memphis or against Helena, it would have been equal to a re-enforcement of 10,000 men at Vicksburg; but I submit to the superior wisdom of the lieutenant-general commanding in this matter.

Captain Carrington, with flag of truce, took the general's communication toward Helena to-day.

I can subsist and forage my whole command, including both brigades and Kitchen's battalion, three months, if necessary, in this neighborhood. I am saving the wheat crop, and am making arrangements to have unbolted bread for my command. Have ordered down my train from Jacksonport, but with no intention of increasing the size of the train permanently. Major Byrd has not yet made his appearance; I will advise you of his arrival. Have ordered a double line of couriers to be put on the lower road between this point and Jacksonport. The present route (courier) is nearer 75 than 45 miles. I think I can make three or four hours by the change. If the lower line works well, I will relieve the men on the upper route and order them to their respective companies.

If the reports from across the Saint Francis are favorable, I shall send <ar33_859> over parties in a few days to collect supplies and bring them on this side the river.

I have received all the general's notes up to the 4th, and have replied to all interrogations addressed to me.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note written "on the road," dated the 8th of June, and regret that accident prevented your arrival here. In regard to the condition of my troops, I am glad to say that they are now fully rested and in excellent spirits. General Marmaduke also reports his command to be in efficient condition. He reports to me this morning the following number: Total present, Shelby's brigade, 1,561; Greene's brigade, 1,122; Burbridge's brigade, 1,089; Kitchen's battalion, 286. In all 4,058. Of these, many are out on outpost duty. Carter's brigade, now attached to General Walker's command, is reported 1,170 total present. From the most reliable information General Marmaduke can obtain, the enemy have not more than from 4,000 to 5,000 at Helena; and were a movement conducted with celerity and secrecy, by which you could concentrate the commands of Generals Frost and Fagan with this column, I entertain no doubt of your being able to crush the foe at that point.

I have the honor to inclose two communications from Colonel Carter and one from Colonel Coleman, &c.(*)

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note written "on the road," dated the 8th of June, and regret that accident prevented your arrival here. In regard to the condition of my troops, I am glad to say that they are now fully rested and in excellent spirits. General Marmaduke also reports his command to be in efficient condition. He reports to me this morning the following number: Total present, Shelby's brigade, 1,561; Greene's brigade, 1,122; Burbridge's brigade, 1,089; Kitchen's battalion, 286. In all 4,058. Of these, many are out on outpost duty. Carter's brigade, now attached to General Walker's command, is reported 1,170 total present. From the most reliable information General Marmaduke can obtain, the enemy have not more than from 4,000 to 5,000 at Helena; and were a movement conducted with celerity and secrecy, by which you could concentrate the commands of Generals Frost and Fagan with this column, I entertain no doubt of your being able to crush the foe at that point.

I have the honor to inclose two communications from Colonel Carter and one from Colonel Coleman, &c.(*)

MAJOR: General Marmaduke, being quite unwell this morning, indeed confined to his bed, directs me to say that, upon arriving upon the ridge, he found everything quiet and progressing satisfactorily; Greene's brigade showing an effective total of between 1,400 and 1,500 men.

The country is filled with rumors of skirmishing and fighting in and around Vicksburg and Port Gibson, and the general is satisfied that the enemy is re-enforcing as rapidly as possible. Thirty transports, filled with troops, passed down the river two nights ago. There are no movements in the direction of either Memphis or Helena, and late intelligence from Colonel Kitchen says that there are no Federals in Missouri south of Cape Girardeau and that line.

A detachment of 250 men and a section of artillery start this morning to the Mississippi River above Memphis, for the purpose of firing into transports and annoying the enemy generally.

Papers and information are expected from Helena and Memphis this evening, and will be sent down.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, and to report my action thereon.

As you will see by inclosed extract from Captain Reyes' letter,(*) my front is not menaced; consequently I have ordered Col. J. O. Shelby, with the cavalry portion of his brigade, to report to General Steele, at Fayetteville; but as one battery went from this command with Colonel Carter's brigade, I am compelled, unless otherwise ordered by you, to retain Collins' battery, it being the only one now belonging to the cavalry, except two small pieces or mountain howitzers. Two hundred and fifty men, with these two small pieces, have been sent to a point on the river north of Memphis, and 400 men, with a section of Collins' battery (one piece rifled), have been ordered to a point on the river below Memphis, with instructions to harass and injure, as far as practicable, the enemy's transportation of supplies and troops.

Thirteen companies have reported their company organization, the greater portion of whom have been operating with Colonel Kitchen. Of those, about 500 are wholly unarmed, and General Marmaduke reports to me to-day 1,041 unarmed in his command. Whatever means <ar33_870> you adopt to obtain a supply of arms cannot be too vigorously prosecuted, and I respectfully request attention to the requisitions of my ordnance department.

I inclose a copy of a letter received at this point from Mr. L. L. Moore,(*) and have given instructions to the commanders of detachments on the river with a view to carrying out the plan introduced in it.

DEAR GENERAL: I reached camp yesterday, and find the command in good health and spirits. Many are home, cutting wheat. It is generally understood that Colonel Clark will return with an order for the election of colonel, and that the election will come off on next Monday. It has been generally understood that I am to be the colonel, but I find an undercurrent at work which makes the matter not so sure. There are several of the captains who are ambitious, and they think by promoting Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchen that they may stand a chance to fill the vacancy, some trusting to election and others to promotion. (Hence I have written an official letter upon this subject.) The old table that tells of the mouse releasing a lion might have said that the silk-worm could have spun the fiber that confined him, and I may be defeated by the small axes that others may want to grind. I do not know that Colonel Kitchen will lend himself to this matter, but human nature is mighty strong in him, and he may think that I may not be promoted as rapidly as I expect to be.

The Iowa troops have left New Madrid for Vicksburg, and the place is now garrisoned by 400 of the Fourth Missouri Militia. If I could have Jeffers' regiment next week, the two regiments (about five hundred guns for both) can take Madrid in a few minutes, and we can get their guns and outfit for our command. I will make all the inquiries necessary, and, should you allow us to go next week, I will be ready for the order whether I am in command or not.

I have heard of the Republican of the 11th, but there was nothing interesting from Vicksburg.

We have received rumors of the reorganization of the cavalry, but no orders on the subject have been received here yet. Should I be elected colonel of this regiment, I would prefer not to be brigaded, as I am sure that I can soon recruit it up to a brigade. There are already several new companies forming of Missourians and also of Arkansians, who express a desire to serve under me, and I am sure that I can recruit further for myself than for any other officer that I know of. I am, however, willing to serve under anybody, and always prompt in my obedience. I used to except [C. W.] Phifer and Marmaduke, but I will except none now.

The following telegram received from Colonel [J. B.] Rogers, commanding Cape Girardeau:

I have information on which I rely. Kitchen is at Brown's Ferry with 400 men. Price at Jacksonport with 8,000 infantry. Marmaduke moving up to Price with his cavalry; this one week ago Saturday. They are probably there yet. This is from citizens of assured loyalty and truthfulness.

I have proper measures taken to ascertain the truth of above statement. Will you be down to-morrow? If so, please advise me. I hope you can come.

GENERAL: I have just received a dispatch from Colonel Kitchen, who saw the Saint Louis Republican of the 16th. Lee has invaded Pennsylvania with a force estimated at 90,000. Chambersburg, Pa., and Hagerstown, Md., are in our possession. Lincoln calls for 100,000 militia to repel the invasion. Federals are moving their supplies from Aquia Greek to Alexandria, and have changed their bose of operations. A battle is daily expected there. No change in matters at Vicksburg. Rebel privateers are making sad havoc with Federal shipping on the Atlantic. My scouts report but few Federals at Rolla and Ironton. All the regular troops have been sent to Vicksburg. I have given strict orders to all my outposts to allow no one, under any circumstances, to pass north. I will use every precaution to prevent the movement of our army at Jacksonport from being known by the enemy. If an advance is made in this direction, I will harass and impede his progress as much as possible. I have built a good bridge across Black River at this point, and my wagons are now crossing upon it If I should be ordered to leave this point, 1 think it should be sent to Jacksonport.

MAJOR: I have just received very important information from the enemy. My scouts report that the Federals have left Ironton. There <ar33_905> is no doubt, that they have fallen back to Ironton. Inclosed I send you dispatch(*) from Lieutenant Johnson, of Captain Reyes' company.

I have sent a scout to ascertain whether the above is true or not. Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchen informs me that two regiments of cavalry have just taken possession of Bloomfield. He thinks that they have only taken possession of the town for the purpose of establishing a post at that point. We are anxious to hear from Helena. Rumor says that you are now in possession of the place. I have not received a single dispatch from you for six days.

ar32_420 con't]

On the evening of July 3, the army bivouacked on the Little Rock and Helena road, and 6 miles from the latter place. It having been determined to attack the enemy at dawn next morning, the disposition of the troops for the various points of attack was immediately made by the lieutenant-general commanding the army and the major-general commanding this division. The assault and capture of the enemy's works on Graveyard Hill was assigned to the major-general commanding Brigadier-General McRae's brigade (Arkansas) and my brigade (Missouri Volunteers). This position was by the lieutenant-general commanding believed to be the strongest of all the enemy's works, and the key to all his defenses. He was particularly solicitous that it should be carried and held at all hazards. It was represented to contain six heavy pieces, protected by earthworks and a line of rifle-pits on its front, and extremely inaccessible on account of the numerous sharp ridges, steep ravines, and felled timber in its front and flank. These works were situated between Fort Hindman on the right and another fort on the left, both being within rifle range of the position to be assailed by my command, and supported in its rear by another fort between it and the town of Helena, and Fort Curtis, obliquely to the right and rear of the works to be assaulted. All these fortifications were situated upon high, steep hills, with deep ravines and felled timber between, rendering the rapid and orderly movement of troops very difficult.

At 12 o'clock on the night of the 3d the division was put in motion, my brigade in advance, which moved in the following order, viz: First, battalion of sharpshooters, Major [L. A.] Pindall commanding, in front; second, the Ninth Regiment, Colonel [J.D.] White; third, the Eighth Regiment, Colonel [S.P.] Burns commanding; fourth, the Seventh Regiment, Colonel [L.M.] Lewis commanding; fifth, the Tenth Regiment, Colonel [A. C.] Pickett commanding. After moving on the main road <ar32_421> about 2 miles, the column diverged to the left along an obscure path for 2 miles farther, and then left this path to the left and followed up a rivulet until arriving within about 14 miles of Graveyard Hill. Day having not yet dawned, a halt was ordered to await sufficient light, during which time my command was ordered to lead. I had previously thrown out well to the front as skirmishers Major Pindall's battalion of sharpshooters, to which command was attached Captain [C. N.] Biscoe's company of sharpshooters from McRae's brigade. Taking advantage of this halt, I particularly instructed in person the commandants of regiments as to the plan of attack, and charged them that in the event any of their divisions should become disordered in carrying the works, that they should be promptly reformed, and, as the orders of my superiors extended only to the capture of Graveyard Hill that no further movement should be made without orders. I deemed this precaution absolutely necessary, as it was impossible for either myself or staff to ride over the rough ground on which we moved, and consequently orders could not be transmitted with the usual rapidity.

At daylight the march was resumed, and in a short time we encountered the steep ridges and deep ravines, which rendered the movement very slow and fatiguing. At 5 a.m. Major Pindall encountered the enemy's pickets about half a mile front the fortifications. Sharp skirmishing ensued, and finally they were driven in. I ordered the column to form divisions at half distance and move steadily forward in that order. The enemy now commenced throwing shell and grape upon the column, killing and wounding about 20 men, but no signs of disorder or fear were apparent. They moved steadily and firmly forward. By this time Pindall's sharpshooters had arrived within musket range of foe enemy's works, and from behind stumps and logs and the branches of felled trees were delivering an effective fire upon the gunners of the enemy's artillery.

Upon arriving within 300 yards of the line of rifle-pits, I again halted the column, to allow rest and to enable Brigadier-General McRae to move up on my left and take the position as previously agreed upon between that officer and myself, for the purpose of making a combined assault upon the works. So soon as it was announced to me that he was in position, I ordered the "forward" at double-quick, to which officers and men responded with alacrity. Just at this moment a heavy fire was opened on my right flank from a rifle-pit distant about 150 yards; also the shell and grape from Fort Hindman was showered down upon the column. This was the critical moment. I watched with an anxious eye to see whether my battalions would falter or break under this flank attack, but they moved gallantly on, unheeding the murderous missiles now being hurled on them both from front and flank. Turning my attention to the front, the head of the two columns (McRae's and mine) were beyond the rifle-pits, and in an instant White's battle-flag, waving over the works, announced that Graveyard Hill was won. Thirty men of [C. B.] Tilden's battery having been armed and sent forward with Colonel White's regiment, under command of Lieutenant [A. A.] Lesueur, for the purpose of working the enemy's guns upon their capture, this officer immediately took them in charge; but finding shot wedged in the bore, and the enemy having taken away the worms, he could not work them. He and his men resumed their muskets and fought as infantry throughout the battle. As previously ordered, the commandants of regiments proceeded to restore order in their commands wherever confusion had occurred. Just at this time the lieuten-ant-general commanding arrived upon the hill and gave orders directly <ar32_422> to one of my colonels to attack and carry the fort in direction of the town, and he proceeding to execute the order, the other commandants understanding it to be a general movement toward the town, advanced in that direction, some portions of regiments rushing into the town and even to the river bank. All the way from Graveyard Hill to the town, and through it, those devoted troops were exposed to a fatal cross-fire from the enemy's artillery and musketry. It was here that my loss was the heaviest. Not more than half of those that went in that direction returned; the remainder were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners.

From time to time the enemy made repeated assaults on Graveyard Hill, but was always successfully repulsed. While General McRae and myself were thus holding it under the terrific storm of bullets hurled upon us, both from the right and from the left, he suggested that if I with my command would hold the position he would assault Fort Hind-man in the rear, which General Fagan was then engaging in front. This arrangement having been agreed upon, he moved with what troops he had at his disposal to the assault; but being assailed by the guns from the fort, by the musketry from the rifle-pits, and in flank by the heavy artillery from the gunboat, he was compelled to withdraw his gallant command into the timber for shelter. During these operations against Fort Hindman the enemy was continually shelling my position from the fort upon my left, and repeatedly advanced against me, but was each time repulsed. General Fagan having retired from the assault upon Fort Hindman, no troops were now upon the field except my own. The enemy moved upon me in front and upon both flanks and opened a furious cross-fire of artillery from right and left. I still maintained my position, driving back the enemy's infantry wherever assaulted.

At 10.15 a.m. I received an order from the major-general commanding to retire. I immediately sent orders to commandants of regiments and Pindall's battalion to withdraw their commands in good order and fight the enemy as they retired. At 10.30 a.m. I withdrew my command from the field.

It gives me great pain to report the heavy losses in brave officers and men that my brigade sustained on that bloody field.

The following is a summary of my losses(*) in each regiment, battalion, and the artillery detachment:
 

While the country will long mourn the loss of the gallant officers and <ar32_423> men who fell as martyrs to our cause, the historians of this revolution rill record them as "the bravest of the brave." For their gallant comrades who now lie disabled from their wounds, the officers and soldiers of this brigade feel the deepest solicitude, and cherish the hope that they will soon recover and return to their commands, to give the country more examples of unprecedented coolness and daring.

To mention the name of any particular officer or soldier as having distinguished himself for gallantry above his fellow would be to do injustice, for the brigade, as a whole, fully sustained its well-earned reputation, and gave additional evidence of the disinterested devotion of Missourians to the cause of their country, showing, as heretofore, that they are always among the first in the breach and the last to leave it.

I am indebted to my aides, Captain [James F.] Edwards and Lieutenant [P. E.] Chesnut, for the prompt and untiring energy with which they assisted me in the engagement. Major [T.] Monroe, my brigade quartermaster, and Major [John B.] Ruthven, my brigade commissary, deserve great praise for the activity [with] which they discharged the duties of their respective departments. Chief Surgeon [C. D.] Baer, with the regimental surgeons and their assistants, were on the field, and by their prompt professional attention to the wounded saved many valuable lives.

A report in detail of the killed, wounded, and missing will be forwarded at an early day to the proper department.

Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR: In accordance with your orders, I forwarded to you every day a report of the movements of the enemy in the direction of Iron-ton, &c. I directed all my dispatches to the care of post quartermaster at Jacksonport, and, if you have not received them, it is his fault or the courier line south of that point. Brigadier-General Davidson left Iron-ton on the 30th of June, and marched with the greater part of his troops in the direction of Cape Girardeau. He camped near Fredericktown on July 2. Whether it is his intention to go to Cape Girardeau or to Bloomfield my scouts cannot as yet determine. I am inclined to think that the enemy are concentrating at Bloomfield, and will make that point a base of operations. There is one regiment, 800 strong, at Bloomfield at this time. They entered that town about two weeks ago, and brought with them a train of 30 wagons, loaded with supplies. The wagons immediately returned to the Cape, from which point they will be compelled to transport their supplies, &c. One regiment is now building a bridge across the Mingo. This stream empties into the Saint Francis about 16 miles from Poplar Bluff. I think this bridge is only for the purpose of keeping communication open between Ironton and Bloomfield. There are now at Ironton about 1,000 troops, mostly militia. Col. Jake Hill (a big buck negro) has established his headquarters at that place, and is recruiting a regiment of American citizens of African descent. The Federal outposts are about 10 miles from Patterson, and can be very easily captured, if the general will only give me permission.

Davidson's men say that they are going to Helena, down Crowley's Ridge. There are about 2,500 Federals at New Madrid. They are preparing <ar33_919> extensive fortifications at that point, and say they are looking for large re-enforcements. The enemy continue to make raids into West Plains and Thomasville from the direction of Hartville, Mo., but it is only in small bands and for plunder. There are only 800 or 900 men at Rolla. A few militia at Salem and Houston. There are three companies at Hartville.

Since our army has returned to Jacksonport, there will be no danger of an advance in this direction, as the enemy only presented a threatening front in anticipation of an advance on our part; for as soon as they discovered that we did not intend to advance, they abandoned it. If the enemy advance at all, which I do not believe, it will be, in my opinion, from the direction of Bloomfield. Davidson's force has been very much overrated. He left Ironton with about 4,000 men. That makes my former estimate correct. I estimated his force at Ironton between 5,000 and 6,000 effective men. There are a great many recruiting officers in this section; they profess to be authorized by Major Crandall and others; they are not recruiting many men. Major Crandall and Colonel Wood are now encamped near head of Spring River. Colonel [J. T.] Cearnal is near Salem, Ark., and has 60 or 70 men. Colonel Kitchen is now encamped 3 miles from Chalk Bluff. His regiment was organized on yesterday. I have instructed him to watch the enemy at Bloomfield. Inclosed I send you map of roads and stations of my pickets.(*)

My officers complain very much because their men have not been paid since 1st of last January. Four of my companies have not been paid one cent since they have been in the service. They were organized in January, and two thirds of the men have been with me over eight months. A great many of the men are dismounted, and they want their money to buy horses. Has not Shelby's brigade been paid since January? My officers say that it has. I hope the general will give me justice. I will send my quartermaster down for funds.

I send you Democrat of July 4.

GENERAL: I have fallen back from my position at Brown's Ferry, in consequence of the scarcity of forage and supplies. While there the regiment foraged in Missouri, but the reoccupation of Bloomfield by a heavy force rendered it extremely hazardous to send parties over the river for supplies. The forces of the enemy formerly in occupation of <ar33_921> Ironton have changed their position as a corps of observation from that place to Bloomfield. They are watching for Price to come into Missouri. A prisoner in my hands belonging to Glover's Third Gamble Militia, and captured by my scouts 1½ miles from Bloomfield (Third and Eighth Regiments Gamble Cavalry are already at Bloomfield), says that the officers state that 30,000 Federals will be stationed at Bloomfield, but says his opinion is that the number will not exceed 15,000. I think some 5,000 or 6,000 are all that will be concentrated there. There has been a force left at Ironton sufficient only to garrison the forts at that point. Part of the troops to be sent to Bloomfield are of the Enrolled Militia. No artillery has yet arrived there, although some is on the way. It is said they have a pontoon train. The forage is hauled from Cape Girardeau. The enemy is extending the lines of fortification at New Madrid so as to make them sufficiently capacious for a garrison of 10,000 men.

The paper of 3d reports a battle near Harrisburg, Pa., in which Ewell and Longstreet routed the Federals and killed 4 generals (General Reynolds, U.S. Army, of the number). General Meade is in command of the United States Army on the Potomac.

The conscript act has proved a failure. Papers are openly acknowledging the necessity of recognizing the Confederacy. Large peace meetings are being held. Lee has it all his own way in Pennsylvania.

My battalion was organized into a regiment on July 9; S.G. Kitchen, colonel, Jesse Ellison, lieutenant-colonel, and J. A. Walker, major. I would not be surprised at a raid from the enemy soon. The clothing arrived last night.

I am, sir, &c.,

MAJOR: Colonel Kitchen has fallen back from Chalk Bluff, and has established his headquarters near Gainesville. He says it is impossible for him to obtain forage on the Saint Francis. He represents the enemy concentrating at Bloomfield, and thinks that a large force will soon occupy that place. They came from Ironton, and their officers say that they intend going to Helena. Prisoners represent their effective force at 10,000 or 12,000. I have instructed Colonel Kitchen to post one company at Chalk Bluff, and to guard all the crossings of the Saint Francis. My communications with Colonel Kitchen's camp are now daily. If the enemy advance, shall I instruct Colonel Kitchen to form a junction with me near Pocahontas? If Price has fallen back to Little Rock, I think you may expect an advance of the enemy. They have a force superior to General Marmaduke, and will try to drive him out of this portion of Arkansas. Colonels Wood and Coleman are instructed to picket and scout the country in the direction of Thomasville, Mo., and Van Buren, Mo. Captain Reyes occupies his old position near Doniphan.

Captain Porter's men claim to be twelve-months' men. The majority of them will re-enlist, but some of them will not. They wish to reorganize, and their time will be up on the 5th of August. I wish instructions from the general in reference to this company. My quartermaster sends estimates for pay of troops up to June 30, 1863. In that estimate is included the bounty of the men. I hope the general will pay my regiment their bounty; it is due them, and they ought to have it. They wish all that is due them for the purpose of buying horses. I have seven or eight deserters from my regiment. Shall I forward the charges against them? Send me pay-rolls for May and June, and also muster-rolls.

I send you Saint Louis Democrat of the 5th of July.

Information obtained by one of Glenn's men from a captured lieutenant of Kitchen's regiment to-day. Price crossed from Jacksonport to Crowley's Ridge, by a good road, 40 miles. He had no intention of holding Helena; merely attacked for supplies. Has now on the ridge six brigades of infantry, 2,000 each. Marmaduke has 7,000 cavalry. If we do not advance, Price proposes to attack us here. His present object is to draw us across the Saint Francis, and then assail our rear. Two regiments of Burbridge's brigade are at Chalk Bluff, and 6 miles below. Burbridge can concentrate his brigade from Pocahontas to the bluff in twenty-four hours.

Rebels are fully aware of the nature and strength of this command. We are all right.

MAJOR: My last dispatches gave it as my opinion that at that time General Davidson did not intend an advance in this direction, and that the threatening front presented was only to prevent an expected raid on our part, and that, as soon as he discovered that it was not our intention to advance, he, of course, abandoned it, and commenced the concentration of his whole force at Bloomfield, Mo. His object in so doing and the benefits arising from such a move are, in my opinion, twofold. He could not only from this point protect Ironton (that he had an eye to this, notice his bridging the Mingo and other small streams), but would also occupy such a position as would enable him to cover Cape Girardeau and New Madrid, thereby rendering the navigation of the Mississippi above that point perfectly secure.

Again, from this point he could the more readily assume the offensive than from any other place, and, by bridging the Saint Francis, could throw his whole force upon Jacksonport, or unite with those at Helena. Davidson's force is now undoubtedly superior to that of General Marmaduke, and, in the event of an advance, that force will be swelled by the troops now at Cape Girardeau and New Madrid, this advance superseding the necessity of their remaining any longer to protect those points. The design of such a movement would be either to force General Marmaduke to abandon this portion of Arkansas or to unite with the troops at Helena, and march upon Little Rock, and drive us south of the Arkansas River. Helena is now secure, and no reason exists why those troops may not engage in such an expedition. When Davidson does advance, I think he will cross at Chalk Bluff, that being his most accessible point. The above reasons induce me to think that it is the intention of General Davidson to advance, and that before long.

Colonel Kitchen writes me that there are only 1,200 now at Bloomfield, but that there are several regiments on the way to that point. I think «59 R R--VOL XXII, PT II» <ar33_930> he is mistaken, for I have every reason to believe that Davidson, with his whole force, is encamped at that point. One hundred Federals are posted near Chalk Bluff., on the opposite side of the river. My scouts now have no trouble going in the direction of Ironton, and several of them are now posted in the vicinity of that place. They represent both Ironton and Pilot Knob with small garrisons. I am satisfied this is true, as the enemy confine themselves to those places, and are not sending out any scouts. Recruiting officers give me a great deal of trouble with their recruiting authority; they pass my outposts, and some of them are engaged in smuggling goods from Ironton. About every other man you meet has recruiting authority from some one to raise a regiment or a company. Two-thirds of them never intend to raise a company, but only wish the authority to enable them to pass with impunity. Two of these men passed a negro through Captain Reyes' pickets to Ironton. The negro is a free negro, living at Pocahontas. It seems that they are connected together for the purpose of bringing out goods. I am on the lookout, and will try and arrest them.

Mrs. Elliott, of Pocahontas, applied to me for a pass to go to Ironton for her children. I refused to grant it, and she was passed through my lines by some of those recruiting officers. I have given strict orders to officers in command of outposts to allow no one to pass without passes from the general or myself. Officers who are legally authorized to raise regiments are, of course, very anxious to recruit, and generally gives recruiting power to every one that applies. We have, therefore, the whole country overrun by them. I would like to have some instructions from the general concerning these men.

My officers are all willing to help defray the expenses of Colonel Con-row to Richmond and back. I will send you a roster of my officers to-morrow.

Private Grissom, unfortunately, escaped from his guard upon the way to this camp. From what the corporal says, he was very negligent of his duty. I will send his description to Colonels Wood and Coleman, and instruct them to use every effort to effect his capture.

I have heard of Saint Louis paper of the 8th. I will try and get it and send it to you. I understand that it acknowledges a disastrous defeat in Virginia, and says Vicksburg has surrendered.

<ar33_931>

SIR: For the information of the general, I have the honor to report that to-day I laid the pontoon bridge, having first pushed across the river by swimming above a reconnaissance of 50 men, who found nothing but some citizens and one man only watching the crossing. This latter got away before they could capture him. Merrill's Horse, the two batteries of artillery, and the infantry are on the other side. The Seventh and Eighth will move across early in the morning. I find on the other side, where I am now encamped, a very strong natural position, of which I send a rough sketch.(*) We have captured 2 prisoners of the enemy, one who says he is a deserter and willing to enlist, probably a spy; the other is one of Kitchen's men, who was out hunting his horse; also a field forge and its appurtenances complete, which was left, concealed in the woods by Marmaduke, probably. From the most reliable information, Kitchen is about 12 miles southeast of Gainesville, with some 500 or 600 men; one company armed with Enfield rifles, the rest (who are armed) with shot-guns and squirrel rifles. About one-third of the whole are not<ar33_383> armed. The man we saw yesterday was a scout from his camp, who went back this morning. Price is at Jacksonport; no rumors of his strength. The First Missouri moves at daylight to-morrow to Gainesville, and, as that is some 34 miles from here, I would suggest the propriety of my moving forward the next day, so as to get within supporting distance of them. From all I can learn of the movements and position of the enemy, I would suggest to the general that the intended reconnaissance to Pocahontas will scarcely be necessary, as it does not seem probable that there are any forces at or in that vicinity. One of Glenn's scouts captured the man from Bloomfield, who was in Kitchen's camp, and recognized the two men sent down to join Kitchen. I sent him back by the same party who takes this, to be taken back to Bloomfield, unless the general should otherwise order.

CAPTAIN: Colonel Kitchen's estimate of the Federal force at Bloomfield is confirmed by my own scouts from Poplar Bluff. Very few Federal scouts are sent out from Bloomfield, and they make no attempt to cross the Saint Francis River. Citizens report the Federals feeding all the wheat in that vicinity, on account of the scarcity of forage.

The force at Ironton and Pilot Knob is about as previously reported. No scouts are sent out from those points. I send you field returns of my regiment and Captain Reyes' company. Reports from the other commands have not as yet been sent in, although they were ordered to do so six days ago. I will forward them as soon as received.

Colonels Wood and Coleman have not as yet acknowledged the receipt of Brigadier-General Marmaduke's order. I do not think they intend obeying it. I suppose the reason why Colonel Coleman does not report is that Major Crandall is in command of his men.

Captain Reyes writes me that he has seen a Saint Louis paper of the 11th. He says it contains full particulars of the Vicksburg surrender. Lieutenant-General Pemberton surrendered, on the 4th, 14 brigadier-generals, 130 colonels, 30,000 privates, 50,000 small-arms, and 102 cannon. He also says that a citizen reports seeing the 13th, which denies the surrender, and says, on the contrary, the enemy was repulsed, with a loss of 8,000.

SIR: For the information of the general, I have the honor to report that to-day I laid the pontoon bridge, having first pushed across the river by swimming above a reconnaissance of 50 men, who found nothing but some citizens and one man only watching the crossing. This latter got away before they could capture him. Merrill's Horse, the two batteries of artillery, and the infantry are on the other side. The Seventh and Eighth will move across early in the morning. I find on the other side, where I am now encamped, a very strong natural position, of which I send a rough sketch.(*) We have captured 2 prisoners of the enemy, one who says he is a deserter and willing to enlist, probably a spy; the other is one of Kitchen's men, who was out hunting his horse; also a field forge and its appurtenances complete, which was left, concealed in the woods by Marmaduke, probably. From the most reliable information, Kitchen is about 12 miles southeast of Gainesville, with some 500 or 600 men; one company armed with Enfield rifles, the rest (who are armed) with shot-guns and squirrel rifles. About one-third of the whole are not<ar33_383> armed. The man we saw yesterday was a scout from his camp, who went back this morning. Price is at Jacksonport; no rumors of his strength. The First Missouri moves at daylight to-morrow to Gainesville, and, as that is some 34 miles from here, I would suggest the propriety of my moving forward the next day, so as to get within supporting distance of them. From all I can learn of the movements and position of the enemy, I would suggest to the general that the intended reconnaissance to Pocahontas will scarcely be necessary, as it does not seem probable that there are any forces at or in that vicinity. One of Glenn's scouts captured the man from Bloomfield, who was in Kitchen's camp, and recognized the two men sent down to join Kitchen. I sent him back by the same party who takes this, to be taken back to Bloomfield, unless the general should otherwise order.

In consequence of an advance of the enemy, I have been compelled to fall back. The advance, 350 strong, were camped last 4 miles below Scatterville, and are coming down the ridge, from what I can learn. <ar33_937> Their entire force is estimated at 12,000, with some twenty pieces of artillery and 800 infantry. They are fortifying Bloomfield, and may do the same at the Chalk Bluff:

I am falling back on Marmaduke, and will cross at Lofton's Ferry, as I will be unable to get through with my train any farther up Cache River. My courier will remain with you and fall back as you do. There is considerable danger of your being attacked by a superior force from the ridge if you remain where you now are. A force of cavalry could cross by Moore's and easily get in your rear. Vicksburg is not taken, at least up to the 13th. Three brigades of Yankees were captured by Johnston near Vicksburg. Vicksburg has four months' provisions. Lee has cut the Federals to pieces in Pennsylvania. Longstreet engaged them with his corps and commenced retreating; retreated two days, occasionally throwing away a gun, saber, or wagon, thus inducing the Federals to think he was retreating precipitately, until Ewell and Hill got on each flank, and then Longstreet turned and held them at bay, and Ewell and Hill closed in and whipped them on the third day. The enemy say, through their papers, that they lost 80,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Forty thousand prisoners were taken by Lee and sent to Virginia, on their refusing to be paroled.

It is stated that Kirby Smith had possession of Algiers, opposite New Orleans; also that Morgan had taken Columbus, Ky., and evacuated it. Pillow is over in that section of Tennessee, conscripting..

I am, sir, &c.,

GENERAL: Dr. Pearson (of Des Arc) has sent me, by courier, from Wittsburg the dispatch for you and paper. Dr. Pearson wrote this at 8 a.m. on 20th; was in Memphis on 18th or 19th.

Colonel Kitchen writes, July 20, 2 p.m., that the advance of the enemy, in force, were crossing at Chalk Bluff; Colonel Burbridge writes, July 20, from Pocahontas, that his pickets near Doniphan were driven in on the 19th; thinks a Federal scout did this. It seems to me that all indicates an actual advance into this State of a strong Federal force. Pearson thinks there will be a co-operating force by water. The supposition is reasonable, to say the least of it.

I hear that General Holmes is very ill. I have no specific instructions, and no idea of the plan of operations. The question is one of so serious importance that I have deemed it advisable to write to you, inasmuch as General Holmes may be so ill as to be unable to attend to business.

Considering the high water, the admirable means of operating in the Federal hands, and their possible combined movement by land and water, concentration is absolutely necessary in order to give decided resistance at some point, and to do this requires prompt action.

Very respectfully,

<ar33_938>

I have thought it expedient to fall back this far on my way to Lofton's Ferry, on Cache. I have no additional reliable information from my scouts, but know that the enemy is in force. I have since my last dispatch learned that a force (larger)was some 4 or 5 miles in rear of the 350 mentioned as camping below Scatterville. My scouts have not reported this morning, but if anything happens or any information of importance comes to me, I will send extra courier or dispatch. I am this morning sending my train and ineffective men to Cache River.

I am, sir, &c.,

<ar33_940>

<ar33_938>

GENERAL: By direction of Lieutenant-General Holmes, I have the honor to inclose herewith letters from Brigadier-General Marmaduke (one inclosure each) of July 18 and 20 instant, and also one from Colonel Kitchen of July 19 instant,(*) all giving intelligence of the enemy's force in Southeastern Missouri, and of his probable intentions.

The condition of General Holmes' health entirely prevents hope of his being able to take the field in person at this time. If the reports contained in the inclosed letters be correct, they disclose a state of affairs that will render immediate and energetic action necessary. He directs me, therefore, to say that he relies upon you to take such measures as, in consultation with General Marmaduke, you may find necessary to meet the threatened advance of the enemy, in whatever direction it may come.

Inclosed I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a letter of this date from these headquarters to Brigadier-General Marmaduke, by which you will perceive he is directed to inform you fully of all information of interest he may receive relative to the movements of the enemy, and to advise with you fully on the measures to be adopted.

It is hoped that by this time your division is reunited at Searcy. It is of the first importance it should be so at the earliest possible day, and ready to take the field promptly. Just returned from an exhausting expedition, Lieutenant-General Holmes trusts that the prospect of meeting the enemy in open field will inspire the troops with ardor, and that while they have already shown their valor in attacking a strongly fortified place, they may prove more successful against a foe on equal ground.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters of the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th instant, relative to the movements, &c., of the enemy near Bloomfield, Mo.

I am directed by the lieutenant-general commanding to reply to them. For a week past his health has been such that his attending physicians have protested against his giving his attention to any matters of business. The character of your communications made it necessary to infringe upon his seclusion. He desires me to express to you the great relief he derives from the confidence he reposes in your energy, combined with prudence and ability to deal with the difficult circumstances that surround you. He feels that at this distance, and enfeebled as he <ar33_939> is, he can safely depend upon you to meet any emergency that may arise, and to deal with it to as great advantage as your means will permit. He directs me to say that he desires your command to be independent for the present, except in matters relating to recruiting service, with which Major-General Price is charged for Northeastern Arkansas and Missouri.

Should the enemy advance in force from Missouri upon you, or west of Black River, it is General Holmes' opinion that you should not allow yourself to be found by him on the east bank of White or Black Rivers. The time for crossing, as well as the selection of the point at which you will dispute the passage, he leaves to your discretion, to be guided by the information you receive of his force, &c.

The disposition to be made of the supplies at Jacksonport must also be determined by you. Should you find it necessary to order their removal, he places at your disposition, for the purpose, all the means of transportation on the rivers available to you.

Should the force of the enemy be too great to allow you to cope with him single-handed, Major-General Price will co-operate with you. To enable him to do so to the best advantage, Lieutenant-General Holmes commends to your special notice the importance of communicating with Major-General Price every circumstance worthy of attention, and of advising with him on all the measures to be adopted. Should your forces unite, he, as senior, will, of course, take the direction of the whole.

It is almost unnecessary to mention that these instructions, being based upon the probable necessity in which you may find yourself to retire before the enemy, are not intended to operate to the derangement of the usual business of the service in your vicinity, except in case the contemplated contingency arises to view.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

I have thought it expedient to fall back this far on my way to Lofton's Ferry, on Cache. I have no additional reliable information from my scouts, but know that the enemy is in force. I have since my last dispatch learned that a force (larger)was some 4 or 5 miles in rear of the 350 mentioned as camping below Scatterville. My scouts have not reported this morning, but if anything happens or any information of importance comes to me, I will send extra courier or dispatch. I am this morning sending my train and ineffective men to Cache River.

MAJOR: I inclose dispatches this moment received from Colonel Kitchen, commanding outpost near Jonesborough, on Crowley's Ridge; also a letter from Colonel Burbridge. Both concur that the enemy are advancing and in force. I am also of that opinion. As yet they have given no indications of a raid. My impression is that Schofield is in command.

My train has been crossed to the west side of Cache, with all my effective men and the battery of Captain Griswold. Lieutenant-Colonel Ellison, <ar33_944> with scout No. 1; Major Walker, with scout No. 2; Captain [W. H-.] Glenn, with scout No. 3, and Captain [James A.] Cooper, with scout No. 4, are on the ridge yet. I shall start over to take charge of them this morning. The enemy have again commenced an advance down the ridge, having again appeared in force in the neighborhood of Scatterville on the evening of the 22d. My train will start this evening to Jacksonport. I would start it this morning, but it is nearly exhausted from the forced marching. My dispatch of the 21st should have been dated the 22d. A dispatch has been sent you every day for the past five days. The enemy is supposed to be fortifying at Chalk Bluff, and are establishing a telegraph as far as they come. I will retain one or two teams, with cooking utensils sufficient for the regiment, yet behind.

MAJOR: One of my scouts, who was captured and paroled by the enemy, returned last night. He says there are three forts at Bloomfield, and some very large siege pieces. General McNeil is in command. He says there are 2,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry left to garrison that place. He crossed on the pontoon at Chalk Bluff, with Colonel Glover's command. He says there are not less than 10,000 Federals this side of Saint Francis, and about 2,000 infantry. He counted 250 wagons and eighteen large field pieces. The field pieces have 8 horses, and not under 24-pounders. They are preparing to take up their pontoon, and are making a raft bridge across the Saint Francis. This man was taken to Cape Girardeau and then brought back to Bloomfield, and had a good opportunity to find out their strength.

The enemy is in force at Gainesville, and are putting up telegraph wires to Chalk Bluff. They say they are going to Jacksonport and to Little Rock. They think General Price's division is at Jacksonport. I am satisfied that this is no raid of the enemy, but that it is their intention to march this time to Little Rock.

Shall I destroy my boats, or send them down the river to Jackson-port? One of them is a large Federal flat-boat. I have a 2-inch rope. It is impossible for the enemy to cross without my having immediate information. I will encamp at cross-roads and wait further orders.

I have just returned, with my scout, from Crowley's Ridge The enemy are advancing down the ridge on the east and west sides. A regiment camped at Dr. Cross', 4 miles above my house, last night, on the west side, and a regiment (800 strong)reached Jonesborough, on the east side, after dark last night. The main body was to camp last night at Gainesville. I have reliable information that nine regiments of cavalry and 200 infantry and ten pieces of artillery were all that came to Bloomfield. I left Osborne's, on the Ridge, after daylight this morning. I cannot yet ascertain about their artillery. The enemy are destroying all the corn and wheat, feeding it to their horses. I yet have two small scouts on the east side of Cache, under Captains Glenn and Cooper. <ar33_948>

I send you this evening a Yankee prisoner (J. D. Lindsey) captured by my men on this scout. He was bearing a dispatch from Davidson to Jonesborough. You can question him when he arrives.

GENERAL: Colonel Kitchen desired me to keep you informed of everything coming to my notice. A messenger 'has just arrived from Captain [J. R.] Henson (who was out scouting), and says he was sent back from Greensborough before daylight this morning. He was sent by Captain Henson to hurry Colonel Kitchen up with the balance of the men, as he (Captain H.). had captured 3 wagons, 10 mules, and 2 horses. The wagons are all loaded with boxes (contents unknown). Colonel Kitchen met the messenger 5 miles beyond Cache River, and hurried his command forward to meet Captain H., who by that time must have reached the swamp. Captain H. also captured 3 men and 1 woman. The prisoners reported 500 Federals on the Ridge, 5 miles above Greensborough. Will dispatch again when the command arrives, or should I hear from Colonel Kitchen.

If it is true that General Davidson is at Helena, can I not withdraw my force from Chalk Bluff? They are getting sick fast. The point is of no strategical importance, and a force so isolated and compelled to forage at immense distance is constantly in danger of being cut up; besides, the force itself may be hemmed in, and, being so far from supplies, and no forage, could not hold out long. The concentration of guerrillas, and the daring raids between here and there, fill me with anxiety. I fear for them unless speedily re-enforced or withdrawn. I suggest that you allow me to move them up in the rear of Reyes' force; send Major Montgomery out on this side, let me approach from this quarter and you via northwest, and rid the country of these murderers. One thing or the other should be done at once. These may be enveloped and cut off from forage at any day. Kitchen is said to be between Davidson and us, with 500 men and four pieces; Reyes northeast, with 300 men.

Dispatch just received from Lieutenant-Colonel Hiller. He says:

Have Just arrived here (Bloomfield) from the bluffs to see about supplies. The country is fast filling up with guerrillas; have had four brushes with them. Killed the notorious Lieutenant Chamber, of Kennett, and three or four others. Recaptured the train taken from Merrill's Horse. Sergeant Ferguson, Second Missouri State Militia, dangerously wounded and I private. We need more force. Forage scarce.

DEAR SIR: A dispatch is due to you from this regiment, and, in the absence of Colonel Kitchen, I undertake to comply with the usage. I cannot, however, transcribe anything that will be of use to you, as you are now as well posted in regard to the enemy as we are at this time. We still get confirmation that 6,000 Federals are the number that went down the Ridge. This information certainly is correct. There came a rumor into this neighborhood yesterday evening that the Federals were at Chalk Bluff. Colonel Kitchen has gone in person in command of a scout in that direction. I think that in four or five days he will have some important information from that direction. When he returns he will advise you of whatever he may discover. As I cannot inform you on any other subject of interest, I may speak of some deserters from this and other commands. They are very numerous, hiding about in the hills and swamps like the wild beasts of the forest. We have chased them rapidly for some time, with but little success; in consequence of which our horses are jaded; though we are now improving our horses, as we can obtain plenty of forage in this part of the country. The people seem to be more willing to sell to us since we are paying our way. Smuggling cotton to the Federals seems to be a popular business on the west side of the swamp. It is impossible to stop it now. I was credibly informed that 102 men, who have deserted this command within the last three months, are now on the Mississippi River, chopping wood for the Federal boats which run down that stream. We do not know who our friends are on the Ridge, as many prominent citizens whom we looked upon as our friends are now engaged in the smuggling business. Captain Glenn reports that while he was near Jonesborough, on a scout, the citizens were reported to have visited a vacated camp of his for the purpose of surprising and firing on his troops. We have concluded that severe punishment will be the best remedy for such tories. Our troops are very much vexed because they have not been paid for any part of their services, as many of them have been in the Confederate States service for ten months.

COLONEL: I take the liberty to submit to you the following report of matters as they now stand in regard to the enemy at Bloomfield and this side of that place:

I obtain information from different reliable sources that there are 500 troops at that place, 300 of which are ineffective, as they are sick, making all of them ineffective. If there are 300 of 500 sick, it will take the remainder to provide for the sick. There are now between 200 and 400 troops at Chalk Bluff. It is believed that, they will move down the Ridge. It is reported that they have immense supplies at Bloomfield, many guns being left at that place, and many other articles of value, besides two stores kept by individuals. We have moved to this place for the purpose of placing ourselves in a position to do some injury to the enemy in rear of the command now at Wittsburg. Colonel, if it would not interfere with your present base of operations, and <ar33_956> you would move a part of the most effective of your troops this way, so that we could fall in together here or somewhere this side of the Saint Francis River, it would be an easy matter to move our forces jointly on, in the direction of Bloomfield, and, crossing the Saint Francis River at the shoals, proceed in perfect secrecy to make an attack on Bloomfield. If we could make a successful attack on Bloomfield, it would certainly not set us back any at present. In my opinion, if a project of this kind were judiciously managed, it would result in the capture of Bloomfield. There can be found in this neighborhood 500 bushels of corn, and at Custer's, 9 miles farther on the Gainesville road, there are 300 bushels more. All of our men are very anxious to make this raid, and would evidently fight in desperation. Colonel Kitchen is on the Ridge, and will be in this evening or in the morning.

In the month of June, 1862, the Federal forces under General Curtis, from the attempted invasion of Arkansas, betook themselves to the city of Helena and there fortified. Since that time it has been constantly and heavily garrisoned by Federal troops. The possession of this place has been of immense advantage to the enemy. From it they have threatened at all times an invasion of Arkansas, thereby rendering it necessary that troops should be held in position to repel such invasion. From it they have controlled the trade and sentiments of a large and important <ar32_409> scope of country. It has been to them a most important depot for troops in their operations against Vicksburg. In view of these great advantages to them, of the great embarrassment to my movements elsewhere, arising from the proximity of a large and threatening army, and of the deleterious effect on that portion of the State cursed by their presence, it was deemed of very great importance that they should be driven from this their only stronghold in Arkansas. As a means of raising the siege of Vicksburg, and of keeping the Mississippi River closed, in the event of the surrender of that city, the policy of the move was perfectly apparent. Moreover, from information considered reliable in my possession, the capture of Helena by the forces at my disposal seemed perfectly practicable.

On June 14, 1863, I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Smith that I believed I could take the place, and asked his permission to attack it. Two days after, I started to Jacksonport, there to consult with Generals Price and Marmaduke and to make the necessary preliminary arrangements. The result of this interview was the following orders: Price's command, consisting of General McRae's Arkansas and General Par sons' Missouri brigades of infantry, constituting Price's division, and Colonels [Colton] Greene's and [Joseph O.] Shelby's brigades of Missouri cavalry, Marmaduke's division, to rendezvous at Cotton Plant, and Brigadier-General Fagan's Arkansas brigade of infantry at Clarendon, on June 26 (Friday), whence, by converging roads, the two columns would move in the direction of Helena. I also informed General [L. M.] Walker, commanding brigade of cavalry in the vicinity of Helena, of my intention, and directed him to allow no ingress to the place.

Upon my return to Little Rock, I found that General Smith had fully sanctioned my proposed attack, and that the Secretary of War had written a strong letter suggesting, advising, and urging it. Thus encouraged, on June 26 I proceeded to Clarendon and assumed command of the expedition. From unavoidable necessity, consequent on rain, high water, and wretched roads, General Price's command did not reach its rendezvous for four days after the date fixed, thus giving the enemy abundant notice of my approach. General Fagan arrived at his place of rendezvous (Clarendon) on the 26th. As soon as the troops were in position, I proceeded toward Helena by converging reads, and reached Allen Polk's house, 5 miles from Helena, on the morning of July 3.

Having received full, accurate, and reliable information of the forces and fortifications of the enemy in Helena, and the topography of the surrounding country, I here made the final dispositions for the attack. That information disclosed that the place was very much more difficult of access, and the fortifications very much stronger, than I had supposed before undertaking the expedition, the features of the country being peculiarly adapted to defense, and all that the art of engineering could do having been brought to bear to strengthen it. The fortifications consisted of one regular work heavily armed with siege guns, and four strong redoubts mounted with field pieces and protected by rifle-pits, on suburban hills (see the map).

The disposition for the attack was as per following order:

The attack on Helena will be made to-morrow morning at daylight, and as follows:

1st. Major-General Price, in command of McRae's and Parsons' brigades, will proceed by the best route, assume position, assault and take Graveyard Hill at daylight.

2d. Brigadier-General Walker, with his cavalry brigade, will, in like manner, proceed to the Sterling road, where he will hold himself in position to resist any troops that may approach Righter Hill; and when that position is captured, he will enter the town and act against the enemy as circumstances may justify. <ar32_410>

3d. Brigadier-General Fagan will proceed by the best route, assume position, and take the battery on Hindman Hill at daylight.

4th. Brigadier-General Marmaduke will proceed with his command by the best route, assume position, and take Righter Hill at daylight.

This plan of attack was fully concurred in by all my general officers, and the part assigned to each accepted with alacrity.

Between 11 and 12 o'clock at night, the troops began to move to their respective positions, whence to assault in the morning. General Fagan detached a regiment from his brigade and sent it forward to the right on the lower Little Rock road, to occupy the attention of the enemy in the rifle-pits below the city, and to protect his flank in case of an attack from that quarter. Three detached companies of cavalry, under Captain [W. B.] Denson, were ordered to act as vedettes in the plain south of the city, and to transmit to General Fagan rapid information of any attempt to flank him. His artillery was also sent forward on this the only practicable road, with the hope that it might assist in creating a diversion and thereby aid the general movement. I took position a little after daylight on the graveyard ridge, one-half mile from the fortifications (a central point), there to await the development of the attack.

Soon after daylight, Brigadier-General Marmaduke drove in the pickets of the enemy in his front and assaulted Rightor Fort. It is believed that a strong, vigorous, and sudden attack on this fort would have been successful, but some delay occurring, a heavy force of the enemy appeared on his left flank and rear, and held him perfectly in check during the whole day. It was the peculiar duty of Brigadier-General Walker to have prevented this movement on the part of the enemy, and, as represented by General Marmaduke, the same could have been easily accomplished. No satisfactory reason has been given by General Walker why this service was not rendered. This attack, being most remote, was not under my personal supervision, and was too distant for me to give specific orders.

The assault on the first line of rifle-pits in front of Hindman Hill was made at a few minutes after daylight. General Fagan, at the head of his brigade, charged gallantly over four lines under a deadly fire from the rifle-pits and guns on his front, and a most disastrous enfilading fire from Graveyard Hill, on the left, previous to the attack by General Price. Having driven the enemy from and carried the fifth and last line of rifle-pits, the brave men who had followed him thus far, overcome by sheer exhaustion, resulting from the inordinate exertion of their difficult charge and the intense heat of the day, were unable to proceed farther. A charge upon the fort was, nevertheless, attempted, and failed. The brigade thereupon took shelter behind the inner line of breastworks, anxiously awaiting assistance. This assistance never arrived. Major-General Price did not make his attack till after sunrise, and more than an hour after the time named in the order. As an explanation of this delay, his report states that, finding when he had gotten within 1½ miles of the position he had been ordered to take, his division would arrive upon the ground prematurely, he ordered a halt, and resumed his march at dawn of day. His troops, when brought into position and ordered forward, behaved magnificently, charging rifle-pits and breastworks without a falter, and taking the hill without a halt.

As soon as the works were carried, I rode rapidly into them. Finding the guns in the fort had been rendered useless by the enemy before being abandoned, I at once dispatched one of my staff to the rear to <ar32_411> bring up some artillery. Owing to the impracticability of the roads, this could not be effected in time.

Perceiving the position of the gallant Fagan and his command, I ordered Brigadier-General Parsons, the only general officer present, to proceed at once to attack the Hindman fort in the rear. Everything was in confusion, regiments and brigades mixed up indiscriminately, and the order was not attended to. Immediately afterward I sent an order to General Price to the same effect, and then returned to my headquarters. Two or three hundred yards in the rear I passed Brigadier-General McRae, who had not joined his brigade since the assault. I ordered him at once to the fort. It seems that General McRae was the officer designated by General Price to go to General Fagan's assistance. After much delay he proceeded on this duty, but utterly failed to render the slightest aid, making no attempt to assault the hill. Not having been advised of this order for General McRae, and being impatient of the delay, I proceeded again to the fort on Graveyard Hill, where I found General Parsons with only 300 or 400 men of his brigade. He informed me that General McRae had been ordered to the relief of General Fagan. That officer was nowhere to be seen, while General Fagan, with greatly reduced force, was being assaulted and driven back by the enemy, largely re-enforced. Under these circumstances, at 10.30 a.m. I ordered the troops to be withdrawn. My retreat from Helena was effected in the most perfect order and without the slightest demoralization of any kind.

My whole force engaged in this expedition amounted to 7,646. My loss, as near as is ascertained, is 173 killed, 687 wounded, 776 missing; total, 1,636. See reports of division and brigade commanders, forwarded herewith.

I write this report with a deep pain. I commanded brave, gallant, and willing troops, and should have succeeded in the capture of Helena, for though the difficulties were very great, they were not insurmountable, and the misfortune of a failure was in a very great measure consequent on the men not being well in hand after success. Most of my loss in prisoners resulted from not restraining the men after the capture of Graveyard Hill from advancing into the town, where they were taken mainly without resistance. If instead of this the regiments and brigades had been reformed instantly, the capture of Hindman Hill and consequently of the town would have been of easy occurrence.

I cannot close this report without expressing my obligations to His Excellency Harris Flanagin, Governor of Arkansas, who accompanied me and had my confidence during the whole campaign. I owe to his cool, discriminating judgment many valuable suggestions. His presence, confidence, and zeal had no little influence on the spirit and energy of the Arkansas troops. He and Col. Gordon N. Peay, adjutant-general of the State, acted as volunteer aides-de-camp on my staff during the battle.

As the expedition failed, which should have succeeded, I refrain from all expressions of commendation, believing that the brave officers and men who distinguished themselves will willingly forego the applause due to them in consideration that our beloved country reaped no benefit from their exploits.

Chief of Staff, Trans-Mississippi Dept., Shreveport, La.

<ar32_412>

I have had all the boats above and below sunk, as per your order. The boat at Jacksonport has not been sunk, although I had given the orders to sink it; but finding that the enemy had not advanced as I sup posed they would when I gave the order, therefore I countermanded it. <ar32_468>

The enemy was reported at Augusta, but I learn from my scouts that they are all gone back. My scouts learn that the citizens at Augusta brought in all the produce they possibly could and traded to the enemy, principally cotton. There is but a small force at Bloomfield, Mo. Colonel [S. G.] Kitchen's health is improving slowly.

P. S.--When the balance of the scout get to camp I will write all the particulars of the above-mentioned engagement, day and date.

???
Maj    Since writing the above I have been shown a letter from Fisher to the Genl who says I will supply him for what I want, I have not been informed by any of the comg below as yet what amount of stores are to be had ??? other ??? more acceptable to the troops than this and I presume it will be as convenient for them to draw out subsistence as at this place and will let Capt Fisher ship his stores to that place assuring sufficient quantity to supply the troops here for twenty days and salt for Kitchen and Reeves as I feel sure they may be subsisting with flour and beef where they are.

Marmadukes ???
Please inform me if the Genl desires me to take from Fisher more stores that I mention he will be the better judge whether they will be needed at this point

Col Kitchens our stock is barefooted and it is impossible for us to make time on this line  you have prest the shop that we was ordered to have our stock shod at  we have an express agent who pays for all charges against the express line  our regiment has nothing to do with keeping up the express line  all we want is to have express at the shop until we can have our horses shod  the express agent will pay for it  when you send extrys send orders with it or we wont know whether to double quick it or not  start your regulars at a regular hour every day by doing so you will oblige the curier curier at post no 9     J W Nelson

Special Orders
No. 182

I would particularly commend the conduct of the troops under my command during the action. The batteries were well handled, and their officers and men bore themselves with coolness and spirit.

I regret deeply to record the death of Lieutenant [W. D.] Biser, adjutant of my own regiment, who fell at the close of the action. He was an efficient and useful officer and a gallant gentleman.

My loss during the engagement was 7 killed and 21 wounded, for the particulars of which I refer you to the accompanying document.(*)

COLONEL: I have four scouts out looking for the enemy. Have not heard anything of importance since my last dispatch to General Mar-maduke. One of Monroe's men reports that there were 200 Federals on the Chainey road, 12 miles north of this place, yesterday evening. <ar33_1069> From the last information I have, the whole number of the enemy is 1,200. I can give you more correct information this evening, when my scouts return.

COLONEL: My scouts report the enemy in force 22 miles above here at 2 p.m. to-day, and advancing. They are on the Missouri Stock road, which is the main road from Caddo Gap to Washington.

GENERAL: In conformity to orders from the War Department, bearing date August 20, 1862, I have the honor to report my acts in recruiting for the Provisional Army of the Confederate States in Missouri. I reached Dunklin County, Missouri, in the early part of September, 1862, and commenced recruiting. The men of the State turned out cheerfully, so much so that during said month I was enabled to surprise the enemy, 600 strong, stationed at Bloomfield, Mo., killing 15, wounding and capturing many others, and also two pieces of fine artillery, eight hundred stand of small-arms, a quantity of ammunition, holsters, clothing, medicines, blankets, and other military stores, and this was accomplished with a loss of 1 man killed and 2 wounded. With the articles captured I equipped a regiment, and by the 26th of October I had recruited and had in camp twenty-one organized companies, beside many others partly formed, when the enemy came suddenly upon my encampment at Clarkton, Dunklin County, Missouri, capturing myself and 23 men, together with all my rolls, books, papers, and many other articles. I was taken to Alton, Ill., and, together with the men, exchanged on the 6th of December at Vicksburg, Miss., and sent from there to Jackson, where I remained in charge of exchanged soldiers until the latter part of December, 1862, when I was permitted to return to Missouri to get up my command, which place I reached on the 23d of January, 1863. On my arrival I found that fourteen companies were in the Confederate States Army, under Colonels Jeffers, Greene, Burbridge, and White. I proceeded at once to collect the men of the remaining companies, who were greatly scattered, and, by reason of the overflow and the enemy, I was unable to see them all or notify them to come to camp.

McNeil, of Missouri Federal notoriety, with a force of from 1,500 to 6,000 men, taking possession of the country, prevented me, situated as I was, without sufficient arms, ammunition, or means of any kind, from progressing as rapidly as I otherwise might have done. On the 9th of April I had collected eight companies, and feeling the necessity of some organization by which things might be properly directed, I proceeded to organize the battalion, which resulted in the choice of S. G. Kitchen for <ar33_1080> lieutenant-colonel and J. A. Dooley for major, and in the mean time I was successful upon several occasions in capturing many necessary articles, such as guns, ammunition, blankets, clothing, &c., and, on the 21st of April, in capturing a company of McNeil's command that executed the orders to shoot the Confederate States prisoners at Palmyra, Mo. I also captured from his command arms, ammunition, horses, blankets, and transportation sufficient for a regiment; and on the 9th of July I proceeded to hold an election for field officers of the regiment, the previous one having been decided null and void by the general, and this election resulted in the choice of S. G. Kitchen for colonel, Jesse Ellison for lieutenant-colonel, and J. A. Walker for major. I also, on the 6th of June, organized a company of artillery, the muster-rolls of which, together with two other companies, now under command of Col. William G. Pheelan, I here present, having ordered the scattering recruits to report to the said Col. William G. Pheelan.

Having now discharged the duties enjoined upon me, I respectfully submit the accompanying report, and await further orders.

Lt. Col. Belton  A.A.Genl. Dist of Arkansas                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               I am respectfully..

Special Orders
NO. 206

                                     Major L. A.Campbell White's Missouri Cavalry
                                     1st Lt.H.E.Camngton Co. A., 4th Missouri Cavalry
                                     3rd Lt T.Ballance Co. E., Kitchen's Missouri Cavalry
                                     2nd Lt. S.M. Jester Co. C., Wood's Battalion
                                     3rd Lt W.I.[W.J.?]Ferguson Co. L. Monroe's Arkansas
                                     2nd Lt. I.C.[J.C.] White Co. L. Monroe’s Arlkansas

For several days prior to September 10, this brigade was engaged in picketing the different roads leading to the fortifications at Little Rock. At sunrise on the morning of the 10th, the brigade, with the exception of Colonel [S. G.] Kitchen's regiment, which was directed to remain on the north side of the Arkansas River, was ordered to leave the forks of the Brownsville and Shallow Ford roads (at which point we had <ar32_534> bivouacked the night previous), cross at the lower pontoon, and move down the river at a double-quick to meet the enemy, who had early in the morning effected a crossing at Terry's Ferry. Arriving at Bayou Fourche (4 miles south of Little Rock), the enemy were discovered drawn up in battle line, their right resting on the river, and their left extending parallel to our front. According to orders, I dismounted the men, and made the following disposition of the forces under my command: Colonel [Colton] Greene's regiment, commanded by Major [L. A.] Campbell, on the right; my regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel [S. J.] Ward, and Lieutenant Colonel [W. J.] Preston, commanding Colonel [J. Q.] Burbridge's regiment,, in the center, and Lieutenant-Colonel [M. L.] Young's battalion on the left. Two companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Ward's regiment were deployed as skirmishers. After some slight skirmishing, the enemy, with a body of cavalry and a section of howitzers, attempted to flank us on the left from the river bank. Here a severe engagement took place, which lasted nearly half an hour, and we succeeded in driving the enemy from his position, completely routing him, and forcing him to leave his artillery (two 12-pounder mountain howitzers), which we captured, on the field. I was then ordered to withdraw the brigade (leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Ward with his regiment, supported by General Marmaduke's escort, to cover our retreat), and form about one half mile from the bayou, in an open field, as the enemy was making a flank movement on our right. Lieutenant-Colonel Ward remained in position about two hours, skirmishing heavily with the enemy, when, finding that there was imminent danger of being surrounded on both flanks, he was compelled to withdraw from the bayou, and retreat to the main body. As the enemy, with vastly superior force, attempted to flank us on the right, and kept up an incessant and harassing fire from their batteries planted on the river bank, I, according to orders, fell back slowly, in line of battle, to Little Rock, skirmishing all the while.(*) Here Colonel Kitchen, who had been ordered to burn the pontoon bridges and protect the removal of the public stores from the fort, joined the brigade, and I was ordered to march 10 miles on the Benton road, where I bivouacked for the night.

On the morning of the 11th, I was ordered to continue the march, Major Campbell's regiment acting as rear guard. At 10 a.m. the enemy drove in his vedettes. Retiring slowly by company, making successive formations, Major Campbell fought the enemy for 7 miles, drew them into an ambuscade, and completely checked them for the time. At noon the brigade halted, fed, and [Major] Colonel Campbell was relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, who skirmished with the enemy until late in the evening, when they ceased their pursuit.

I encamped that night 6 miles west of the Saline. Left camp at 12 m. the next day, traveled 7 miles, and encamped for the night.

At 8 o'clock the following morning moved forward, and reached Rockport on the evening of the same day.

During the engagement at Bayou Fourche and the subsequent skirmishes the officers and soldiers of this brigade all fought with the coolness and intrepidity of veterans, and did their duty nobly. Lieutenant [T. J.] Williams, commanding the prairie gun battery, did special execution on the retreat, and deserves honorable mention.

MAJR: I am now 10 miles on my way to Camden. The heavy rains trouble me very much, threatening the intended movements of my troops. Send an order to Colonel Kitchen to-night to march his brigade and the artillery to the Davis Settlement to-morrow, and repair the <ar33_1112> road without delay leading from there direct to Camden, which, I think, crosses the Little Missouri at its mouth, near Tate's Bluff. The Missouri will, I fear, be too high to ford; if so, I learn there are two ferryboats at Tate's Bluff. Both must be put in crossing condition. The horses can swim, the men and trains ferry.

I will reach Camden early to-morrow afternoon and will most probably send Colonel Kitchen orders to march for Camden immediately, so that he can get into his permanent camp before the roads become impassable..My headquarters will join Colonel K. to-morrow night, if practicable. When your men keep up the courier line to Washington, this line had better be withdrawn and paid off immediately. The route from Kitchen's proposed camp (Davis Settlement), via Tate's Bluff, is the most direct, not more than 25 miles to Camden.

Perhaps you had better send this letter to Colonel Kitchen, and it will explain to him fully my views.

MAJOR: The whole programme is again changed. I take my Missouri troops (Shelby's and Marmaduke's brigades)to operate on the Mississippi and Arkansas Rivers this winter; will encamp for the present on the west side of the Saline, near Warren or Mount Elba. The Texas troops, under Parsons, also go with me. I desire Marmaduke's brigade, if possible, to cross the Washita above the mouth of the Little Missouri and encamp on the east side of the Washita, in a country where the men can be fed and the horses foraged. I learn there is plenty of forage near the mouth of Little Missouri, on the east bank of Washita. This brigade must occupy a position where I can readily move it to Warren. If it cannot cross the Washita near its present position, I desire it to march immediately to this place, where there is a pontoon bridge over the Washita; but to come by Camden to get to Warren would carry the brigade some 20 miles out of the way, and make it cross the Little Missouri and Washita both. After crossing the Washita, the brigade will remain on the east side some four to six days, awaiting the arrival of Shelby's brigade, ordered to this place. Colonel Kitchen will judge whether it be best to come by Camden or not. In case Colonel Kitchen crosses above the mouth of the Little Missouri, I desire him to report by courier to this place the exact locality of his camp and the resources of the country. The camp may be 1 mile or 10 miles in the direction of Warren from the Washita, my object being to hold that brigade in a position for marching by or before Shelby' arrives. Order Hughey's battery to report to General Cabell; the rest of the artillery to march with Colonel Kitchen. Cabell and Brooks will be taken from my command, I suppose. Shelby's brigade will not be here under five days; till they arrive I will most probably remain here. I desire my headquarters to come immediately to this place. We will camp near the town, as no quarters can be had. Say to Major [C. C.] Rainwater that I have had stopped all his ammunition wagons, &c., till he arrives. He must make some disposition of his ammunition and gun shop at Washington; to do as he thinks best with them. Shelby will come through Washington; [William M.] Dunn must provide for them en route. They can draw the flour there. The beef-cattle for them had better be put in charge of Major King, a special detail, and kept, to be turned over to them when they join Marmaduke's brigade. Tell Dunn to continue getting in beef from Texas. <ar33_1114>

When Colonel Greene and Captain Brown arrive, I desire Greene's regiment reorganized.

I wish Colonel Kitchen, Majors Dunn, Rainwater, and [G. D.] Page to read this letter in order that they may fully understand my movements and plans, and determine what is best in their several departments, and act accordingly.

I have ordered Shelby to march via Washington to this place; that at Washington, Dunn will have arrangements to get his breadstuffs to this place.

All my courier lines should be withdrawn. Warren is about 52 miles from here, nearly east, in a rich country, and 3 miles from the Saline River.

Very respectfully,